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Abstract 
 
The WIC-Appolonian war of 1761-1764: An inquiry about why the WIC failed. MA. Leiden 
University at Leiden, The Netherlands, August 2012.  
This thesis paper examines and looks at the events, which allowed an African trader to defeat 
a powerful Dutch trading company. The reason why this case is so historically relevant is 
because of the dire consequences it had on the WIC’s Gold Coast economic output. The time 
period studied predates the war upwards of three years, and post dates the resolution to end all 
conflicts in excess of nine years. I used two major research strategies: (1) a thorough analysis 
of the Dutch West India Companies archives from 1759-1773 and (2) a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of previously published data. Data has been collected from archives, 
published first hand accounts written by company officials and journeymen, and keyword 
searches on the Internet. This dissertation augments and reanalysis information provided by 
the field pacesetter’s professor P. Valsecchi and the late R. Baesjou. The focus is largely on 
uncovering the factors behind a failed WIC invasion, while keeping the actual historically 
relevant story intact. By doing the historical qualitative analysis in this manor it not only 
provides the reader with a better overall experience, but also aids further understanding in 
African warfare procedures. The reason why this is of such importance is because the WIC-
Appolonian war of 1761-1764, had an ever-lasting impact on not only Dutch and British 
coastal procedure from henceforth but also on the very foundation of the modern day Nzema 
state.   
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Introduction 
 
VII. Whereas differences have arisen between the English African Company and the Dutch West-India 
Company, relative to the navigation on the coasts of Africa, as also on the subject of Cape Apollonia; for 
preventing all cause of complaint between the subjects of the two nations on those coasts, it is agreed, 
that Commissaries shall be named, on each side, to make suitable arrangements on these points.  
Peace of Paris: September 3rd draft, 1783 
 
Political complications in Africa affected trade… further difficulties on a part of the Gold Coast from the 
merchant prince, Amnichia, of Cape Appolonia. Controlling an extensive slave-trading area, for a 
number of years he maintained an independent course, impervious to Dutch blandishments, preventing 
their trade.1  
The Transatlantic slave trade: a history Rawley, Behrendt 2005 
 
Cape Appolonia, dubbed so by the first Portuguese explorers of the Gold Coast due their arrival on the day of 
Saint Appolonia, has been a place of peculiar interest over the course of time.2 This stretch of land is situated at 5° 00' 
latitude north and 2° 40' longitude west, is quite commonly referenced to as Amanahea, the Kingdom of Appolonia, and 
the Eastern Nzema region. This was the first region of the Gold Coast that sailor’s would meet while traversing towards 
Elmina.3 The region spans from just West of Axim, starting at the West bank of the Ankobra River and ending just shy 
of the town Assinée in a region known as Tanog.4 Commonly Appolonia is spelled with two P’s and one L, however, it 
is also frequently referred to by the Dutch with one P and two L’s, or even the occasional double letters. At present 
Cape Appolonia, which formerly was the center for the ‘Kingdom of Appolonia’, is found in the Nzema state. The 
Appolonia region contains several small villages which include but are not limited to: Beyin, Abini, Cobre, and Beni.5 
Furthermore, historically Cape Appolonia was once part of several other governing powers, which include the rule of 
Greater Jumoree and the Kings of Denkira during the 17th and early 18th centuries.6  
The early geographical composition of Appolonia, like the rest of the Gold Coast, was constructed out of many 
first hand accounts from sailors, journey-men, and individuals working for the European companies. Henry Meredith a 
British fort commander during the early 19th century recalled that the coastline was flat and sandy with seas so violent 
that fishing was merely impossible.7 On the other hand Baesjou noted that ‘Appolonia Hummocks’, present name of the 
region in question, is a ridge of inland hills extending to the coast.8  Meredith further characteristics the coastline as: 
‘…abound with wood and water, but no considerable river runs through it.’9 Contrary to Meredith, Barbot described the 
                                                            
1 Rawley & Behrendt, Transatlantic slave trade: A History, 83-84. 
2  Baesjou, Old Maps and Charts of Africa, 65.  
3  Van Dantzig, The Ankobra Gold Interest, 176 
4  Valsecchi, The ‘True Nzema’: A Layered Identity, 394.  
5  Baesjou, Trade Conflicts in Eighteenth-Century Western Gold Coast, and the Formation of the Nzema State, 26. 
6  NL-HaNA,WIC, 1674-1791, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 116, June 14th 1766, Letter Elmina Council to English Governor Hippisley, Folio: 732F. 
7  Meredith, An Account of the Gold Coast of Africa, with a brief history of the African Company, 57-58. 
8  Baesjou, Old Maps and Charts of Africa, 65.   Also see: Burton, Wandering in West Africa, 51. 
9  Meredith, An Account of the Gold Coast of Africa, with a brief history of the African Company, 54.
 
 
Figure 2: Cap Appolonia. [s.n.], 1700. Bibliothèque nationale de France  (Detailed Map of the Cape Appolonia Geography as seen from 
the sea ) 
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river as ‘broad, long in length, and full of waterfalls and rocks, which make it none navigable’.10 It is quite possible the 
two men were describing different rivers, as there were plenty outlets into the sea along the Gold Coast. Most likely 
however, both men were discussing the same Axim boarder river named the Ankobra or Ancobre, which during the 
seventees became a substantial passageway. Albeit this renewed outlook on the quality of the river, it remains 
speculative that anything else other than canoes or small boats during those days entered the river.    
Strategically, violent seas and the lack of a natural harbor should have resulted in a lackluster trade region. To 
great frustrations of the Dutch, especially during the 18th century, quite the opposite occurred. As reported by Demarin, 
trade at that place allowed the sea captains to stock up on gold to procure their purchase at Annamaboe.11 The question 
than is how a region where there is no natural harbor can have a flourishing trade? Meredith explains that this was due 
to the determination of the few locals; ‘who were acquainted with the art of paddling canoes, performing their office 
with much dexterity’.12 Where normally a ship would lay anchor at a natural or man made harbor, the Appolonians ‘set 
out to sea, taking merchandise to and from the shore safely’.13 If we aid the Appolonians determination with that of the 
sea currents, which forced not only the ships originating from Europe but also those originating from Brazilian close to 
the sandy shore, the result quickly translates into a mutually beneficial trade region. Indeed, trade at Cape Appolonia 
was especially beneficial to the Portuguese. Along the sandy shores they were able to unload a proportion of their 
‘Bahia’ tobacco in exchange for slaves or gold, prior to paying the recognition tax over their cargo at Elmina. For the 
Appolonians it was equally beneficial, because they had no European middleman restricting their prices. Due to a lack 
of agency and material to govern the region, lorredraiers and the economic deprivation that the natives from this region 
forced upon the WIC, fermented Dutch frustrations with the region.14 One can often find in the Axim correspondence of 
the seventeenth and early eighteenth century that natives of Axim had tried to recross the Ankobra River back into 
Axim with European goods that had not been obtained legally. This detrimental trade situation became so prevalent that 
the frustrated Dutch, warned that anyone caught with illegal goods would be stripped of them and punished.15 In 
response to this activity, the WIC also managed a small outpost or tollhouse on the Ankobra River to watch over the 
boat traffic, albeit this post was only sporadically governed. The Lorredraiers on the sea, as well as the economic 
deprivation on land, continued well into the 18th century and are to be considered some of the primary reasons how the 
Appolonian landscape became so coveted by many of the European nations.  
While the aforementeiond unregulated trade played a vital role in making Appolonia famous, it was not the 
primary reason why the area became so coveted by the Europeans. Much sought after gold and to a certain extent the 
fine timbers became ever so prevalent in this regions historical construct.16 Gold as a resource had played an important 
role during the early explorations of Africa. The name ‘Gold Coast’ comes forth from the gold traded by the Portuguese 
on the coast during the decades of early European exploration.17 The Portuguese had vested themselves specifically in 
the Axim region to obtain the gold that was either shipped to the coast via the Ankobra River or brought via the trade 
routes of Ahanta. By failing to keep this information secret in the late 16th century, coincided with a general European 
appetite for expansion, subsequently lead to an active 17th century on the Gold Coast, which saw several European 
nations settle the Gold Coast.  
Actual knowledge of Appolonian gold and where to find it remained relatively unknown during that 
timeframe. This all drastically changed during the late 17th and early 18th century when several expeditions and travel 
accounts surveyed the area. Barbot reported of the region that it; ‘produced much gold, which the blacks fish for, diving 
under the rocks and into the waterfalls’.18 Many of these journeymen reported about the abundance of gold, yet by the 
mid 18th century questions had begun to arise in regard to the quality and actual quantity produced in the Appolonia 
region. Richard Brew, a former British fort commander and later privateer on the Gold Coast till 1776, sent gold back 
to Appolonia stating simply that the quality of the gold was inferior and worthless for trade purposes.19 Further inquiry 
of the regions gold capacity and capability was pursued by Van Dantzig, who was convinced that gold was substantial 
in the region, but that the Africans limited the trade of the resource.20 Regardless of the many unanswered questions 
about the quantity and quality of the Appolonian gold within the 17th & 18th centuries, it is obvious that gold played an 
important role in the regions trade history, as a slew of attempts by several European nations to settle the region West 
of the Ankobra river would justify that assesment. The Swedish, probably more so in response to the aforementioned 
construction of the tollhouse than of actual knowledge where the gold came from, were the first to fully establish 
                                                            
10 Barbot, Barbot on Guinea, 338. 
11 Demarin, A treatise upon the trade from Great-Britain to Africa: humbly recommended, 71. 
12 Meredith, An Account of the Gold Coast of Africa, with a brief history of the African Company, 57-58. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Den Heijer, Goud, Ivoor en Slaven, 263-295. 
15 Bosman, A new and Accurate Description of The coast of Guinea, Letter I.  
16 Ibid.   
17 Van Dantzig, The Ankobra Gold Interest, 170. 
18 Barbot, Barbot on Guinea, 338. 
19 Priestley, West African Trade and coast Society: An Family study, 79. 
20 Van Dantzig, The Ankobra Gold Interest, 176-181. 
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themselves on the Western embankment of the Ankobra River.21 This episode was followed by a short spell of the 
Dutch in the former Swedish lodge at Jumoree when the later had been ousted, however, this did not end well for the 
Dutch as the natives not soon after the Dutch takeover revolted against and ousted them.22 The French equally made 
several attempts in the region throughout the 17th and early 18th centuries, eventually resulting in a wooden fort at 
Assinée that they were forced to abandon not long after its construction due to irreconcilable differences with the local 
Africans.23 Interest in the region declined sharply, due to two problems. The first was the difficulty that the Europeans 
had at governing such a vast area without a permanent foothold.24 Secondly, the ensuing political turmoil with the 
Asante in the early eighteenth century had a detrimental impact on the gold supply of the region, which in turn resulted 
in the declining interest of the Europeans.25  remained high in the early eighteenth century, it was not until the exodus 
of Mr. Stockwell in 1752 that the region again received vast attention.26  
Albeit the Europeans were unable to gain a permanent foothold on Cape Appolonia, until the English actually 
constructed Fort Appolonia in the late 1760’s, this optimum trade environment slowly began to flourish again after the 
Asante left, harboring several famous powerful African traders (caboceers) over the course of time. Jan Conny, the 
once mighty caboceer of the Fort Gross Freidrichsburg in the Ahanta region, settled there briefly once the WIC and the 
RAC had choosen to banish him from Ahanta.27 The next powerful caboceer to irritate the WIC was Amnichia of 
Appolonia. Coinciding with this man’s ascension is the unification and formation of the Kingdom of Appolonia, which 
is latter also referred to as Amanahea in his honor. Amnichia, who could be viewed as the first king, essentially was the 
individual who unified the regions east of the Tano River and West of the Ankobra River. It is quite remarkable that so 
little information is known about this man, and the war he was involved in from 1761 through 1764. This war unified 
Appolonia and the result of the war clearly exemplifies the drastic change in the European pecking order during the 18th 
century. This later bit is evidentiary in the British ability to build Fort Appolonia during the late 1760’s and early 
1770’s.28 The proceeding land claim arguments between the Dutch and English lingered into the Fourth-Anglo Dutch 
war of 1780, and were yet to be resolved by the time the Peace of Paris was concluded. What result came from this 
commission remains unknown, but the lingering reality was that WIC-Appolonia war was an overall embarrassment for 
the Dutch.  
 
Purpose	  Statement:	  	  
  
Due to a lack of information and the severity of the consequences, this study intends to investigate the 1761-
1764 WIC-Appolonia war. This specific topic was chosen because of its close association with the peril beginnings of 
the ‘Kingdom of Appolonia’ and because of the extensive problems it presented to the Dutch West India Company. 
While various authors have plied themselves over the topic in various contexts, only Rene Baesjou and Pierliugi 
Valsecchi have paid any particular attention to the war in question. Valsecchi described the war as a ‘complex assault 
with artillery backup’ and that ‘…the military campaign lacked the target for driving Amihyia and his followers out of 
Appolonia’29 Baesjou fails to expand on this, which raises the question what actually happened during this war. This 
research paper specifically serves to resolve that question as well as: why did the WIC go to war against Amnichia, 
what influence if any did the specific factors have on the war, was the declaration of war justifiable, what actually 
happened, versus what other authors have mentioned, why did the war fail, who was to blame, what was the lasting 
memory of the failed war, and what convictions about the war do the other authors have? The aim quite simply is to 
take a look at the ‘individual’ roles, relationships, and their background causality, in order to provide a historically 
accurate history of ‘actual’ proceedings on the Gold Coast.  
 
Methodology	  &	  Approach:	  
 
The approach to this study was quite simple, essentially doing what every good historian should by going to 
the archives and gathering as much available information as readily obtainable. Given the multitude of pages analyzed 
                                                            
21 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1674-1791, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 116, July 17th 1654, Letter from Adriaan Hogenhouck regarding request made by the Swedish 
director Isaak Ngulla about creating a lodge at Júmoree, Folio: 836F. Also see: Van Dantzig, 175. & G. Nováky, Small Comapy Trade and the 
Gold Coast: The Swedish Africa Company 1650-1663, 60.   
22 Van Dantzig, The Ankobra Gold Interest, 176.  Decorse, The Danes on the Gold Coast: Culture Change and the European Presence, 155.  
Nováky, Small Comapy Trade and the Gold Coast: The Swedish Africa Company 1650-1663, 63 & 67. 
23 Den Heijer, Goud, Ivoor en Slaven, 215. Also see:  Lawrence, Trade Castles and Forts of West Africa, 41. 
24 Baesjou, The Historical Evidence in Old Maps of Africa, with Special Reference to West Africa, 23. 
25 Ibid, 27-28. 
26 Hippisley, Essays, 42. 
27 Den Heijer, Goud, Ivoor en Slaven, 255-259.  
28 Lawrence, Trade Castles and Forts of West Africa,  356-358. 
29 Valsecchi, Power and State Formation in West Africa, 187.  
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in the National Archives in The Hague, which has culminated in nearly sixteen gigabyte of photographic data, it was 
necessary to severely narrow the initial research topic. The result of this narrowing is that chapter two of my initial 
research question, has now become the entire master thesis. Narrowing the thesis this extensively, meant that secondary 
information would also be severely constrained. While I am quite aware of the academic requirements of using 
secondary sources, the general aim of this paper is to enlighten rather than to justify or reinvent a history, which is 
already known. This paper is subdivided into three chapters, the first chapter introduces the problem and characters as 
well as looking at accounts made by Baesjou and Valsecchi, while building laying the foundation upon which the war is 
based. Chapter two looks at the WIC actions and the build-up of the war, and the failures associated with that process. 
Chapter three aims to explain the invasion explicitly with a timeline construct. The last chapter aims to look at how and 
why the WIC war failed, and the subsequent consequences that arose afterwards.   
 
Historiography:	  What	  has	  been	  done?	  	  
 
The general information provided by the large majority of the books about Appolonia is predominantly 
repetitive, at times harshly inaccurate, and ninety nine percent is absolutely irrelevant in regard to the prospectus 
questions. Only two particular authors have excelled in constructing a historical past for the Cape Appolonia region. 
Rene Baesjou, a former professor at Leiden University, is the foremost authority on the topic, having first covered some 
of the issues during the mid to late nineteen-eighties. The second author, Pierluigi Valsecchi a professor at Università di 
Pavia, has several articles related to Cape Appolonia, including a book that has only recently been translated for the 
Anglo-Saxon world. Valsecchi’s aim throughout his book and articles is more so political and formational, oriented 
mainly on the African side of things. Aside from these two authors, only a select few actual historians such as Claridge, 
Cruickshank, Den Heijer, Priestley, and Van Dantzig have managed to find their way into this research. Equally 
important are the first hand accounts of Bosman, Barbot, de Marreé, Meredith, as well as a few others, upon which this 
thesis relies. The limited secondary sources does present a problem, in the sense that modern historical practice has 
started to overvalue the art of secondary source citation and undervaluing the actual primary source research. I hope 
that the reader understands that avoiding this entanglement was simply impossible, largely due to the narrow research 
topic, and instead appreciates the heavy reliance on the primary source material.     
  6 
Chapter I: The origin of the War 
 
 
Displeasure and what can be determined as a rollercoaster relationship between the Cape Appolonia region 
and the WIC had persisted throughout the duration of the Dutch settlement on the Gold Coast. The problems started 
almost immediately after the Dutch conquered Axim from the Portuguese. This was in large part due to the early fort 
commander’s determination to levy taxes on the peoples across the Ankobra River. In order to bring their trade to Fort 
Saint Anthony in Axim, these natives had to pay toll at the hastily constructed tollhouse on the Axim side of the 
Ankobra River. This levied toll made profit for the natives on the other side of the Ankobra harder, and subsequently 
gave the Swedish an opportunity to establish a settlement there on the notion of profitable trade for the natives.30 This 
episode was followed by a short spell of the Dutch in the former Swedish lodge when the later had been ousted. This 
did not end well, as the natives revolted and ousted the Dutch after only a few years.31 Many years would pass before 
the Dutch were able to successfully reaffirm the regions of Appolonia into their favor. The efforts by Director General 
Joan van SevenHuyzen in 1697 brought many of the regions West of the Ankobra River into alignment with the WIC 
through acts of vassalage. The French in Assinée suffered a similar fate as the Dutch had at Jumoree.32 Not soon after 
the accords and the ousting of the French, the mention of Appolonia again grew obscure until the exodus of Jan Conny 
from Ahanta. The regions West of the Ankobra River yet again garnered much attention by allowing Jan Conny, the 
enemy of both the Dutch and the British, settlement within their domain. His short stay in the region was in large part 
due to the Dutch backed expeditions lead by Mea Tekye, the caboceer of the state of Edwira (Egila), which was located 
North-East of Cape Appolonia.33 Around the time that all this took place, it was quite possible that Annor Blay (Ano 
Bile), Amnichia’s father, was located already in Cape Appolonia. What impact the invasion by Mea Tekye had on the 
Appolonian landscape at that time, and or if he offended Amnichia’s father, is far beyond the limits of this research. 
This should be pursued in the future, as it could provide a further understanding of Amnichia’s loathing of Mea Tekye. 
After the defeat of Jan Conny and his removal from the region, mention of Appolonia grew less and less till Mr. 
Stockwell’s the former English chief of Cape Coast settlement there infuriating the Dutch in 1752.34 From that instance 
forth Cape Appolonia remained a popular topic among the Dutch. 
The direct origins of the war, limited to a ten year time constraint, reveals a multitude of factors, including 
several minor independent disputes, which were all beneficiary to the war development. Peculiarly interesting are the 
two independent disputes, which resulted in a triangular relationship of feuding men. The first man is the previously 
mentioned caboceer by name Amnichia. His role should be characterized as the responding escalator, essentially the 
troublemaker whose aim it was to seek justice by means of the sword. The second individual in the triangular 
relationship is Axim fort commander Huydecoper. He should be viewed in the great picture as the conspicuous 
retaliator. Last in the triangle was Mea Tekye, the principal agent (caboceer) of the region of Edwira. The few authors 
who have written about this war have largely negated Mea’s role. History should cast Mea with several roles, which 
include but are not limited to: responder, instigator, sitting duck, and later warmonger. Each of these three men was 
needed at this specific historical intersection, as their actions and personalities clashes created the perfect storm that 
became the WIC-Appolonia war. With this in mind that each of the characters was needed, it is best to have a closer 
look at the background of each characters and their corresponding disputes with one another.  
 
 
1.1	  Amnichia	  
 
Amnichia the character remains a mystery, as little information is recoverable about this character aside from 
repetitious snippets, and the information provided by both Baesjou and Valsecchi. Limited information is only half of 
the problem, as historians failed to cast this historical figure with the same name. The WIC archives refer to him mainly 
as  ‘Amenichia’ and ‘Amnichia’, Hippisley cited him as Amoniah, Meredith as Amonihier, Fynn as Ammoniah, 
Mariano Pavanello as Amihyia, Valsecchi as Ammenighia and other variants, Baesjou casts him not only as 
Amanahyia, but also as Amihere Kpanyili and Ammoniah.  The discrepancy does not yield there as other authors see fit 
to change his name further. Presently he is commonly referred to as ' Nana Amihyia Kpanyinli'. Even though the 
character has been portrayed with many different spellings of his name, the authors who have attributed to this 
                                                            
30 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1674-1791, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 116, July 17th 1654, Letter from Adriaan Hogenhouck regarding request made by the Swedish 
director Isaak Ngulla about creating a lodge at Júmoree, Folio: 836F. Also see: Van Dantzig, 175. & G. Nováky, Small Comapy Trade and the 
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31 Van Dantzig, The Ankobra Gold Interest, 176.  Decorse, The Danes on the Gold Coast: Culture Change and the European Presence, 155.  
Nováky, Small Comapy Trade and the Gold Coast: The Swedish Africa Company 1650-1663, 63 & 67. 
32 Lawrence, Trade Castles and Forts of West Africa, 41. 
33 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1600-1815, 207. 
34 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 116, June 1st 1752, Letter English Governor Bacot to Director General Jan van Voorst, Folio: 837F.
  
  7 
confusion generally all failed to deliver insight about who Amnichia actually was. This bares the question than who is 
this Amnichia, where did he come from, how did he rise to power, and why is he such a problem for the WIC? 
During the 1720’s Annor Blay an intellectual trader most likely from Edwira, settled in the Cape Appolonia 
region. He fathered Aka, Boa, and Amnichia, who would eventually succeed him as the rulers of Appolonia.35 It bears 
repeating that Valsecchi also recorded a similar instance but noted his name as Ano Bile.36 The name of the mother 
remains unknown till this date, but Valsecchi is convinced that she must have originated from Kema Kpanyinli, the 
leader of Ahumazo.37 This seems quite logical as Amnichia did bear that name. While to a certain degree this does 
refute Amnichia's own admission that he was born a Dutch subject, most likely in Edwira, it must be understood that 
the place of origin is of little importance. Furthermore due to a lack of delineation from a royal bloodline, which is 
passed by the mother, it is hard to understand why Hippisley proclaims him to be a king.38 While the majority of the 
other authors do not share Hippisley's message, some truth can be interjected from this text. Baesjou noted that the 
unification of the lands that construed the Kingdom of Appolonia happened when Amnichia was ruler.39 More so, the 
fact that Quassi, Amnichia’s appointed heir, was titled as king gives all the more reason to believe that the people of 
Appolonia did consider Amnichia as their king. Baring further inquiry, which Valsecchi might well be pursuing, it 
would be more fruitful to focus on the sequence of his ascension to prominence, rather than attempting to procure a title 
or place of origin.  
After the death of Annor Blay, Aka the eldest of the three brothers took over his reign. According to 
Huydecoper this man was pleasant to deal with, and he and Boa Penin were subservient to the WIC. Little was spoken 
of Amnichia during the early days of Aka’s reign, aside of his eagerness rob his neighbors.40 J.A. de Marrée highlighted 
these actions, as he determined that Amnichia was able to secure his initial wealth through robbing his fellow Africans, 
who traversed the trade routes near him. Amnichia did this in a sneaky manor, waiting patently and out of sight in dense 
bushes along the trade routes. When the traders came along the route he would fire his weapons blindly at them, and 
subsequently was able to collect the goods that the traders left behind in their hurried retreat.41 More than likely these 
are the actual proceedings, the beginnings so to say of how Amnichia furnished the warehouses needed in order to 
expand his trade and power. Tactically this early ploy at obtaining goods eventually gave way to proper trade, which in 
turn must have given way to his dabbling with the European sailors, which is mentioned by many authors. He was able 
to lure the European traders to shore by flying representational flags of the ships that passed Cape Appolonia.42 While 
Amnichia gained a formidable wealth by doing this throughout the 1740’s and 1750’s, he was still far removed from 
becoming the influential pest that Huydecoper so despised.   
Unyielding motivation and a thirst for more power essentially became the backbone of Amnichia’s operation. 
Cunningly Amnichia redistributed all the profits much he made into the surrounding societies, essentially buying 
allegiance through trade. It must be mentioned that Amnichia, ever so tyrannous, instructed his close followers to kill 
all those who opposed his trade empire expansion. This certainly mimicks Thornton’s assessment of how the King of 
Dahomey was able to maintain control.43 Amnichia was so successful in drawing trade toward him and buying the 
allegiance of individuals that by the time that some of the more powerful leaders of the surrounding regions realized his 
ultimate goal, it was to late for them to act.44 When Amnichia finally had control over his African brethren, he ruled 
through fear tactics. A great example of how Amnichia was able to rule his subjects is explained by J.A. de Marrée, he 
details a bloody game in which Amnichia throws a knife at a collection of his followers and subsequently decapitates 
the individual whom the knife struck.45 Meredith during the early 19th century recalls a similar story of Amnichia’s iron 
fist rule:      
 
“A leopard had committed many depredations in the neighborhood of the king's residence and although every 
vigilance was practiced, and many methods employed to destroy him, yet by his extraordinary sagacity he 
eluded them all. At length the king, wearied with the caution of the animal and enraged at the ravages he 
committed, summoned the principal men before him, and told them that he had come to the resolution of 
securing the animal, even at the risk of half of his subjects; and gave orders, that the thicket where the animal 
kept concealed should be surrounded, and that he should be brought to him alive! This extraordinary order 
was obeyed, and the animal secured, but not without the loss of life to some, and mortal wounds and severe 
laceration being inflicted upon others. The king, not withstanding, was highly pleased in seeing the animal in 
his possession, and caused a post to be driven in a yard, to which the beast was secured. On particular days, 
                                                            
35 Baesjou, Trade Conflicts in Eighteenth-Century Western Gold Coast, and the Formation of the Nzema State, 30. 
36 Valsecchi, Power and State Formation in West Africa, 168. 
37 Ibid, 172.   
38  Hippisley, Essays, 41. 
39 Baesjou, Old Maps and Charts of Africa, 72.  
40 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr.  929, September 14th 1763, Letter Cmd. Huydecoper to Lord X, Folio: 133F. 
41 J. A. de Marrée, Reizen op en beschrijving van de goudkust van Guinea: voorzien met de noodige ophelderingen, journalen, kaart, platen en 
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42 Baesjou, Trade Conflicts in Eighteenth-Century Western Gold Coast, and the Formation of the Nzema State, 30.    
43 Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa 1500-1800, 89 & 93. 
44 de Marrée, Reizen op en beschrijving…, 78. 
45 Ibid, 79. 
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and when surrounded by his chief subjects, he failed not to address the animal, in (such) a manner 
demonstrative of his power and authority, and to extol his supremacy over every thing…”46  
 
His fellow African in subservitude, Amnichia turned his attention on limiting the European competition for his 
trade. The earliest linkable account of Amnichia undermining European authority is when he played host to Mr. 
Stockwell in 1752. Relatively little is known about Amnichia and Aka’s reasoning to host Mr. Stockwell. Hippisley 
was convinced that they wanted Mr. Stockwell to build a trading fortress in Appolonia, but this seems quite unlikely, as 
both Amnichia and Aka were not willing to subject themselves to overrule in their own territory. It is quite possible that 
it was the brother’s intent to extort recognition money out of the Dutch by using the English as their bargaining chip. 
Hippisley is quite adamant that Amnichia gained a fair amount of wealth by swearing an allegiance with the Dutch on 
the February 13th 1753.47  The deal accorded by Director General van Voorst’s is devoid of any financial retribution and 
reflects only the signatures of Amnichia’s son named Brier (Bile) and his cousin named Minjan (Menla).48 There is in 
fact no indication that Amnichia ever signed the 1753 act of vassalage himself.  Nonetheless, by terms of the agreement 
Amnichia had agreed to: ‘be subservient and obedient to the WIC’, and that ‘no one, including him and his followers, 
are to allow any other nation, including Dutch traders not belonging to the WIC, to reside or to do business on the 
shores of Cape Appolonia.49 Regardless of the wealth he and his brothers gained from this transaction, Amnichia was at 
the time of signing still far removed from being the main leader of Cape Appolonia.  
Amnichia’s rise to prominence outside of the confines of Cape Appolonia began in the mid to late 1750’s. This 
rise was paired with the decline of trade at Fort St. Anthony in Axim. The declining trade was largely due to a series of 
lame duck commanders, who sought only to promote themselves and subsequently were unyielding to the African 
traders needs. This forced the traders who had habitually come to Axim, to seek trade elsewhere.50 It is at this specific 
moment that Amnichia arose, providing an outlet to the surplus goods that were no longer welcomed in Axim. Slowly 
but surely he was able to steal more and more trade away from Axim, profiting handsomely in Axim’s wake. Cunningly 
Amnichia understood that if he was to obtain all the trade of the surrounding areas without the associated problems of 
dominating trade that he had to build relations slowly in order to gain his neighbors trust. He was so successful that 
within in a mum of time he had a hand in all trade on the upper coast and had obtained the loyalty of every village 
along the beach, extending as far as those situated on the Ankobra riverbank.51  
The death of Aka in 1758 should have pushed Boa into the spotlight, but his passive gestures and his 
willingness to be subservient instead thwarted Amnichia to reign over Cape Appolonia. Amnichia had taken over Aka’s 
reign with humility and pride. He quickly became an unstoppable force, swiftly gaining the upper hand in all matters on 
the uppper coast. In the meantime his village, according to Dutch sources, had become a hideout for all those who had 
committed crimes or had outstanding debts.52 With his gold he catered to those who were forced to seek trade elsewhere 
due to the filled warehouse of the forts on the upper coast. Amnichia went to great expense to gain this trade position, 
but was able to furnish it all by an ever expanding trade emporium on the coast. Once he had gained enough notoriety 
and followers, he started to occupy the trade roads to Fort Axim, siphoning into what little trade still made its way to 
Axim. This resulted in a total collapse of trade at Fort Saint Anthony. Indeed, the Aowin, Ashanti, Wassa, and the 
better part of the Edwirians, had begun to by pass Axim. On top of all this, Amnichia’s cunningness allowed him to get 
the upper hand in the Portuguese trade, stopping all ships that sailed past his village. Huydecoper is convinced that he 
generally purchased upwards of two to three hundred rolls of tobacco annually from these ships. With this tobacco he 
continued to build his trade empire by sending this to the markets on the coast, this came at grave expense of all the 
WIC commanders stationed on the upper coast. Around 1760 Amnichia controlled a great proportion of the trade in 
Ahanta, with his trade caravans supposedly reaching as far as the rivers near fort Saint Sebastian at Chama. Amnichia 
was able to extend his trade empire due to his reinvestment in the region and his ability to strategically place his 
supporters in the forts directly or the corresponding villages. Amnichia was also able to influence many Africans 
leaders with his rise to prominence, including those of Ahanta who had fully aligned themselves through a sworn oath. 
Much to Huydecoper’s frustration, even the peoples of Axim had largely begun to serve his interests in the months 
prior to the start of the war.53 Mea Tekye of Edwira was the sole individual so it would seem, who had remained loyal 
to the WIC.  
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1.2	  Huydecoper’s	  Quarrel	  with	  Amnichia	  	  
 
At first glance, the first dispute was not unlike others on the Gold Coast, essentially a quarrel over an 
outstanding debt of tobacco and slaves. What is particularly conspicuous of this quarrel is that a WIC official incurred a 
debt at the expense of a native caboceer. Huydecoper the fort commander responsible for the trade dispute, had arrived 
on the coast in 1758 and after a failed presidency at Elmina, was displaced to Axim where he opted to take the task of 
improving trade upon himself. The Axim correspondence of December 26th 1760 clearly indicates that Huydecoper was 
faced with a monumental task, as trade in the region had come to a grinding halt.54 Failure to improve trade was genuine 
cause for concern, as the previous fort commander Walmbeek was displaced because of this reason. The lack of trade at 
the fort has been directly attributed to Amnichia’s power insurgence, which according to Valsecchi supposedly caused 
Huydecoper to dislike Amnichia from the get go.55  
Many question remain about Huydecoper’s choice for Fort Axim in 1760, when Director General Erasmi 
displaced him as president at Elmina. Certainly the argument that he choose this place due to its trade and or its ability 
to furnish his private trade oligopoly, seem unfounded due to the conditions of trade that subsisted at Axim. If indeed 
Huydecoper had opted to choose a fort for his private business, he would have been much better off at Accra or 
Cormantyn where trade had in recent times remained constant or flourished. More than likely Huydecoper choose the 
difficult task to restart trade at Axim to prove his worth to the company, as his presidency at Elmina in the years prior 
was not well received. This argumentation lends itself well to Huydecoper’s early actions at Axim. In a matter of 
months Huydecoper was able to reopen the trade routes, largely due to his negotiations with Amnichia, which included 
the mediation between Amnichia and Mea Tekye.56 Much to an historian’s dismay, Huydecoper opted to invite 
Amnichia to Axim in order to speak of the conditions face to face. This has left little evidence to determine what was 
discussed and what the specific results were. What little we do know of this is that Amnicha had stayed eight days, by 
which time he had: ‘worn out his welcome’.57 Latter fragments of information revealed that an agreement was struck to 
reopened the roads and allow free passage, in exchange for this Huydecoper had to pay Amnichia eight English 
(shillings) for each slave that he received. More so, from this occasion a renewed vassalage was accorded, and 
Amnichia left Huydecoper with the impression that he left as a happy man.58   
Reopened roads meant that trade was now able to reach fort St. Anthony for the first time in many years. 
Huydecoper’s subsequent ability to reach out to the peoples of Edwira and Wassa, by offering them favorable trade, 
meant that no one with goods to trade passed by the fort without first stopping there. From the get go Amnichia must 
have known that reopening the roads to Axim would have a detrimental impact on his own trade. Gradually trade ebbed 
away, largely due to Huydecoper’s initiatives and Mea's willingness to guide trade to Axim. This later fact, given that 
Amnichia and Mea had long standing problems, must have greatly frustrated Amnichia. Whether or not he felt betrayed 
by Huydecoper remains open for debate.59 In a later letter Huydecoper made it clearly obvious that his intentions were 
to limit Amnichia and to pry away his trade in similar fashion as Amnichia had done to the WIC in years prior.60  
Over optimism about trade at Axim and a subsequent unfulfilled slave consignment, eventually forced 
Huydecoper to turn to Amnichia for slaves. What little we know of this interaction stems from Huydecoper’s own 
admittance, an English correspondence between Cape Coast and Elmina in 1763, and from the peace term repayment 
that the WIC concluded with Amnichia in 1767.61 What is certain is that this slave trade transaction must have taken 
place between March 1st 1761 and October 23rd 1761 when Amnichia and Huydecoper were on good terms. These 
slaves bought on credit were presumable sold to Mr. Gaestwyk, with whom Huydecoper had previously accorded a 
contract. If indeed the slaves were for Mr. Gaestwyk, Captain Izaak de Clerk would be responsible for the shipping as 
he was in service of the latter man. While the record indicates that the later captain took on 60 slaves from Huydecoper, 
it is nearly inconceivable that Huydecoper had obtained 60 slaves from Amnichia.62  The WIC’s repayment of 13 rolls 
of tobacco to Amnichia in 1767 clearly indicates that a number between 3-8 slaves, depending on age and sex, is a more 
probable number.63  
Why Huydecoper did not repay Amnichia initially has remained an enduring question. Baesjou was convinced 
that he wanted to simply get ride of Amnichia, and for that reason Huydecoper simply declined to repay him.64 This 
conviction was based on the October 23rd 1761 entry in the Axim journal, an entry that due to unraveling circumstances 
had been tainted by controversy of that time. The reality of the matter goes much deeper than first thought. At the time 
                                                            
54 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 962. Axim Correspondence, December 26th 1760, Letter Cmd. Huydecoper to D.G. Erasmi, Folio: 1F-4R.  
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57 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 962, Axim Correspondence, March 4th 1761, Letter D.G. Erasmi to Cmd. Huydecoper, Folio: 16F-16R. 
58 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 929, September 14th 1763, Letter Cmd. Huydecoper to Lord X, Folio: 134R.  
59 Ibid, 135F. 
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63 Baesjou, Trade Conflicts in Eighteenth-Century Western Gold Coast, and the Formation of the Nzema State, 45. 
64 Ibid, 31. 
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of transaction, Amnichia was not repaid simply due to the lack of tobacco on the coast when the deal was struck. By the 
time tobacco had arrived at Axim, presumably early to late summer, deteriorated conditions at Axim between 
Huydecoper and Amenichia due to the latter’s engagement with Mea, prompted Amnichia to demanded repayment of 
the outstanding debt in guns and gunpowder instead of the agreed upon tobacco. While it is quite common to exchange 
slaves or tobacco for firearms, Huydecoper realized that dealing firearms to Amnichia at point in time could have 
further catalyzed the regional conflict. Huydecoper a well-educated man from a respected family could be characterized 
as: overly stubborn, set in his ways, and to the book.65 What is certain is that Huydecoper would not change agreements 
unless it was beneficial for his own interest. His unwillingness to budge to Amnichia demands, must have caused 
outrage and inevitably must have been one of the underlying reasons why the Amnichia opted to defy the fort 
commander by invading Axim in 1762. Whilst several further inquiries into the outstanding debt were made by the 
English acting on behalf of Amnichia, each letter was returned with an underlying tone of ‘none’ payment.66 This 
stance would not change till July 11th 1767, when the WIC settled the debt as part of their peace negotiations.67    
 
 
1.3	  Mea	  Tekye	  Problems	  with	  Amnichia	  	  
 
The parts of the first dispute actually originated out of a preceding dispute between Amnichia and Mea Tekye 
of Edwira. This kingdom situated in the interior reaches of the Gold Coast, along the banks of the Ankobra River, had 
an important role in the middle of the 18th century. The capital city Amakraso housed Mea Tekye, one of the leaders of 
this kingdom who held a broker (caboceer) position. Before proceeding further, for the sake of clarity and the 
inevitable impending research, it is best to notify that Mea’s name, similar to Amnichia’s, has had several different 
incarnations in the course of history. The man also referenced as the ‘captain’ of Edwira also goes by names: Mea 
Takyi, Mia Tekki, Mea Tekkie, and Emmia Tekyi. Notably he had been connected and intertwined with the WIC for a 
duration of several decades, predating the foremost principal of this allegiance, which was the act of vassalage accorded 
on the 22nd of August.68 Prior to his involvement in the Amnichia war, he was best remembered as one of the leaders 
whose actions helped ride Jan Conny from the political spectrum.69  
The conflict between Mea and Amnichia is of peculiar interest, because both men had destined from the same 
matrilineal lineage.70 The feud between both men, which probably predates the early 1750’s, can be directly attributed 
to the ascension of Amnichia. Indeed, Valsecchi’s report that both men were on the verge of war in 1752 is testament to 
the difficulties that reigned between both men.71 There is an argument to be made for the WIC’s actions to stand aloof 
during these initial arguments. Certainly preferring one side over the other would have endangered the WIC trading 
position, inevitably this would have lead to several repercussions in regard to trade and African relations. There has 
been a general understanding that meddling in disputes between two independent African cohorts was avoided if at all 
possible, however, both these men had accorded acts of vassalage with the WIC.72 General procedures in previous cases 
of a similar nature dictated that the WIC should have attempted to at least mediate, if not outright resolved the conflict. 
More than likely what occurred is that the foregone fort commanders chose not to dirty their hands on this conflict due 
to the potential volatility, opting instead to serve out their time peacefully and quietly before they were transferred to 
another post. Now this is not to say that the same fort commanders failed to seek out a solution, quite the contrary is in 
fact true.  
Walmbeek in 1760 opted to send an envoy to Amon Ndofu, the boss of Assinée, to inquire if a war with 
Amnichia could be ensued by the latter.73 Huydecoper affirms this fact later, when he mentions that he had bought an 
African native named Adjerrefie, who had supposedly been the messenger sent to Amon Ndofu. All that we know of 
this instance is that the messenger was taken captive by the peoples of Cape Appolonia and was latter sold to Captain 
Hendrik Meister of Wien. Huydecoper obtained the slave from said captain after bartering for his rights.74 We do not 
know if he revealed anything during his captivity or if he was captured on route to Assinée or on his return voyage. For 
this reason it is difficult to gauge if Amnichia knew of Walmbeek’s interest to start a war against him. Whether or not 
this is directly linkable to the Amnichia-Mea Tekye conflict remains unknown, but the time frame is rather 
conspicuous.  
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The less than hypothetical origin of the dispute actually was due to Amnichia’s own doing, as he had stolen 
(panjaared) two women from Mea and married them out.75 Valsecchi highlights that these two women were dealt 
specifically to one of the sons of Kema and the other to one of the sons of Kema Betu of Kekame.76 Reportedly this was 
not all that Amnichia did, as the general thought was that he also had a hand in the torture death of Mea’s heir.77 The 
later referenced instance was reason enough for many Africans to go to war against the perpetrator. Nonetheless, under 
Huydecoper’s watchful eye the bitterness came to a resolve when Mea opted to settle the case for an undisclosed sum 
of gold. Huydecoper’s dispatch to Elmina not soon after, clearly indicates that this agreement must have been settled in 
late February or the first week of March, which coincides with Huydecoper’s negotiations with Amnichia about 
reopening the trade routes.78 The amount to be paid by Amnichia to Mea Tekye was set in stone, as was the date when 
the transaction was set to occur. Dispite the agreement, the date came and went, with Amnichia making not even the 
slightest attempt to pay sum. This infuriated Mea who opted to take the matter into his own hands. African customs 
dictated that if someone had an outstanding debt and was incapable of repayment that the debtor than had the option to 
collect on his incurred debt.79 This is exactly what Mea Tekye did, as he took captive a tobacco trade envoy from 
Appolonia. Reportedly one of the captives in this trade envoy was one of Amnichia’s own sons. The stealing 
(panjaaring) of his son, who served only as a pawn for the debt collection, infuriated Amnichia. Upon hearing the news 
Huydecoper pleaded with Mea Teyke for the immediate release of those taken captive, in order to prevent open 
hostilities between the two parties.80 The later obliged and Amnichia took the arbitration and renewed his promise to 
pay the previously accorded amount on a later date. When that deadline arrived for the second time, Amnichia was 
partially true to his word as he had managed to come to Edwira. The circumstances, however, were quite different than 
those agreed, as Amnichia brought soldiers with him instead the due amount.81 
 
 
1.4	  Invasion	  of	  Edwira	  	  	  
 
Our knowledge of what transpired in Edwira on October 21st into the 22nd in 1761, is very limited due to a lack 
of primary source material. The fact that the other authors that have written about this topic pay virtually no attention to 
this equally is setback. The lack of interest in this invasion and the subsequent ramification are quite easily linked to the 
causality sequence that both Baesjou and Valsecchi present. Indeed, if arguing a Huydecoper trade themed sequence as 
the main reason for the subsequent war, than details of this invasion and the subsequent communication between 
Amnichia and Huydecoper factors little into the equation. It seems quite remarkable that there is little to no information 
of what can best be determined as the actual physical start of the war. In order to correct this wrong the following 
paragraph will detail what happened.  
In October 1761, Amnichia was due on his gold payment to Mea. Early that morning Amnichia quietly 
ventured into Edwira, accompanied by a force upward of 2000 men, with the conviction to kill Mea Tekye and pillage 
his region of Edwira.82 The number presented initially by Huydecoper has been adjusted by Valsecchi and Baesjou to 
1500 men, while Jacob van Wijk reduced the number even further noting that the King of Appolonia wields an army of 
no more than 1000 men.83 Regardless of the number of men, Amnichia’s overt ability to sneak into Edwira without the 
other leaders of the region taking any action against him was later explained by Huydecoper. He was convinced that 
shortly after the early spring mediations, which settled a truce between both figures, that Amnichia set about buying the 
neutrality or allegiance of the remaining Edwirians chiefs, in order to venture into Edwira unopposed.84 Amnichia’s 
ability to strike deals with the chiefs meant that he was able to make a hastened and surprise entry into the region 
belonging to Mea. Nonetheless, all the haste in the world did not result in the captivity of Mea, who cunningly set his 
village ablaze and had remained hidden with 150 of his men in the bush.85 The question of whether or not Amnichia 
actually searched for Mea and in what capacity he was able to do so, remains largely unknown. Any new information 
that would reveal more on this subject would be especially interesting, because from the remaining descriptions and 
information that Huydecoper was able to obtain, it is obvious that Mea did not stray very far from the village 
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surroundings.86 This means that Amnichia quite certainly would have apprehended Mea if he had sent everyone into the 
bush. Nonetheless, Mea awaiting for the opportune moment to strike back, and was able to come out of hiding in the 
early evening hours and strike at the remaining troops vigorously, which caused wide spread chaos and a hastened 
retreat. Supposedly only aid of Bekoa Ano (Bekwauw) of Asenda halted Mea Tekye from outright invading 
Appolonia.87 
 
 
 
 
 
The failed invasion of Edwira, lead to several severe consequences for Amnichia. One of these was the abrupt 
ending of several loyalties over which he had toiled for years. Regardless of Amnichia’s might and attempts to halt the 
spread of Mea’s victory, the resilient message that has persisted till this day was that of the latter’s bravery and 
cunningness. According to Huydecoper spread of this victory against Amnichia inspired many leaders, to switch sides 
and aid Mea in a rejoiced fashion. The first to join Mea's side were the Edwirian caboceer’s who had previously been 
divided between the two.88 Soon to follow was the Wassa caboceer Asserrie Abrouponba, who had sent an advance 
regiment to aid against the initial invasion and subsequently in the repulsions of Amnichia’s troops. Another caboceer 
of Wassa Ntiakon (Entjacon), whose troops out number Amnichia’s, had initially remained idle in the fight. After 
learning that Amnichia’s warnings that the Dutch would invade his lands if he was to undertake any action against him 
were false, he quickly aligned himself with Mea Tekye. Huydecoper also noted that the King of Aowin, who had been 
one of Amnichia’s main supporters, had also opted to leave the aforementioned caboceer’s side.89 The botched invasion 
thusly resulted in Amnichia being surrounded by a coalition, which could easily defeat him.  
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1.5	  Negotiations,	  Alignment,	  and	  Settlement	  in	  Axim	  	  
 
The persistent image that has been procured thus far by other authors is that Huydecoper did not negotiate with 
Amnichia. Quite contraire to this belief, there had been several instances of mediation and several more attempts to 
initiate mediation. The aforementioned negotiations in March and the subsequent communications following the 
blotched invasion are a great example of this. Nonetheless Valsecchi and Baesjou fell prone to diverting their attention 
from Huydecoper’s inclinations to listen to what Amnichia had to say, opting instead to focus on his thirst for war. This 
section will attempt to reconstruct what had transpired after the invasion of Edwira and before the Invasion of Axim. 
First and foremost in order to understand the lack of negotiations post dating the Edwira invasion, recall that 
the initial relationship between Amnichia and Huydecoper was far from perfect. Insult to injury was Amnichia’s action 
a month before the invasion of Edwira, when the fore mentioned caboceer had purchased all of the food stock in Axim 
while the fort commander was at Elmina.90 Huydecoper reiterated the food scarcity issue on November 17th, but this 
was no more than a sales pitch to the council in Elmina.91 While the belief that Amnichia had supposedly bought these 
food supplies due to a crop failure in Appolonia may hold merit, it is quite possible that Amnichia had bought the food 
stock as a pre-emptive strike, or as a strategic asset. Certainly the argument that no war was won on an empty stomach 
would garner this perspective a renewed look. Baring further inquiry this concept will remain difficult to prove. 
Nonetheless we must fathom that Amnichia was a shrewd man, whose ability as a tactician have vastly been 
undervalued by previous authors. Prime example of Amnichia cunningness is to be retrieved in the following statement 
made by Huydecoper:  
 
“…Entjakon caboceer of Wassa who has an army that is more powerful than Amnichia, lead by a brother of Mea 
Tekye (vaandrager), had remained an idly bystander due Amnichia’s ability to profilate that we (WIC) would 
come to his aid if anyone tried to attack him. He was also able to use this fear to deter Amon Ndofu from making 
an attempt on him.”92 
 
  As the aforementioned statement revealed, the caboceer intellectually used the March accord to frighten his 
neighbors from entangling themselves in his business. Subsequently this allowed Amnichia to extend his power grasp 
further, as the checks and balance system of the African nations surrounding him had become irrelevant due to the 
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notion of Dutch protection. Another prime example of Amnichia’s strategic intellect as advocated by Huydecoper and 
subsequently by Valsecchi, was his ability to buy influential pawns. This ability to buy and subsequently hide 
individuals who had unpaid financial obligations greatly frustrated Huydecoper. The fort commander once decried that 
he did not know six Africans who were not indebted to the caboceer.93 Subsequently after Amnichia’s failed attempt on 
Edwira, he was in need of those allegiances, which inspired the caboceer to send a messenger to Axim.  
The message at face value is easily mistaken as an attempt by Amnichia to seek restitution from Huydecoper. 
Much to Huydecoper’s displeasure, the messenger’s actual purpose was to inform Amnichia’s loyalist in the Axim 
camp, that their immediate presence was needed at Lacam (Kekame on map), a village situated two miles West of the 
Ankobra River.94 While Huydecoper revealed that he refused his subjects from going to Amnichia, it is obvious in his 
October 23rd letter that Bekwauw (Bekoa Ano), a WIC loyalist for over 20 years, had provided aid to Amnichia in his 
hastened retreat from Edwira and had subsequently closed his routes to Mea’s messengers.95 More so, the actual intend 
of Amnichia message becomes clearer if one consider that this communication between Huydecoper and Amnichia lead 
to no new negotiations or any further communications, albeit Huydecoper’s invitation. This invitation of course was at 
best a formality as both men were quite aware that a meeting between them at this time would be less than opportune. 
Nonetheless, detested from a lack of respect, it is no secret that Huydecoper was not a fan of the latter’s actions.  
The negotiations of the 21st of December when Amnichia’s messenger reappeared were anything but 
negotiations. Amnichia’s offering of a cow, a male slave, and as much gold as desired, in exchange for neutrality in the 
dispute was a simple bribe that the fort commander was keen to decline for several reasons.96 First and foremost he 
declined due to the potential volatility that this might have had on his bond with Mea. Secondly, Huydecoper as 
mentioned in section 1.1, was not to be belittled, or forced into situations where he had no control over events. Given 
both of these situations it should come of no surprise that Huydecoper kindly returned the messenger to the riverside 
without the desired answer. Even though the Elmina council unanimously supported these actions, the damage inflicted 
by the messengers visit was huge.97 Recall that Huydecoper had openly invited the Edwirian women and children to 
settle under the protection of his fortress, these peoples as Huydecoper latter noted had overcrowded Axim at the time 
Amnichia’s messenger journeyed there.98 This messenger must have reported to Amnichia that he had seen a vast 
number of women and children from Edwira in Axim town.99 On the premise of this new information Amnichia must 
have concluded that Huydecoper had fully aligned himself with Mea. 
Huydecoper’s decision to align himself with Mea Tekye came only after a blessing from Erasmi, Walmbeek, 
and Triscane. These men bestowed Huydecoper with the power to pursue any actions against Amnichia that he deemed 
necessary. While both Valsecchi and Baesjou noted that Huydecoper’s decision to align himself with Mea was largely 
based on the equitability of his private trade enterprise, both men quickly forget that the Elmina council had the final 
say in the matter.100 Indeed, while Huydecoper was given unlimited powers, he still was instructed to write about any 
and all actions that he had undertaken. He was told numerous times that any action pursued against Amnichia, should 
be done so out of consideration for the common good of the WIC.101 Quaint on simply removing Amnichia from his 
political landscape, Huydecoper accepted these conditions and whole-heartedly restrained himself from overstepping 
the consigned boundaries.  
With the blessing of the Elmina council, the first real actions pursued by Huydecoper were the attempts to 
procure Mea’s trust. From the Axim correspondence it is obvious that the latter was worried that the Dutch could be 
impartial, or even worse, be supportive of Amnichia secretly. It took quite a bit of convincing, both verbally, 
monetarily, and action wise, before Mea was fully convinced that the Dutch would not secretly support Amnichia. Due 
to the fragility of the freshly accorded relationship, any negotiations with Amnichia by the Dutch would have greatly 
undermined their coalition. Huydecoper weary of Dutch profiteers sent a letter to address this issue to Director General 
Erasmi, in order to prevent Dutch sailors from selling goods at Cape Appolonia. Subsequently he also began inquiring 
about all ships that passed Axim, to see if they had done business in with Amnichia in Cape Appolonia.   
The expedition to Amon Ndofu was another idea that the Elmina council agreed to, eventhough appropriating 
a ship for such a journey proved difficult. Over the course of January and February several voyages were undertaken, 
and a plethora of gifts both from the Elmina council as well as Huydecoper were entrusted in Amon Ndofu’s hands. 
These voyages were all justifiable and were approved by the Elmina council, albeit that the initially gifts granted to 
provoke Amon Ndofu to stand against Amnichia later proved useless. It is not until mid January when the Elmina 
council and Huydecoper would come at odds again. This was largely due to Huydecoper’s admittance of Mea’s troops 
in Axim.    
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Little is known of Mea’s settlement in Axim, yet this played a crucial role in the sequence of events that 
eventually lead to the declaration of war against Amnichia. From the scoured texts we are lead to believe that Mea left 
Edwira and fought his way through the coastal region of Asenda to eventually settle in Axim. Supposedly he had no 
longer felt safe in his native region, and sought shelter elsewhere.102 Despite Huydecoper’s repeated requests to await 
further aid and provisions, Mea who had in all likeliness accorded a deal with Amon Ndofu for a coordinated invasion, 
invade the eastern regions loyal to Appolonia on January 13th.103 What we do not know of this altercation is if Mea 
attacked from the North going south towards the beach, which would constitute his escape from Edwira as uttered by 
Huydecoper, or if he attacked from the east going west, which would constitute that he had a previous residency in 
Axim.104 We know from previous texts that Huydecoper had provided the provision necessary for the invasion, in this 
regard it would make sense that he had been situated in Axim as the journey to Edwira with supplies of war certainly 
would not have been easy nor cleaver. Likewise, analysis of the intrusion into Appolonian region reveals that first 
Asenda (Assenta) around 3PM and then Kekame around 6PM were set ablaze, this indicates that the invasion must have 
been done from the Axim side.105 Regardless of the location from which Mea hailed we know from Baesjou and 
Valsecchi that they did not stay in the Asenda region due to a lack of provisions and subsequent fears of being overrun 
by Amnichia’s troops.106 These fears spurred Mea’s retreat to the small village named Mussouw (Mussow) in Axim, 
which Huydecoper could not refuse. 
Due to the none-aggression stance of the WIC, it is perilously interesting that Huydecoper allowed Mea to 
settle in the Axim landscape. In January 1762, Huydecoper made an adamant plea to the Elmina council, that he could 
not turn Mea away largely impart due to his loyalty. Loosing Mea as a ‘loyal friend’, according to Huydecoper, would 
have had grave repercussions and almost certainly would have meant that all his trade and the subsequent Wassa trade 
that went through Edwira would have faltered to the English.107 This resounding message of impending trade woes, 
which was the subject of his letters in late December and early January, was the supposed reasoning behind 
Huydecoper’s admittance of Mea to Axim. Obviously Huydecoper who had so-called restrained himself from forcing 
Mea out of Axim, must have had ulterior motives for admitting Mea into Axim, as he was quite aware of the potential 
consequences. This ulterior motive becomes exponentionally more visible if one specifically analyzes the Elmina 
council’s war stance and their lack of interest in a direct confrontation with Amnichia.108  
Tactically Huydecoper knew that something drastic had to happen in order to change the mindset of the 
Elmina council. Albeit the following remains only theory, it is quite conceivable that Huydecoper had allowed Mea to 
settle his troops on the Axim side of the Ankobra River in order to entice Amnichia to make an advance on the areas 
belonging directly to the WIC jurisdiction. If one aid this theory with Valsecchi’s verdict that the Dutch had supported 
Mea during his excursions into the Appolonian landscape in early 1762, then the theory that Huydecoper was trying to 
provoke an attack by Amnichia does not seem so distant. Accepting the aforementioned theory, baring any counter 
revelation by future research, would certainly indicate that Huydecoper as had been previously thought by Hippisley, 
Baesjou, and Valsecchi, was indeed war hungry. 
The outcome of this failed invasion of the territories loyal to Amnichia, weighed heavily on the minds of the 
Elmina council, as is obvious from the brief division between Huydecoper and the council. Prior to Mea’s intrusion, the 
largest restraint preventing outright support by the council for the war was the issue of what would happen with Cape 
Appolonia after Amnichia was removed. When Huydecoper finally convinced Mea Teyke to accord to terms, which 
allowed the Dutch to build a fortress in Appolonia at wars end, new issues resulting from the botched invasion greatly 
undermined Huydecoper’s position.109 The general trust and loyalties among the Africans themselves now worried the 
Elmina council. This was such an issue that the council now staunchly opposed Huydecoper’s request for support 
troops, to aid Mea Teyke.110 The council was so frustrated by the situation that they reminded Huydecoper that the WIC 
was not directly engaged in a war against Amnichia. There is good logic behind the council’s decision to restrain 
Huydecoper, as the outcome of the war was less than certain at that point in time. The idea of how the WIC would 
rekindle the relationship with Amnichia if he were to be victorious certainly had captivated the Elmina council’s mind. 
This sudden change was largely due to Huydecoper’s report entailing the inaptitude of the Wassa and Amon Ndofu in 
supporting Mea during his invasion. Due to the lack of aid from his supposed loyal Africans Mea’s exodus from East-
Appolonia (Asenda) out of fear of being overrun by Amnichia was equally responsible for the changing mindset of the 
Elmina council.111 Weary of inviting war, the council determined due to the aforementioned factors to take a stance 
against Huydecoper’s demands. The very idea of sending more troops to Huydecoper’s position in Axim was squashed 
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due to financial reasons. Presumably the council wanted to prevent Amenichia from having the idea that the WIC was 
preparing for battle against him, as certainly reports of troop increases in Axim would have trickled down to Amnichia 
by his loyalist that had remained in there. Ironically the denial of these troops in early February indirectly created the 
dire situation a month later, as Huydecoper had virtually no arms to resist Amnichia during his invasion in March.     
 
 
1.6	  Invasion	  of	  Axim	  &	  Consequences	  	  
  
The invasion of Axim is of the utmost importance, largely due to its residual impact on the decision to proceed 
with war against Amnichia. Perilously, this singular event directly shaped the actions of the subsequent years. Despite 
this forgone importance historians have largely yielded at examining many factors that gave way to the invasion. In a 
broad sense the invasion should be looked at as no more than a retaliation act of Amnichia’s doing. The reason for its 
very occurrence was largely impart due to Huydecoper’s conjecture to allow settlement of Mea’s troops in the village 
named Mussouw not far from the Ankobra River. It is quite plausible that the invasion of Axim would not have 
happened had it not been for this act. The argument that Huydecoper wanted war as uttered by Baesjou, Valsecchi, and 
to some extend the Elmina council, presents an interesting standpoint. Many unanswerable questions about this specific 
instance remain. One of these questions is: did Huydecoper invite Mea to Axim because he knew Amnichia would 
pursue his enemy ill regard of location or consequence? Another question is: Why did Amnichia attack the peoples of 
Axim, if these had done him no wrong? Due to a lack of information occluded by previous authors it is best to 
reconstruct the past in order to attempt to understand why, how, and to what extend Amnichia was able to invade Axim.     
The invasion of Axim began in the early morning hours on March 1st 1762. Cunningly Amnichia invaded just 
before the start of the rainy season, which consequently gave the WIC very little time to amass the troops necessary for 
a counter attack. To prove that this invasion was strategically planned to coincide with the approaching wet season is 
seems merely impossible, however it cannot be discredited to quickly due to lacking scripture. Recall that the 
negotiations between Huydecoper and Amnichia were carried out in late December, two months prior to the invasion. 
The residual tone from these negotiations must have clearly given Amnichia the impression that Huydecoper wanted 
nothing to do with him anymore. Particularly interesting is that Amnichia delayed his invasion for another two months, 
even though he was capable of immediate attack. While it is true that between October and March both parties were 
occupied with recruiting and forming allegiances, this was a relatively slow process and not likely responsible for the 
delay of the invasion.112 Equally the invasion by Mea in early January had little impact on Amnichia’s fighting 
capacity, as the invasion force in all likeliness was near the same strength as the force Amnichia had amassed for the 
invasion of Edwira. One crucial element on top of all the aforementioned that strongly leads to the belief that this was a 
strategically planned invasion is that Amnichia opted to wait till the anlonra week. This week was an African tradition 
that disallowed the Africans from pursuing wars or any action relating to warfare including negotiations.113 Given the 
aforementioned, in all likeliness Amnichia’s invasion must have been premeditated and strategically planned.  
Equally important to the invasion initial success, was the sheer luck Amnichia had. On the morning of the 
invasion, the river guard who normally observed the opposing riverbank vigilantly had not appeared for his duty.114 
Amnichia opted to use this to his advantage crossing the Ankobra River unopposed and subsequently surprising his 
enemies without warning. Consequently Mea Tekye, who had granted a leave of absence to many of the warriors due to 
the anlonra week, was overwhelmed and was forced to seek safety in the forest.115 Having forced the Edwirians to 
abandon their camp, Amnichia’s progressed towards Axim, according to Captain David Solomie of the Jacoba Maria, 
was swift. Along the way he attacked the innocent peoples of the Axim territory, by setting ablaze the village of 
Tannetje.116 According to Huydecoper these peoples along with a few from surrounding villages of Axim, were 
resolved to fight Amnichia. Against all expectation these troops, no more than 300 in headcount, fought off the invaders 
bravely for a while, but eventually had to retire due to Amnichia’s overwhelming troops.117 It is quite possible that the 
peoples of Axim first attacked Amnichia, which caused the pursuit. Of course this information would certainly be 
lacking Huydecoper’s notes, as it would indicate that the peoples of Axim who had been instructed to be neutral had 
been the aggressor.   
All jargon aside, Huydecoper knew that he needed to coax Amnichia’s troops to within the reaches of the forts 
guns in order to bring distaste of warfare to his foe. He saw fit to send out his available troops to position just beyond 
guns reach and attempt to entice the enemy in to a fight from which Huydecoper’s troops were instructed to withdraw. 
Amnichia well knowingly of the dangers of the canons of the fort, awaited patiently until eventually fury and anger 
spark the troops of Axim to out step their boundaries.  The troops advancement beyond the reach of the cannons 
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resulted in huge losses and an eventual retreat. Cleverly and a testament to Amnichia militaristic understanding, the 
caboceer had instructed a portion of his troops to crawl through the bushes in order to attack the Axim coalition from 
behind. This tactical move left the retreating Axim troops only with one option, which was to venture into the sea and 
swim back to the fort. Huydecoper notes that while his troops were swimming they continued to fire upon Amnichia’s 
troops. These brave actions of the swimming troops caused the enemy troops to follow and engage them further and 
further, all the while slowly progressing toward Axim. Eventually the enemy troops came within cannons reach, 
whereupon Huydecoper engaged the enemy with the artillery giving much-deserved breathing room to the swimming 
troops. Huydecoper duly noted that taking aim at Amnichia’s troops caused the later to refocus on the fortress, which 
forced the commander to fire all guns in rapid succession in order to prevent the enemy from taking the fortress.118 
According to Valsecchi, the enemy troops supposedly made it all the way to the gates of Axim, before retreating to 
safety.119  
Amnichia’s retreat from Axim, if it can be called that, occurred no later than two days in the early morning 
hours. On that morning, presumably March 3rd, a helpless Huydecoper witnessed another small skirmish near the 
Ankobra Mountain between Edwirians returning from supply runs and the forces of Amnichia. Fearful of sending the 
troops in Axim to their aid, due to several forested regions in which the enemy could have setup an ambush, this 
skirmish resulted in defeat and retreat by the outnumbered Edwirians.120 Huydecoper in all probability was correct in 
thinking this was an ambush, as not soon after the Cape Appolonian troops would reappear on the beach, wavering 
Dutch, English, Portuguese, and French flags just outside of Fort Axim’s reach. This reappearance instigated furor 
within the Axim troops, but they restrained themselves having previously received clear instructions not to engage. The 
next day early in the morning the peoples of Axim and Edwira, including the Rimadoors and several others in service of 
the WIC, decided to take the matter in their own hands. This coalition divided itself in three groups, one that 
transcended upon the beach, and the other two would chase Amnichia’s troops through the forest and over the roads. 
That morning of March 5th, they reported that the coast was clear and that all enemies must have ventured over the river 
again.121 
The damage resulted due to the invasion of Axim was that several people died, countless others were injured, 
upwards of peoples had been taken into captivity, and three villages in Axim were razed.122 More so he mutilated and at 
times barbarically killed the elder peoples who could not flee in time. Pieter de Paap a carpenter, who had served the 
WIC in Axim, was equally lost after he had sustained an injury while fighting the enemy forces.123 All in all the actual 
damage inflicted by Amnichia is not that atrocious, but the psychological and demoralization factors fueled Axim’s 
hatred towards Amnichia. Consequently, due to the destruction of life, property, and a native uproar directly within 
territory of the WIC, Amnichia’s invasion gave justification to Huydecoper’s previous war decrees.  The Elmina 
council could not longer standby idly, as this would have sent the wrong message to all Africans and other Europeans. 
The board voted unanimously to declare war on Amnichia as a ‘rebel leader’ only due to his actions in the 
Axim territory as Huydecoper later made clear.124  This happened on March 3rd when all board members, aside from 
Huydecoper, had been summoned to Elmina for an emergency meeting.125 The results of this meeting gave way to 
Huydecoper’s previous assessments that the WIC should align itself with Mea’s coalition and provide adequate support 
troops to get ride of Amnichia. The extend of support provided to Huydecoper is highlighted in the March 9th letter, 
which reveals that the council gave him and his newly appropriated council Mr. Walmbeek unlimited powers to 
approach and negotiate with Entjakon and seek allegiances with others.126 As Valsecchi noted, the direct consequence 
of Amnichia’s invasion of Axim was that the Elmina board fully aligned themselves behind Huydecoper’s ideas by 
mobilized their allies against Amnichia.127  Thusly the war between Amnichia and the WIC had officially begun.  
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CHAPTER II:  APPOLONIA-WIC WAR 
 
 
“The kings of Appolonia support an armed force of about one thousand men; and every man of consequence 
is obliged to furnish a quota of men and money, when the king goes to war. The history of this small 
kingdom is preserved only by tradition, and in course is involved in much obscurity and uncertainty. We 
know nothing of it anterior to the reign of king Amonihier: and when the Dutch were inclined to settle in the 
country, that (the) king was not willing to favor their inclination; which caused a war. The Dutch crossed 
Ancobra River, which forms the eastern boundary of Appolonia, with a considerable force. Europeans as 
well as natives, with a few artillery; were soon opposed by the Appolonians, at the head of whom was the 
king. A battle was fought, which terminated with the (defeat of the invaders, who were obliged to re- cross 
the river with precipitation, leaving behind them their field-pieces, which (it is reported) are carefully 
preserved by Amonihier's successors, as a trophy of this victory…”128  
 
The Appolonia-WIC war, which equally could be called ‘The Amnichia-Huydecoper war’, represents an 
obscurity in the history of the Gold Coast. Several authors over the past centuries have often mentioned the war, 
devoting little time to its occurance aside from recording the eventual outcome. Details of how this result came about 
are so scarce that not two pages can be filled with content. The first real historical account of the war, at least that what 
is mentionable of holding any historical value or accuracy, is Henry Meredith’s observation in 1812. The excerpt 
above, albeit Meredith was at most forty years removed from the war, clearly reveals that the intricate details of the war 
were long forgotten at the time he recorded this excerpt. This obscurity ruled for the greater part of the 19th and 20th 
centuries with several authors attesting the war in Appolonia, but providing no further details than those provided by 
Meredith. The first work to change this and address the situation was Rene Baesjou’s inquiry into the matter in the late 
1980’s that culminated into an article. Baesjou’s actual devotion to the procedures of the war, however, culminated into 
no more than a lengthy paragraph devoid of any tactical information or intricate detail.129 Pierliugi Valsecchi’s book 
first published in Italian in 2002 extends on Baesjou’s first assessment, albeit his single page assessment reveals 
relatively little of the actual procedures of the war.130 It must be mentioned that his aim was not to uncover what 
happened in intricate details, as it was to create a thorough introduction of the early formation of the Nzema state. The 
aforementioned author’s omission of the actual war procedure stipulates a needed to reconstruct what happened in order 
to fully comprehend how Amnichia was able to defeat Huydecoper. This chapter’s aim is to retify the past by 
reconstructing the Appolonia-WIC war, so that we may get a better understanding of not only the tactical war aspect, 
but also about when, where, and how the war actually took place. Details for the reconstruction of the WIC-Appolonia 
war are extracted from Huydecoper’s latter review of the war, his day journal recorded during the invasion timeframe 
(1763), and the time frame corresponding Axim journal (1761-1764).  
Before we can proceed with our attempt of establishing causality, it is important to understand that the success 
or failure of wars fought with coalition partners is based on a plethora of factors. As many European historians would 
point out, the Roman Empire’s success and partially that of Napoleon, was largely based on their ability to unify 
strange peoples under a common goal. Their inability to maintain this unification has allowed many historians to 
conjured up some basic factors that unified or destroyed coalitions. These include but are not limited to: each concerned 
parties initial and continued motivation toward the initial matter, previous bonds or alliances that reigned between the 
coalition parties, and the common or communal interest in the predetermined and preferred outcome of the war. Given 
the previously shown diverseness of the Cape Appolonia war coalitions, it is quite obvious that terming this war as 
‘tribal warfare’ would be gross neglect of Thornton’s ideas of what ‘tribal’ actually means.131 In all its irony, 
Valsecchi’s reconstruction of the coalition formation clearly proves that this formation does not differ much from the 
complex European relational constructs that preoccupied many of the early historians thoughts that were quick to 
dismiss African wars as tribal wars.  
 
 
2.1.	  The	  Difficult	  Prelude	  	  
 
The WIC war against Amnichia officially began in early march 1762 as a result of the latter’s invasion of 
Axim. Actual war procedures against Amnichia would have to wait another ten months. Many unanswered questions of 
this ten-month time frame have continued to persist. The first question that warrants investigation is about the actual 
time frame itself. James Jones noted in the early nineteenth century that large parts of the Gold Coast experience two 
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wet seasons, one in May through June and the other in October.132 Colin Baker affirms this deposition that there were 
two wet seasons, noting that there was: ‘a short dry spell in July and August and a longer dry spell from December to 
February’.133 If one realizes that the time needed to recruit an army for any engagement normally requires at least a 
month or two, this would have put the expedition to Appolonia in the middle of the rainy season. Attribute that Cape 
Appolonia was comprised of lots of small rivers that ‘inundate the greater part of the country during the rainy season’ 
this meant that any expedition would have quickly returned to Axim simply because the ease of passage during those 
months was extremely difficult.134 The approach of the rainy season thus undermined Huydecoper’s ability to form an 
army, however, it was not entirely Huydecoper’s fault that little to nothing happened during those first few months 
proceeding the invasion of Axim in 1762.  
African unwillingness and the continual problems of the organization of the anti-Amnichia faction is 
something else that should be discusses as a factor of the overall delay of the invasion. As previously mentioned the 
beginning of the formation efforts began when the rainy season was rapidly approaching, we must understand that 
during the approach of the rainy season the men generally were required to stay at home and work the fields in order to 
have produce later on in the year. It is quite understandable that the low turnout of the factions, which were summoned 
to come to Huydecoper’s aid in early March, was partially due to the Africans unwillingness to exchange their fields for 
warfare. While Huydecoper’s irate response to the matter caused the regional chiefs of Ahanta to summon more of their 
cohort’s to Axim, it quickly became apparent that these followers had no interest in warfare at that time, as they slowly 
eroded from Axim’s landscape to return to their villages and fields.135 Equally several of the troops that had supported 
Mea in the initial invasion of Edwira, also eroded from the Axim landscape overtime. Essentially understanding the 
African unwillingness, especially of the troops least vested in the wars resolution, allocates the problem more so in the 
impact upon personal detriment While it might seem worthwhile to analyse all the petty problems associated with the 
coalition building, which would include overseeing the African factions that genuinely joined the coalition and those 
who joined merely to profit from the situation, doing so would yield little more information than that already provided 
by Valsecchi and Baesjou.136 For a better understanding of the alignment of the coalition throughout the early war 
phases please consult table 1 in the appendix.   
The trouble of organizing the army is not entirely to blame on the African contingency, as political pressure 
from Elmina in 1762 greatly undermined the army formation efforts. While initially the Elmina council supported the 
war unanimously, as is obvious from the March and April correspondence between Axim and Elmina, it did not take 
long for them to grow skeptical of the actual necessity for war. This skepticism and harsh critic became clearly apparent 
in May when not only Huydecoper’s recruitment struggles became known, but also his inability to properly arm and 
feed the few troops that had relocated to Axim in anticipation of the war. In limelight of these incidents Director 
General Erasmi sent a letter to Huydecoper on May 11th questioning the necessity for war: 
 
“We [ D.G. Erasmi & Elmina Council ] are afraid that the case will not succumb to an honorable ending, nor 
will it result in an advantage for the WIC. We have feared this would occur from the start, because the past 
has shown us that the word from a caboceer is not to be trusted. The only ones who have committed 
themselves to the fight are Mea Tekye and Boa who have shown up with the appropriate numbers as they 
said they would. To go to war against Amnichia at present with peoples who are unfamiliar of the road, will 
do little justice. We will consult with our Council further before we incur further expense. If Amnichia was to 
approach the WIC through one of the trusted caboceer’s, to talk about a peace accord, we shall not turn our 
heads or ears away from such a gesture. It would be more honorable to accord a peace for the WIC than it 
would be to continue racking up debts by funding a war that is yet to start and to which we know no 
outcome. However to ask Amnichia for peace we do not approve, because it would be shameful for the WIC. 
We hope that we do not have to resolve to this method.”137 
 
Pragmatically the mood change in Elmina was entirely based on the longevity of the recruiting tactics and the 
associated costs. Indeed, the fact that Huydecoper had to buy King Entier’s loyalty for roughly 160 ounces of gold, did 
not sit well with the Elmina council.138 Likewise the large monthly expenditure to feed and supply Axim with 
armament and other necessities such as gold and tobacco in order to keep the African troops station in Axim happy, 
equally frustrated the Elmina council. By late June Huydecoper’s inability to further align the African nations against 
Amnichia forced another letter from the Elmina. This letter like before questioned the very livelihood of the WIC’s 
ability to wage war, again emphasizing the immediate economic detriment.139 Whether or not these letters sent by the 
Elmina council during mid 1762 should be understood, as a break from Huydecoper supposed wish for war remains 
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open for debate. What is certain is that the council was resolved to forsake the war, especially if Amnichia were to 
apologize and subject himself to the company yet again. Resolution to the latter never took place, as the WIC never 
received word or any indication from Amnichia to seek a resolve in the matter. This does not mean that Huydecoper in 
preparation for the war was granted everything that he had requested from Elmina, as Baesjou would have us believe.140 
Quite the opposite is true, Huydecoper had in fact quarreled several times with Elmina not only about the bare 
necessities to keep the troops fed, but also about the appropriation of war materials that actually worked. From the 
Axim correspondence during the year 1762 it was obvious that the African unwillingness, the weather, and political 
opposition to Huydecoper’s will are in large part to blame for the lack of action in 1762.  
 
 
2.2	  	  The	  First	  Invasion	  and	  Battle	  	  
 
Echo’s of a potential war and an invasion of Appolonia had been raging for well over a year, by the time 
January 1763 came around. Similar to the disorganization of the foregone year, troops were still largely scattered by 
begin January, and once again the impending rainy season was approaching rapidly. The pressing costs and the poor 
living conditions at Axim, forced Huydecoper to make a decision either to proceed or to withdraw entirely from the 
battlefield. On Thursday morning January 13th, an ill commander Huydecoper ventured toward the Ankobra Mountain 
to inspect the battery that he had requested be installed.141 This strategic battle post served two specific purposes and 
was of the utmost necessity for the war to proceed accordingly. First and foremost it would serve as Huydecoper’s 
forward field post, from which they could better observe the battlefield and if necessary aid the WIC troops in their 
river crossing by providing covering fire.142 Secondly the instalment had relieved some of the reminiscent fears of a 
foregone river crossing during the Jan Conny era, when many troops that had pursued the latter across the river ended 
up drowning in it during their hastened retreat.143 The trek toward the Ankobra River was quickly noticed by the troops 
that had camped on the outskirts of Axim, and many of them opted to join Huydecoper journey to the Western bank of 
the river. Once there, Huydecoper who had observed the troops determined that they were numerous enough to pursue 
with his war. The good spirits that the African showed on that day, much to Huydecoper’s delight, prompted the latter 
to make the battle plans ready, and send word to Elmina for the impending invasion.144  
The first Ankobra river crossing occurred on Thursday January 27th had been well co-ordinated, even though 
the natives had put up resistance to the plan initially. That previous Tuesday morning the first part of Huydecoper’s 
invasion plan was officially set in motion. According to plan the Edwirians of Mea Tekye and Baan Aranco, as well as 
the Africans loyal to makelaar Quow, caboceer Dabo of Boutry, and those from Poho, traversed north through the 
forest on the Axim side to cross the river upstream near the Edwira boarder. The entire invasion depended on the ability 
of the coalition to clear the forest on the opposing riverbank side of potential enemies, as certainly the African troops 
would have fled if attacked during their river crossing.145 The following morning Huydecoper and the remaining 
African troops, in similar fashion as the forest clearing troops and the bombardier had done the previous evening, 
traversed to the Eastern Ankobra River bank to await the arrival of Mea Teyke’s coalition. Huydecoper’s coalition 
arrived at the riverbank within a few hours, and awaited the majority of the day for Mea’s arrival. By the time the latter 
had arrived with word that they had encountered little resistance, it was to late for Huydecoper’s coalition to cross the 
river probably due to the tides.146 Thursday morning the native spirit was ebb of inspiration, as the Africans on the 
Axim side refused to cross the river without first bathing and eating. This infuriated Huydecoper who stormed down 
from his encamp on the Ankobra Mountain and proceeded to yell at several of the African leaders. This fury did the 
trick as the Africans moved out in a hurried pace and made way to the Abbo Mossou (Amanzule) River by late that 
afternoon. Instead of crossing the river the troops opted to settled near a town called Siama, also known as Ekiama or 
Aziema, for the duration of the night and the following day.147 Their journey, a trek of roughly 10km was uneventful, as 
they encountered no resistance. The fact that there was no resistance must have been in large part due to the African 
watch posts who had observed Huydecoper’s initial trek to the Ankobra Mountain.148 These men must have informed 
all the natives in the Asenda region, as well as Amnichia that a large invasion force was assembling near the Ankobra 
River mouth, thusly giving ample time to remove all individuals from the region which Huydecoper’s coalition 
traversed a week later.  
Amnichia’s outposts probably stationed in the dense bush on the Western side of the Abbo Mossou, similarly 
as those previously station on the Ankobra, must have reported the sight of the WIC alliance to Amnichia. The 
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caboceer’s response to this unwelcoming news was swift, by that following day he and his troops had arrived at the 
Western riverbank of the Abbo Mossou. Directly facing the front posts of the WIC opposition troops, Amnichia opted 
to cross the river sooner rather than later. Amnichia’s success in crossing the river unopposed must be understood in the 
greater context of African spirituality. The allied natives yielded in their quest for combat due to an African ritual, 
which disallowed any attempts of crossing a river and of undertaking anything in regard to warfare unless instigated.149 
Amnichia not particularly prone to follow African traditional beliefs, as observed due to his invasion of Axim during 
the Anlonra week, did restrain himself from engaging the WIC coalition after he had successfully crossed the river.150 
When Huydecoper received word that Mea Teyke and the other forces had failed to obtain an advantage of Amnichia’s 
river crossing due to an native ritual, Huydecoper let it be know that if a similar event were to incur that Mea would be 
on his own for the duration of the war.151   
The first battle between the WIC coalition and Amnichia’s cohorts broke out on Saturday morning January 
29th 1763. Deliberately the battle raged on two separate fronts, one along the shoreline where the troops from the forts 
along the beaches fought and one within the deep brush and jungle where the ‘bosch negers’ fought. In the jungle Mea 
Tekye aided by Boa Bendequouw and Dabo of Boutry were engulfed in a heavy battle directly against Amnichia and 
several of his high-ranking officers.152 The lasting memory of this battle was that Amnichia was severely hurt, which 
has been projected by many foregone historians. The reality of the matter was that Amnichia was actually wounded in 
three separate positions, of which the most notable was the severe chest wound that had resulted from an exploding 
bandolier worn over his shoulder and across his chest.153 Latter rumors also indicated that he had sustained a gun shot 
to the head, which partially lead to the unfounded belief that he had succumb to his battle wounds.154 Equally important 
and rashly overlooked are the other injuries and subsequent rumors that resulted from this bush battle. Bekoa Ano 
(Bekwouw), the former WIC subject who had defected in January 1762, had to be carried of the battlefield due to his 
injuries. He survived these battle scares, but four other caboceer’s were not so lucky. |Eventhough their heads were 
later presented to Huydecoper, who reportedly recognized them from an earlier encounter, the names of those killed 
thus far remain anonymous.  
Meanwhile on the beach, the troops of Axim initially took the lead in the fight, and were eventually relieved 
by the troops of Hollandia, Accoda, and Meacon.155 Obvious from a latter letter sent to Elmina in February, the 
Boutrysche, Hutteposche, Pompondesche, & Saccondeesche who should have supported the attacks made by the 
peoples of Axim, Hollandia, Accoda, restrained themselves from engaging the enemy. Their inability to fire their 
weapons as instructed, forced Huydecoper’s regiment into the fight. Huydecoper was convinced that the disloyal troops 
from Boutry and others from Ahanta would not have joined the fight if they had not been outflanked and attacked 
directly.156 Likewise the troops from Elmina would have stood by idly if it had not been for Entiem Roem of Akim roar: 
‘I will not eat the white mans bread without offering them my loyalty and support in time of need’.157  Entiem’s bold 
words and subsequent actions brought embarrassment on the Elminians, who tried to redeem their honor by fighting 
like possessed men. Certainly if it had not been for Entiem Roem, who was subsequently hurt, a different result would 
have been easily envisioned.158  The troops most disadvantaged by these malefactor’s, were the African troops of Axim 
who recieved the brunt of the other Africans unwillingness to share the burden of the fight. Indeed, the situation for 
these troops was so dire that if it had not been for the slaves of Axim and rimadoors, as well as the possessed 
Elminian’s who latter joined, they would have certainly been overrun. Noteworthy was that Amnichia’s troops tried to 
outflank the WIC coalition by attempting an attack from the forest side. While this attempt was probably meant to 
surround the WIC troops or to drive them into the sea, the possessed troops from Elmina quickly forced the later into 
recourse. While the WIC beach troops had with certain degree of success withheld Amnichia’s force, it was obvious 
that Amnichia’s troops were determined to defeat the WIC beach troops. Huydecoper was convinced that if Mea had 
not come to their rescue after a direct victory over Amnichia in the bush, it would have been quite possible that 
Amnichia’s beach troops would have defeated ours. 159 Even though Amnichia’s beach troops were now well 
outnumbered, they were quite determined to defeat their foes as they instigated several more offensive pushes. Alas, 
after two failed attempts they were resolved to cross the river again and fall back to Cape Appolonia. When Elmina had 
succumb news of the victory Huydecoper had obtained, he was endlessly praised receiving many congratulatory letters 
from all, as victory must have seen within grasp.160  
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Victory near Siama did not mean outright victory for the WIC. This was due to a cunning strategic move made 
by one of Amnichia’s cohorts, given the latter was injured severely. They sent one of their peoples, a former slave of 
the WIC, across to the WIC camp to deliver a fear-inspiring message to the WIC coalition troops. News carried by this 
former slave indicated that Amon Ndofu supposedly had agreed with Amnichia not to enter into war and that the 
peoples of Aowin would not engage the caboceer if he were to donate a copper cup filled with gold. More so, 
Asserrie Abrouponba would come to Amnichia’s rescue in no more than three days time and would venture 
through the forest to strike the WIC coalition from behind.161 This news spread instantaneous fear through the WIC 
camp, and not soon thereafter the African troops began with their retreat to the Ankobra River. Huydecoper tried 
eminently to prevent the troops from recrossing the Ankobra even promising that he himself would join them in battle, 
yet by the following morning it was obvious that a large proportion had crossed the river at night.162 Even though 
Huydecoper’s troops had clearly won the physical battle, as is obvious from the captivity of Amnichia’s horn blower 
and the unofficial casualty count of 21 enemies, that included Quassie the traitor who presided over Mia Cudjo’s chair, 
Amnichia had through inspiring fears within the WIC ranks won the important psychological battle.   
 
 
2.3	  	  Reassembly	  at	  the	  Ankobra	  River	  
 
  Reassembly of the troops at the Ankobra river site was an arduous task, which squandered seven weeks of 
time. The fear that had caused the natives to retreat over the Ankobra River had caused significantly more damage than 
previous authors have lead us to believe. Time essentially, after Amnichia’s demoralizing defeat, gave the latter’s camp 
ample time to rehabilitate and fortify against another invasion.163 More so, it gave the Appolonians a chance to spread 
rumours of their victory to their neighbours, which certainly could have had a lasting impact on the willingness of 
neighbouring regions such as Aowin, Wassa, and even Amon Ndofu from entangling themselves in the matter. To a 
certain degree Huydecoper’s subsequent frustrations, largely miss directed at Elmina, must be superimposed on his 
know how that Amnichia would pursue such tactics to potentially disturb the allegiances that had been previously 
formed. By understanding that this is a mindset factor, which probably preoccupied Huydecoper thoughts, certainly 
equates to a better understanding of the ensuing correspondence between Elmina and Axim.     
 One of the very first actions that Huydecoper pursued, aside from sending a belligerent letter to Elmina, was to 
see if the rumour that had caused the Africans to flee was worth any substance. Intelligently Huydecoper sought out the 
very causality upon which the Africans had based their retreat. He did so in order to obtain leverage over the troops that 
had abandoned their posts. On the eve of February 13th Huydecoper obtained the exact result that he had expected, 
when the messenger brought news that foretold rumours were unfounded. More so, the messenger brought news that 
the Wassa troops of Asserrie Abrouponba, who had supported Mea initially during Amnichia’s invasion of Edwira and 
presumed to wield a force upward of 300 men, could be bought for the right price. Huydecoper keenly noted in an 
address to Elmina that he would benefit graciously having this commando’s allegiance, stating that this ‘union would 
instantaneously eliminate the fears that had caused the natives retreat’.164 The eventual result of the communications 
between Huydecoper and Asserrie Abrouponba was that an allegiance was not entered into largely impart due to 
Elmina’s exceeding concern that the latter were trying to scam the WIC, as it was believed that they were already 
preoccupied in an entanglement with the Akim and Dinkira.165 Even though the troops did not join the coalition the 
very news brought back by the messenger that they would not support Amnichia under any circumstances, essentially 
granted Huydecoper the proper leverage to recall and complain about the troops that had fled.  
 Before we can understand why the Africans did not return immediately, we have to understand why they left. 
The troops from Elmina, although the reason remains unknown, cited that Huydecoper had treated them too harshly and 
unfairly. More so, they belligerently insisted upon the same treatments the white soldiers received and demanded to 
know what the latter’s purpose was in this war was. 166 We must assume that Huydecoper did not give into their 
demands, which must have spurred them on to leave Axim in the cover of darkness, equally as the troops of Boutry and 
other regions of Ahanta had done. Later on in February the troops that had left made it clear that they left under the 
suspicion that the WIC would pursue a course of peace rather than attempt another invasion, thusly making their time 
spent at the Ankobra encampment redundant. There is something to say about the secrecy that the troops from Elmina 
undertook to avoid notice at home, as even Director General Erasmi a full week later was still unaware of their 
presence.167 Whether or not the troops were ashamed of deserting Axim or were outright unwilling to continue the war 
is a matter that we cannot resolve, however, their reluctance to return to Axim does speak volumes of their true nature.   
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 The procedure of having the troops returned to Axim resulted in yet another semi hostile atmosphere between 
the leadership at Axim and Elmina. While Huydecoper was righteous to have the deserters returned, his demands for 
strenuous and immediate actions against the troops, which included but was not limited to punishing those unwilling to 
fulfil their duty with fines or jail time, was not well received. This is obvious in a letter dated February 18th from 
Director General Erasmi, which stated that ‘jailing or fining those who failed to listen to the orders had the potentially 
create an uproar that could undermine the WIC’s operation on the coast’.168 Instead of severely punishing those who 
had left, the Elmina Council choose to open up a dialogue, requesting those who had fled to return to Axim in due 
time.169 While in theory this was probably the best option, contrarily in the real world it proved quite otherwise. This is 
obvious in a letter dated March 10th, which revealed that many of the African troops whom had left in foregone weeks 
from Elmina and other places had yet to arrived at Axim. Rather arrogantly Huydecoper noted that ‘these troops simply 
stayed endlessly on the roads because they had not fear any punishment’.170 Even though the facts in this letter are 
accurate, as the troops did hideout on the roads, this letter in its entirety must be considered somewhat of a frustration 
outing as only a few days prior the very questionability of the continued war efforts had yet again gained momentum in 
Elmina’s letters. The frustration exerted on both sides during early March, which prompted this reoccurrence re-raises 
the very question if Elmina did in fact want to continue the pursuit of the war.  
There is a certain element, which gives rise to the reoccurring question about the actual degree of support 
Huydecoper received during this timeframe. As mentioned above Elmina was equivalently vested in the positive 
outcome of the war against Amnichia, this evident in February when Erasmi quickly dispatched new tents to Axim to 
replace those that had been left behind near Siama.171 Equally Erasmi’s conformity to Huydecoper’s request for more 
‘white soldiers’ lead the prior to directed a canoe to Accra with orders to anchor at every fortress and take at least 1 
soldier from each forts all the way to Axim on the return voyage.172 While the final tally of actual soldiers who went to 
Axim during this time stretch remains rather enigmatic, it was obvious that Elmina was certainly willing to abide to 
Huydecoper’s wishes in February. The very support that Huydecoper had long battled for and endured only for a short 
period began to cave in upon itself in early March due to several independent factors.  
The first in a series of setbacks for Huydecoper was a report he wrote to Elmina inconsequence of a rumour 
heard by Mananne of Huttenpo, which mentions that Amnichia had died from his injuries.173 While this information 
was only a rumour and the dispatched troops sent to disseminate truth from fallacy later returned without answer, this 
bit of information must have effectively been the trigger for the change in attitude towards the war for Elmina. 
Subsequently a mere two week later when the coalition still based at the Ankobra base camp refused to cross the river, 
even though they had finally received the long awaited word from Amon Ndofu imminent attack, a furious and 
disappointed Huydecoper wrote to Elmina about the latest setback.174 Huydecoper the strategist and keen observer of 
the past must have been quite aware that the longer his coalition sat still, the more this would fuel Elmina’s doubt 
regarding the necessity of the war. It is probably in this context that we must understand his harsh stance and belligerent 
attitude toward Elmina’s soft approach of the African deserters and other matters.  
 While Huydecoper was required to write about the latest developments surrounding the war, his March 7th 
letter detailing the caboceer’s unwillingness and the subsequent follow up dated March 10th in which he promised to 
lead the troops into battle so that he could keep an eye on them to ‘prevent another unorthodox retreat’, received 
staunch criticism from Elmina.175 This criticism was reverberated on March 14th, questioning Huydecoper’s very 
leadership ability whilst highlighting that this war had become an ‘enduring expense with no results worthy of mention 
for the Company’.176 Specific wording in the March 14th letter certainly gives the notion that the Elmina council was so 
disappointed in Huydecoper that they were but a vote removed from bringing a halt to the war. With the arrival of this 
letter in Axim Huydecoper must have realized that his worst fears, a tarnished legacy, would quickly become a reality if 
he did not act fast. Huydecoper’s uncandid ability to convince the natives, probably through fury or some form of 
unrecorded extortion, that this would be the only chance left to make another attempt on Appolonia, quickly brought a 
halt to Elmina’s efforts. Indeed, within in a week of receiving the March 14th letter, Huydecoper was advanced across 
the Ankobra River planning his next move to oust Amnichia.  
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After nearly two months of lying idle at the Ankobra Mountain base, on the 21st of March Huydecoper’s 
troops finally agreed to ventured across the river to make another attempt on Appolonia.177 While the troops traversed 
the river on the 22nd, Huydecoper himself would follow a day later accompanied by command of 42 men and the 
company slaves. More was expected from this expedition, as the quantity of people was larger than those of the 
previous expedition.178 Actual head count for this expedition was difficult to determine due to a native superstition that 
foretold that the last man counted faced certain death.179 Due to this superstition Huydecoper refrained himself from 
counting and later estimated that the army was between 2000 to 3000 head strong at the beginning of the campaign.180    
On the 23rd an informant of Joúw of Seconde reported that the troops had made their way to Siama. Similarly 
to the first expedition this trip had gone without incident, till they had reached the Abomouw (Abo Mossou) riverbank. 
On the opposing riverbank the troops had discovered a newly erected fortress. The troops had attempted to lure the 
enemy across the river, but success was not immediate as the enemy settled for gunfire across the river instead of 
crossing it themselves. This gun battle was all in vain, because the range and the quality of the men shooting the 
weapons meant that hardly any shots were landing. Huydecoper informed the Africans that they were to halt and make 
no attempt to cross it till the commander himself had arrived. Later that day when the heat had begun to dissipate 
Huydecoper exchanged the Ankobra mountain post for one along the beach near the enemy’s fortress. 181 His coalition 
consisted of the sergeants Lehman and Hasselaar, the Axim cotton planter Heuvelman who had been armed, the 
bombardier (artillery corporal), corporal Carbo’s 36 soldiers and 2 voluntary tapoeyers. As is obvious from the resource 
material, their trek toward Siama was not well planned out, as high tide made crossing the Ankobra River a difficult 
and exhausting task. Nonetheless by 6:30pm the coalition had arrived at Kakam, from whence a few Africans were 
dispatched to notify and request troops to guide them to their camp.182 After resting at Kakam for sometime, a tired 
Huydecoper arrived around 8pm that evening near the enemy’s fortress and opted to erect a new base camp along the 
shoreline with his troops station directly in front of him, before electing to rest.   
 That prior evening little rest was obtained due to the enemy’s continuous suppressing fire. This gunfire had 
dominated the night still and had not let up by the early morning hours, which caused the troops to respond. 183 
Witnessing this gun barrage across the river from a safe distance, Huydecoper with limited war supplies in the back of 
his mind, put forth an order to halt the aimless gunfire. The troops initially resisted the cease-fire order, which caused 
Huydecoper to accompany sergeant Hasselaar and Mr. Heuvelman to the front line to see for themselves if anything 
could be accomplished by shooting across the river.184 Hasselaar and Heuvelman decided that the best way to determine 
if anything could be accomplished with their guns was to fire their weapons themselves and see the results. The enemy 
had spotted their approach to the riverbank and had taken a few precautionary steps backwards, but continued their 
barrage. The sergeant and Heuvelman determined that something could be undertaken with the small guns. This news 
excited Huydecoper who quickly ordered the white soldiers to the front line with the appropriate small cannons. These 
troops announced their approach to the front line with beating war drums, the noise and later sight frightened the enemy 
into a hastened retreat to a supposed safe distance.185 Still convinced that the bigger guns could inflict harm despite the 
enemy’s retreat, Huydecoper promptly brought the so called ‘dubbele haken’ to the frontline. With the first discharge 
the WIC troops hit one of the enemies, who was subsequently pulled to safety by another. Another five shots would 
proceed, but at the time the last shot was fired the enemies had retreated to within the fortress walls well beyond the 
guns reaches.186   
 Within the confines of their walls the enemy rather defiantly, probably with intimidating contempt, raised 
three flags. Of the three flags two were known, the Dutch and the English flag. The brand new British flag was 
determined the most importance because it was centrally displayed and flew higher than the rest.187 This is the flag  
incident that prevails in most scripture that attest this topic.188 We know no further information of how Huydecoper felt, 
or if he was suspicious of any English wrong doing at the time, because he makes no further notes of the instance. What 
we do know is that when the enemy retreated into their fortress, some brave troops dared to venture across the river 
where they burned the enemy’s front posts. Whether this was a tactically instructed move or not, it was obvious in the 
lack of a response that the enemy had no interest in facing the coalition on the flats of the beach. The lack of a response 
by the enemy lead to Huydecoper’s return to his tent, where a discussion took place about what needed to be done in 
order to defeat the enemy.189 The conclusion was that proper cannons were needed to defeat the enemy’s army.190 Later 
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Figure 5: NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 964, Axim Correspondence, March 24th 1763, Folio: 52F. (Troop arrangement on the Abbo 
Mossou River) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  (part) Map of Appolonia 1766 TNA CO 700/Gold Coast (1D), Map of Cape Appolonia, Dublin 1766. 
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that afternoon Huydecoper sent the bombardier Teltjes accompanied with a few strong men to collect the two and four 
pound cannons from the Ankobra Mountain.191  The result of a disinterested enemy and a lack of guns meant that the 
remnants of the afternoon and evening were uneventful. 
On the morning of March 25th an unlikely obstacle confronted Huydecoper. The leaders (opperdienaers) of the 
troops from Elmina and Sacconde had come to Huydecoper and requested from him to make and end to the war by 
engaging in battle now rather than later. There was good reason for the natives to do so, as the rainy season in which 
they sewed the fields was approaching rapidly.192 Huydecoper’s assistants warned him that the same might happen as 
had previously occurred at Axim and the Ankobra. This meant that the war could quite possibly be shoved on a long 
term undertaking yet again.193 This news greatly frustrated Huydecoper, as he was well aware that another delay for a 
few months would almost certainly end the war entirely. This fact alone led him to compromise with the African 
leaders from the Elmina contigency, promising that he would set a date for the return voyage no later than the forth 
coming Saturday or Sunday and that he would personally accompany them back to Axim.  
Not all was lost on this day, as a hostile canoe that was spotted around 9:00 AM gave way to an expedition. 
Hasselaar and Heuvelman (see Table 3) were dispatched along with a command of Edwira, to figure out what this 
canoe was doing.194 While the troops were unable to capture this canoe, which had supposedly a water supply mission, 
the coalition had discovered the enemy’s command post. The recognisance further revealed that the enemy’s stronghold 
was actually a square structure built in similar fashion as the European forts along the coast, rather than a wall like 
structure. The draw back was that this cordoned building hid the enemy troops, preventing the coalition from making an 
accurate assessment of how large the enemies combat force was. The actual size of the building made the coalition 
determine that it could hold no more than half of Huydecoper’s troops. Furthermore, the recognisance mission showed 
that the stronghold stretched from the sea to the river, and that on that day four English flags were flying defiantly.  
The news for the remainder of the day was of mixed feelings, as certainly the 50 Africans from Ahanta that joined the 
troops must have made Huydecoper rejoice. On the other hand the news that Tjekoe, one of Huydecoper’s servants, had 
died from a wound incurred during the last battle must have dimmed the mood.195 News that a supply canoe at the 
Ankobra had capsized made the day gloomier, even though a large part of the supplies were later recovered from the 
sea.196 That evening in an indeterminable mood Huydecoper made his way to the river mouth just before it turned dark, 
to look at the enemy’s stronghold through a scoop. He noticed that there were two different kinds of towers that were 
occupied with people and that construction on the fortification had not ceased as of yet. Huydecoper wanted to attack 
the stronghold badly with his white troops in order to prevent the later from further fortifying their fort, however, he did 
not have enough capable white troops to undertake such a mission. The Africans were of no use, as they had no interest 
in crossing the river without the reinforcement of strong cannons.197 That evening a deterred Huydecoper must have 
laid in his bed contemplating a variety of options that must have included bringing an early end to the war.  
On the 26th, the mood had turned yet again, as the arrival of the bombardier in the morning meant that the 
army no longer had to watch the enemy from a distance without being able to undertake anything. Baesjou’s reference 
about the Elminians making a massive effort to bring the cannons, is directly associated with this day. The reason why 
the troops from Elmina had to make that ‘massive effort’ was because Teltjes the bombardier was faced with a 
unnavigable rough sea.198 Upon sight that the bombardier was struggling mightily, the Elminians swam out to the ship 
to prevent it from capsizing. Huydecoper later said that if it had not been for their exemplary actions that all would have 
been lost to the sea. When the single four pounder cannon accompanied by one two pounder had been brought ashore, 
the remnant of the daylight hours was spent preparing the materials for battle the following day. When the sun had 
settled and neither party could monitor each other’s activities, Huydecoper saw fit to install the cannons along the 
riverside. Cleverly he decided to mask them so that the enemy would not spot them immediately, by building hut like 
structures of branches and leaves.  A report from Axim clearly indicated that on the morning of March 27th a heavy 
battle had commenced on the Abbo Mossou river, as gunfire could be heard all the way back to Axim.199 That early 
morning a coalition led by sergeants Lehman and Hasselaar had been ordered to take the  ‘dubbele haken’ and two 
‘koehooren’ mortars, and trek into the forest to report on the enemies movement once cannon fire had commenced. 
Huydecoper meanwhile had joined bombardier Leltjes and Heuvelman along with a few others on the river 
embankment to watch his cannons do his bidding.200 Cannon fire commenced at 5:30 AM, when a few enemies left the 
safety of their fortress at the river mouth entrance. This barrage was very brief, and the results were mixed. The two-
pounder cannon did little damage, as it did not have the necessary range. This was quickly noticed and firing of this 
cannon ceased within a matter of minutes. The four-pounder cannon, much to Huydecoper’s delight was much more  
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effective, killing several of the men that had traversed outside the stronghold that early morning. It was during this 
cannonade that the oft-mentioned scene of the Africans standing aloof smoking their long pipes with their cloth over 
their shoulders took place.201 What is more relevant than their stature or attire, is that these African troops had no 
interest in crossing the river and engaging the enemy when called upon to do so. The fact that the African troops were 
unwilling to cross the river even with the aid of the WIC soldiers deeply frustrated Huydecoper. Good news from 
sergeant Lehman around 7:00 AM diverted his attention from the unwilling stubborn Africans.  
Sergeant Lehman’s report showed exactly what Huydecoper had hoped would happen, that the cannon fire 
would cause the enemy to start packing their bags and make a quick exodus. Lehman who was station across from a 
small village saw how the fleeing troops were overrunning the small village. He determined that from his position he 
could inflict not only inflict massive damage on the stronghold with the two pounders, but also instil more fear in the 
enemy through a surprise attack on the village from the bush across the river. An ecstatic Huydecoper ordered a portion 
of Mea’s troops to take the 2-pounder cannons to Lehman. Equally he exchanged his position near the river mouth for 
that of Lehman’s. Three quarters of an hour later, after a continious trek through the dense underbrush, Huydecoper 
finally caught up to Lehman and Hasselaar’s party and witness the crowding of the small village first hand. The enemy 
troops were at that time still oblivious to the danger lurking in the bush across the river from them. This point is made 
obvious in Huydecoper’s logbook, when he described the utter chaos that unfolded when the two pounders fired upon 
the village.202 The result of this cannonade was that the enemy hurried out of the village and moved upstream to another 
small village on the river. Within a mum of time the exact same sequence repeated itself once the cannons had been 
moved into position yet again. This final sequence forced Amnichia’s troops from the riverside permanently, which 
caused Lehman to refocus his aim on the stronghold.  
Around noon, Huydecoper having witnessed the limited success of the cannons instructed the mortars 
(Koehoorn mortieren) to be primed for an attempt to throw them over the river into the fortress. Success in landing 
several mortars instilled panic and confusion for the first time within confines of the fortress. The enemy responded to 
this by digging trenches and holes that would protect them from the mortars. This prompted Huydecoper to use the 
guns (dubbele haken), which briefly brought a halt to the work. Once the work resumed in the fortress a subsequent gun 
barrage yet again brought the work to a grinding halt. This sequence of events must have gone back and forth several 
times, till the bombardier who had been left behind at the river mouth with the 4-pounder joined in with several 
devastating shots. The actions of the later caused droves of the enemy to flee all at once, in groups upwards of 30 
people. These deserters were chased by gunfire (dubbele haken), in similar fashion as those attempting to return to the 
stronghold. In the heat of the battle Huydecoper noticed that several enemies were severely wounded, but no account of 
injured could be taken as these men were quickly pulled to safety by their cohorts.203 While the previous was unfolding, 
Huydecoper would have liked the African troops to have mounted an attacked. An inquiring if the later would do so, 
received a less than satisfactory answer. The Africans had outright refused because they supposedly could not cross the 
river at high tide. Even after reassurance that the fortress was virtually empty, the Africans stuck to their initial verdict. 
This greatly frustrated Huydecoper, who foresaw his fruitful daytime venture dwindle into an abysmal state, as he was 
certain that the enemy would return to the fortress during the night. While the battle continued on and enemy troops 
continued to flee from the fortress, the eventual nightfall forced an exhausted Huydecoper to halt the barrage and return 
to the base camp.204  
The end of the battle meant that the Africans could go off and search for food and relax for the duration of the 
evening. That is exactly what a fisherman belonging to the Ahanta commando of King Entier opted to do. While on the 
river, due to the dead silence the fisherman heard the enemy’s instructions to abandon the fortress, followed by 
substantial river noise as if many men were crossing the following river all at once. Instead of continuing with his 
fishing he made haste for Entier’s quarters and informed the leader of what he had heard. King Entier promptly put 
together a recognisance party who crossed the river with a hastened pace, to see if any enemies had remained in the 
fortress. After dispatching his men, Entier dispatched an informant to Huydecoper’s quarters, to inform him of his 
doing.205 Huydecoper had barely but his head down to rest, when this hastened messenger came with the news. This 
news rejuvenated Huydecoper who leapt from his bed and sent instructions to all the nations to grab their arms and 
follow the Entier regiment in support. All the haste proved to be fruitless, as the Entier command had secured the 
fortress by the time that the last party of the African coalition was informed. Upon hearing this news of the capture of 
the fortress, a euphoric Huydecoper crossed the river with several troops, to have a look at the palisade for himself. 
Corporal Carbo stayed behind to take watch over base camp, just in case the enemy was trying to outflank the troops 
and opt for a nightfall attack from behind. 206  
The evening light produced by the smouldering remnants of the enemy’s huts revealed that stronghold had 
been damaged terribly.  The digging and sand throwing that Huydecoper had witnessed from a far that afternoon 
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revealed themselves to be the works of numerous holes and trenches.207 The extent of the ground disturbances was so 
bad, that Huydecoper’s opted to settle outside of the fortress on flat ground to accommodate a good night rest. The 
additional troops that had jointly crossed the river opted to forage ahead, and eventually by nights end settled in a town 
that had previously belonged to Amnichia’s cousin named Carraua (Carralla). The troops of King Entier claimed this 
victory, and Huydecoper let them have it, even though he realized that the cannons were largely to thank for the 
enemy’s hastened retreat. In light of all that happened the Elminians felt disgruntled and were disappointed that they 
had not listened to the commands of that afternoon to attack the stronghold. A late letter that evening from Huydecoper 
to Commies Klok at Axim to report that the troops had successfully captured the enemy’s fortress marked the ending of 
the second invasion and the battle for the first enemy fortress.208 
 
 
2.5	  	  The	  Battle	  for	  the	  Second	  Palisade	  
 
Eagerness for battle reigned within the African coalition after the capture of the fortress. The African troops 
for the first time were ready and willing to commence an immediate attack on the enemy. In the shadows of the first 
fortress Huydecoper learned quickly from the remnants of the first fortress that storming the next fortress would likely 
be a suicide mission. Indeed, while climbing one of the three towers to view his battlefield, Huydecoper discovered that 
the enemy had cleverly cut several small shooting holes into the framework that allowed them to shoot at the 
approaching troops without sustaining any damage themselves.209 When Huydecoper reached the top, he observed 
another fortress, which forced him to tame the African eagerness. The cannons were deemed necessary again, as 
Huydecoper and his officers understood that a full on assault would inflict hardly any damage on the structure and 
likely produce excessive casualties.210 Well aware that a demoralizing defeat would jeopardise the whole mission, clear 
instructions were sent to the African troops that had foraged ahead to halt progress and refrain from combat. Ironically 
the African troops listened for a change and stayed put while the supplies were brought across the river from the old 
encampment. Loading and shipment of the cannons was delayed until later that evening, as the two-hour trek towards 
the second stronghold would have forced heat exhaustion on the soldiers in the middle of the day.211 Later that 
afternoon, Sergeant Hasselaar and bombardier Leltjes accompanied by Heuvelman and another 18 men, were charged 
with shipping the cannons to the battlefront. This convoy was aided by 3 African commandos, which cleared their 
pathway and provided extra military support in case of a surprise attack. News came that the canoes had run into 
troubles, when Huydecoper was on the verge of leaving the encampment for the battlefield. The canoes had to pas two 
small islands where the forward posts had discovered enemies.212 Going past these islands without a larger escort who 
could defend or capture the islands, meant that the enemy could easily make an attempt on the canoes. Mea’s troops 
offered to capture the islands the next day in order to secure the river and to make way for the delivery of the 
artillery.213 
On the morning of March 29th, an impatient Huydecoper decided at 9:30 AM to send Lehman and the 
bombardier accompanied by two regiments to the front posts on a recognisance mission.214 These men were specifically 
instructed to see if the front posts could undertake any action. Not far removed from the battlefront Lehman opted to 
divide the group, and sent a small command of Antasche troops ahead to clear out the overgrowth (kruepelbosch) along 
side the riverbank. This command made quick headway and before they knew it, they had reached the front posts of the 
enemy’s stronghold.215 The enemy had quite easily spotted the advance group, as they had been in a relatively open 
area and were rather careless with their guns along the route. This had prompted a small group of the enemy to leave 
the fortress in order to confront the troops. The Antasche had maintained a vigilant eye on their surroundings and had 
noticed the movements of the small Appolonian regiment. Their awareness prevented the Appolonians from sneaking 
up on them and allowed them to fight without a disadvantage. The gunfire that resulted awoke all the regiments, and 
both fiend and foe converged to support their troops.216 The battle commenced in a very structured and organized 
fashion, as the regiments took turns fighting. Lehman and bombardier Teltjes escaped the fight without harm and made 
a quick return to the base camp where they informed Huydecoper of what had unfolded. It was obvious that 
Huydecoper wanted to send the cannons to the African troops aid, but a lack of information and support troops dejected 
him from doing so. Instead he opted to ready all the remaining regiments for immediate departure. Before he was able  
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 to move out, proof of the battle started to arrive in the form of a jawbone brought by Entier and a head brought by 
Apefoa (Apejoa) of Ancobia.217  
In the afternoon the battle had turned due to several advances made by the African coalition troops on all 
fronts. News came from Boa’s actions around 1:00 PM, that the islands had been captured and that the enemy had 
retreated to the front steps of the fortress. This message appeased Huydecoper greatly, as it meant that the cannons 
could now safely make their way toward the battlefield. The canoes were not soon thereafter on route toward Boasso, 
which probably correlates to present-day Arobaso. Huydecoper equally journeyed toward the battlefront with the troops 
that had remaining at his side.218 The voyage there took upward of two hours as indicated by Huydecoper’s arrival of 
3:00 PM, even though the actual distance covered was probably no more than five kilometres.219 The reason why this 
voyage probably took such a considerable amount of time was probably due to the exhausting heat of the middle of the 
day, which must have forced the coalition to proceed with a reduced pace. It was obvious from the number fleeing 
troops that Huydecoper had encountered on his trek toward the battlefield that the desertion rate was high. Most notable 
of those who refused to return were Mananne and Quou the makelaars of Boutry who had been two miles removed 
from the battlefield at the time Huydecoper began his trek.220 Upon arrival Huydecoper discovered that several of the 
African regiments, especially those belonging to Ahanta, had remained absent from the battle scene. He countered 
several of these troops along the outskirts of the battlefield enthralled with their tobacco, resting under parasols.221 Not 
sure what was going on Huydecoper opted to investigate what had transpired and who was leading the charge against 
the enemy.  
 What little information has survived of this battle indicates that the enemy had fallen back twice to the 
comforts of their fortress’s walls. Their attempts to lure the WIC coalition to follow, so that they could shoot from the 
safety of the fortress had obviously failed. This is clearly indicated by the third wave of fighting that was in progress 
when Huydecoper arrived near the battlefront. The information the latter obtained clearly revealed that the troops from 
Elmina were at that present point in time leading the charge against the enemy exhalation. This last wave of attacks 
ended abruptly around 5:00 PM when the enemy retreated for what seemed at that time like the final time.222 From the 
surviving archival records it is difficult to determine what battlefield tactics the Africans employed during these 
clashes. More so, the exact location where this might have unfolded remains equally occluded in the archives, albeit 
Huydecopers notation that ‘they remained steadfast at Boasso’.223 The only modern attempt to uncover where the 
second fortress was is recorded in Valsecchi book, which determined that the fortress was probably located in Ekonu or 
Bakanta.224 What the archives do reveal is that the troops from Elmina, Axim, and Adom had fought valantly in the 
forgone clashes, while the Antasche troops supposedly had not done their part. Huydecoper noted that: ‘none of the 
troops had fought longer than fifteen minutes’.225 Without certainty it was determined that the second wave was fought 
by the troops from Edwira, Adom, and Axim, while the troops from Elmina and Anta had abdicated from ensuing 
battle, dispite King Entier’s attempts to inspire his troops to fight.   
The enemy’s third retreat to their fortress presented the African troops with a chance to pillage supplies from 
the recently acquired islands. The troops took food, fishnets, pots and even parts of the houses that would serve as make 
shift shelters against a potential storm.226 Meanwhile Huydecoper had instructed the troops of Axim and Edwira to gain 
control over a small pathway, which would allow the cannons to be moved to the frontline. Amnichia’s troops who 
witnessed both these scenes from within the fortress walls, lashed out for a vigorous attack. The troops of Axim and 
Edwira who had been appropriated to gain control over the small pathway received the brunt of this fourth attack. 
Amnichia’s troops fought so valiantly, that Huydecoper was forced to call upon the troops of Ahanta in order to contain 
the enemy’s vigour. Much to the displeasure of Huydecoper these troops were dejected by the order and outright 
refused to fight. This insubordination enraged Huydecoper and forced the fort commander to make the tough decision 
to move to the frontline, aided only by the WIC soldiers and the loyal Ancobia troops.227  
Similarly as before, Huydecoper announced his approach to the battlefield by letting the drums echo through 
the forest and the fields. This sound equally to last time it was employed, had frightened Amnichia’s troops into a full 
on retreat to the fortress. The rain that had started not soon after Huydecoper had instructed his soldiers to move to the 
frontline, turned into a torrential thunderstorm that forced the rest of Amnichia’s troops back to the fortress. This 
unfortunate turn of events played well into the latter’s hands, as their fortress sheltered their war supplies from the 
rain.228 On the other hand the WIC coalition troops did not have such luxuries, which resulted in soaked guns, useless 
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wet gunpowder, and unserviceable cartridges for the ‘dubbel haken’ guns. Equally unfortunate was that the 
thunderstorm had instilled fear in the troops, which caused a large proportion of them to retreat.229 Out of fear of being 
overrun, Boa requested that the troops fall back to the base camp and regroup from that location for a later attack.230 
Huydecoper who had barely set foot on the battlefield was forced to make the difficult decision to surrender all that had 
been gained on this expedition.  
The return voyage to the base camp occurred no later than 6:30 PM that evening. On their exodus from the 
front line, Huydecoper ordered several shots to be fired in order to deter the enemy from invading at nightfall.231 This 
action proved to be useful, as that night was particularly quiet. When Huydecoper had endured another lengthy trek 
back to the base camp at the captured fortress location, he was mortified to see that large droves of Africans were 
crossing the Abbo Mossou River. He immediately put a halt to the desertion attempts of almost 200 Africans troops, 
even though he determined that in the hours he was removed from the base camp many more had fled to Axim. At days 
end the WIC troops had only sustained a single loss of life and upward of 80 injuries. Huydecoper was convinced that 
the enemy had suffered far greater losses, but he could not determine the casualties they had sustained in their 
attacks.232 When all was said and done, most of the days work had translated in little progress, and all that was gained 
that day was subsequently lost in the days that followed.  
 
 
2.6	  	  The	  Exodus	  Out	  Of	  Appolonia	  	  	  
 
 The exodus out of Appolonia and why this occurred is generally explained only in single sentence 
constructions by many of the aforementioned authors, if explained at all. Valsecchi noted that Huydecoper was ‘getting 
bogged down in the defense of his position and was daily loosing people who fled from their posts.233 Likewise Basejou 
noted that the retreat was based on the aforementioned instances but added that starvation and the problems of supply 
lines as well as the farming season undermined the whole operation.234 Given that the retreat from Appolonia marked 
the unofficial ending of the war, it is vital that we learn what actually transpired between the ending of the battle for the 
second fortress on March 29th and the full retreat from Appolonia on April 17th.  
 Amnichia’s troops had suffered nothing but demoralizing defeats since the beginning of the second invasion. 
In the wake of the WIC’s offensive on the second fortress near Boasso, Amnichia’s troops needed to do something to 
turn the tide in their favour. Short on war supplies, as was obvious from Huydecoper’s mention that they used bullets of 
copper and other brittle materials, Amnichia needed to plan an attack that optimized his chances for victory.235 
Amnichia or a person acting on his behalf, given the later was badly injured, must have determined that rumours much 
along the same lines as they had done in January’s engagement would likely result in a heightened state of fear and 
could potentially lead to a retreat. Amnichia the intellectual trader understood fully from past experiences that supply 
lines were the backbone of every operation, be it militaristic or economic, without supplies nothing could be done.  
A plan was devised to infiltrate the forest behind the WIC coalition and to attack the supply lines in order to create 
instability and fears. Presumably in the dawn hours of March 31st a small commando of Amnichia’s troops moved out 
of Appolonia to seek a safe spot in the forest along the beach where they could easily ambush the supply runners. The 
troops had stationed themselves between Siama and Kakame where they silently awaited the supply runners that 
transgressed the beach between Axim and Huydecoper’s base camp. On March 31st, the hour being no later than 8:30 
AM, Amnichia’s troops took aim at the supply convoy sent to Axim that morning by Huydecoper. The attack from the 
dense forest blindsided the WIC supply runners and caused mass confusion and total disarray, with people running in 
every direction possible.236 Several were presumed to be dead or taken captive by this enemies regiment, but over the 
course of several days it quickly became obvious that the damage inflicted by Amnichia’s regiment had resulted only in 
three deaths, of which all were from the Apenjafoesche troops. The two troops from Akim who had befallen into the 
enemies clutches later resurfaced, as they had escaped by venturing into the sea and swimming to Axim. From the 
Siama/Kekame area Amnichia’s troops advanced to the river mouth at the Ancobra where they in defiance of the river 
guard planted a flag. The WIC troops still stationed at the Ankobra fired upon the troops with a cannon still stationed 
on the Ancobra Mountain, which caused the enemy to deviate into the obscurity of the forest.237 Subsequent efforts to 
discover the culprit proved itself to be of little use, as the sneaky Appolonian regiment had quickly dissipated into the 
dense forest well beyond the reach of the WIC search parties, as is clear when Mea’s troops on April 2nd returned 
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unsuccesfull from their venture to apprehend the Appolonian regiment now determined to be no more than 20 in 
strength.238  
News of the attack in the Abo Mossou camp, presumed at that time to be inflicted by the Wassa, created mass 
uproar and lead many of the African to decree a need to retreat. This was a total attitude reversal, as not a day earlier 
the WIC coalition forces were still unwavering from the cause, prepping the war materials for another attempt on 
Amnichia’s second fortress. Cunningly Amnichia’s trickery had yet again infiltrated and partially destroyed the mindset 
and confidence of Huydecoper’s coalition. The chaos and the unwillingness to abide to the chain of command on that 
morning forced Huydecoper to undertake severe actions to prevent a full on retreat by several of the native fractions. 
These actions were so severe that he instructed his European regiment to raise their guns against the perpetrators, to 
make them abide to his commands. Most notable of the insubordinate group was the Apenjafoesche regiment of 
Elmina, who had learned not soon after the return of the supply runners that three of their peoples had been killed in a 
small skirmish with the same Appolonian commando that had struck the supply runners.239 Huydecoper’s only option to 
withhold them from foolishly following and likely solely engaging Amnichia’s troops was to fire an empty 4-pound 
cannon shot after them. While this was successful in restraining the Elminian regiment, Huydecoper was forced to call 
upon the WIC soldiers to force the regiment back to their allocated resting place. This action created a tense stand of 
between Huydecoper and the African regiment where both parties had drawn guns on each other with the intend on 
firing not far from the mind. Eventually the regiment from Elmina stood down, largely impart due to the pressure 
exerted by the other African troops. Huydecoper had to restrain himself from lashing out at the troops when one of 
them personally addressed him as a woman who was afraid to accompany them to the frontlines.240 Regardless of the 
devised defensive scheme that Huydecoper installed for that evenings defences, the days business had created a 
permanent destructive divide between himself and a faction of the African troops.  
 In the following days, while tension must still have been high in the camp, one of the first things Huydecoper 
did to combat another attack on the supply lines was to appropriated a forest guard to keep the forest clean from 
enemies. Furthermore, he determined that Amnichia’s troops were only able to bypass his troops because the troops 
from Ahanta had not been vigilant enough. For the aforementioned reason Huydecoper reappointed the loyal Mea 
Tekye to his previous station on the West bank of the Abbo Mossou River.241 When a ship flying the Dutch flag passed 
the camp later on April 1st Huydecoper noted that the ‘mood improved slightly’ due to a belief that this potentially 
carried a long awaited message from Amon Ndofu.242 It is difficult to believe Huydecoper’s statement that the mood 
improved especially because that same evening the troops from Elmina called a meeting to debate the necessity for the 
continuation of the war. The result from this first meeting was that Boa Bende, Aoumi Baan, Aveia Dabo, Quouw, 
makelaar of Boutry, King Entier, Tarre, and Guetta from Axim and other caboceers from Ahanta, disagreed with the 
Elmina troop leaders about the necessity to return to Axim. The troops that disagreed with the troops from Elmina 
clearly were not willing to give up the fight simply because they had suffered a minor setback that resulted in three (five 
reported in text) deaths. Huydecoper on April 2nd could only resort to extreme measures to prevent the argumentative 
troops from Elmina, who had come to his hut, from embarking on a voyage home. He decreed that he would: ’rather 
raise his own guns and shoot them himself than to taint the Dutch name by fleeing from Amnichia’.243 While the 
Elminians would change their minds after the conversation with Huydecoper, it was obvious that the coalition slowly 
but certainly began to fracture at its core, questioning every move that was undertaken by the leadership. Huydecoper 
noted of the Elminians that:  
 
“…their supposed cleverness in openly displaying their change of heart through singing war hymns could not 
fool me,  instead it saddened to know that these troops would stoop to such levels. More so, this cowardice 
act and their avid speech about desertion in times where there was no present danger, made me realize how 
little I could depend upon these troops in time of need. This exhalation of deceit did little to affirm my belief 
that any good was to come of it.” 244  
 
The difficulties encountered on April 1st and April 2nd did not mark the end of the war, as another attempt to 
convince the Africans was agreed upon in the night from April 5th to April 6th.245 As is obvious from the April 4th entry 
and April 6th entry Huydecoper faced severe opposition from the Elmina corridor and parts of the Ahanta camp, who 
had constituted to acts of trickery to demoralize the other troops, by first proclaiming that the Wassa of Asserrie 
Abrouponba was coming to attack and later ensuing a course of action by revamping the fear that Amnichia’s troops 
had fallen in behind them.246 It should come as no surprise that when the troops called another hastily arranged meeting, 
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that some of the Huydecoper loyalist were not present. Their absence from that meeting allowed the the opposing 
coalition to strike down the previously accorded field march, and agree upon a return voyage to Axim.247 In the days 
that followed April 6th, as previously mentioned by Valsecchi, Huydecoper could do little to convince his troops from 
making another attempt on Amnichia.248 Indeed, as is obvious in Huydecoper’s dialogue from April 7th through April 
9th, the forces against him had grown to embittered to reconsider another attempt. While some Africans including but 
not limited to Boa Benda and Mea Teyke would have ‘walked through fire’ for Huydecoper, even they recognized that 
they could not ensure the fort commander his protection without the appropriate backup. Desolately Huydecoper 
realized no later than April 9th that his chances of continuing the war were slim to none. Recourse to Axim for the 
troops that had stuck by Huydecoper’s side finally occurred on April 17th, when all the troops had finally returned to 
Axim.  
 In light of all the above, there are a few conclusions that can be reached about the methodology of the war and 
its impact on African warfare. The problem with our perception of African warfare is that the majority of the authors 
have over the last several decennia mainly focused on the post industrial revolution wars.249 Aside from the limited 
inquiries of Bosman, De Marees, Barbot, Cruickshank, Meredith, Den Heijer, Law, Kea, Thornton, as well as a few 
unnamed authors, the general post industrial view, especially of the influence of war materials such as the gun, has 
yielded a skewed view of not only the usefulness of the gun in the centuries prior but also reduced the idea that 
Africans were at times able to resist European lead advances. The usefulness of the gun in Africa has been a subject of 
long debate and will probably remain so. Despite this imposition, we can confortably conclude that Thornton 
assessment that ‘the gun, in the forest regions of the Gold Coast, only had a nominal impact on the eventual success of 
wars’ is an accurate assessment of what transpired in Cape Appolonia.250 Equally his assessment that ‘war became a 
matter of maneuver, as soldiers made much use of cover, and sought to get enemies to fire at them from long distances 
through taunts and dances, so that they could take advantage when they missed their shot’, is very applicable to what 
occurred during the first evening on the Abbo Mossou River.251 Now as for what specific weapons were in use during 
the battles, we can say for certain that flintlocks, older muskets, swords and or cutlasses played a vital role in the battle 
sequences. Through conversations with professor Den Heijer, we concluded that it was quite possible that the 
Manchester gun was already used during that time. While it is quite possible that throwing weapons such as the pointed 
javelin and throwing club might played some part in the battles, this distinction is not obvious from any of the surviving 
records. The sword was used probably only by the officers to cut of the enemies heads as a prize. All in all, what 
transpired tactically in this war, almost outright agrees with Professor John Thornton’s assessments.  
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Chapter III:  Why the WIC Lost the Battle & the War 
 
“...Huydecoper’s (my) return to Axim without victory caused an indescribable sense of defeat to be instilled at 
Elmina, as if all was lost. Due to the fact that I had been at the head of the battle, people were unhappy with me 
that I could not remove Amnichia from power with this expedition. I showed that we had killed many enemies, 
destroyed one of his fortress, destroyed most of his grain (Milhio) and rice fields, as well as charred many of his 
villages, nonetheless all this did little to convince those in Elmina that Amnichia had suffered a significant 
blow.” 252 
 
When Huydecoper returned to Axim, after enduring a largely unsuccessful and exhausting field campaign, a 
defeatist attitude captivated a wide audience on the Gold Coast. The most prominent of this audience was the European 
constituency on the coast, especially the men of the Elmina council and English Governor Charles Bell. This 
displeasure with the result instilled an internal blame sequence that lasted well into Huydecoper’s appointment as 
Director General. Huydecoper, who had stood solely accused, equally played his part in this subsequent blame game. 
Until his last days as Director General in 1767, Huydecoper on numerous occasions incarcerated nearly everyone while 
maintaining his innocence. Due to the longevity and the political undertone of the blame game sequence, analyzing the 
argumentation of either side in full would yield few answers and would take a considerable amount of time. In light of 
the time constraint, analyzing every single specific detail and individual is simply out of the question. In order than to 
see who is fully or partially to blame for the defeat, there is a subdivision of five categories: The Role of the Africans, 
The Role of the Europeans, Material & Natural Issues, Understanding Amnichia’s Battle Victory in Context, and The 
Walmbeek Presidency & The Consequences for the war.   
Noteworthy before proceeding with analysis is that Huydecoper excluded the following from doing any harm 
to the campaign: the servants (dienaers) of Mr. Ulsen, Myzang, Doekoe, Apefoa, Zuakoe Dejou, Erasmi’s servant 
Klyne Tando, Wimpon Entiem, Doatte, and Etoukema all have tried their best with the Akim troops, yet they each had 
to endure continuous insults from the young adults’.253 Equally, Huydecoper excluded the WIC soldiers who 
accompanied the latter to the battlefront, as well as C.S. Clock, who served as acting fort commander in Axim for the 
duration of the war. On the one hand, it is safe to assume that the Africans provided in the list above were innocent due 
to Huydecoper’s overall dejection of the African behavior. On the other hand, the argumentation for the soldiers and the 
interim commander is less trustworthy due to the camp formation that succeeded the return from the battlefield. This 
thus requires further inquiry in the following sections.    
 
 
3.1	  The	  role	  of	  the	  Africans	  
 
“…the difficulties that I (Huydecoper) face here daily, and the worries that endlessly trouble me, are 
indescribable with ink. The Africans are the most hen-hearted people under the sun. I thought I could trust the 
troops from Elmina, yet they are so smart, smarter than all the others are. Yesterday evening they called upon 
all the African leaders to join them in a meeting, in order to convey to them that they ought to signify and 
convince me that I should now leave the battlefield, as the rejoice of the capture of the first palisade and having 
fought in front of the second was more than enough….”254 
 
The role that the Africans played during the battle for Cape Appolonia is one of mixed if not desolate 
overtures for the WIC. On the one hand, the African presence was an absolute necessity for the Europeans, as the lack 
of a continually maintained coastal army forced the Europeans to source African help to resolve numerous local and 
regional conflicts. The resulting ration of Africans to Europeans for the WIC coalition army was in the neighborhood of 
seventy-five to one. Consequently this extreme ratio gave the Africans a considerable bargaining position in the war. 
Essentially this position allowed the Africans to make decisions about not only when, but also how and by what 
measure warfare would occur. Cunningly, the Africans were able to keep the Europeans interested in the war, by 
pursuing a subservient course of action, until such time that this would be detrimental and less rewarding pay wise for 
the African factions.  
Now not all African factions pursued a similar course of action, as certainly the troops of Mea Tekye and 
those from the Axim area, were model soldiers quite willing to fight Amnichia without the assurance of pay. The 
majority of the troops from Ahanta on the other hand, at least so it would seem from Huydecoper’s letters, were very 
different from the aforementioned model soldiers, as they were there solely for booty. The worst of these troops were 
those from Boutry, as they were outright insubordinate and on regularly far removed from the battlefield. Their 
spinelessness is clearly revealed with their delivery of a jawbone to Huydecoper from a man killed a few days prior by 
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other troops.255 Worse yet, albeit not in regard of the efforts during the actual battles, are the troops from Elmina who 
insisted that their pay for service be paid well advanced. Willingness or unwillingness to fight with or without pay 
certainly is a fair distance removed from explaining, which of the African troops forced Huydecoper from the 
battlefield. What it does reveal is that some troops were motivated beyond the financial gain that they could attain from 
the war.256 The troops that were essentially fighting for honor, which were Mea Teyke, Boa, and the peoples from 
Axim, can largely be excluded from our search, as they wanted Amnichia out of their lives and were so Huydecoper 
would latter say: ‘…willing to walk through fire…’.257  Now in order to see who is actually responsible for the abrupt 
ending of the battle it is best to first look at Huydecoper’s accusation so that we get a picture or a start so to say, about 
which troops stand accused.  
Upon his return to Axim Huydecoper was quick to judge that the failure of the battle for Cape Appolonia was 
due to the Africans abandonment. Huydecoper vindicated that:  
 
“…he (Huydecoper) had been forced to return from the expedition against his wishes, in large part due to the 
African troops from Elmina. Their distasteful attitude and increasing desertion rate toward the end of the war, 
created the necessary doubt that forced even the most loyal Africans to start questioning the necessity and 
motive for war.”258 
 
This blame consignment should receive some consideration, as the man himself was much closer to the very 
issues than subsequent historians have been. Huydecoper specifically attributed the loss to Cudjo, his own head servant 
(opperdienaer), Tjekoe, Erasmi’s servant (dienaer), Tando (vaendraeger) of Akim, plus Tekkie Akoschim and Esser 
Ouckama of the Ancobia party. These men were determined to be the least loyal of the Africans that fought in the battle 
for Cape Appolonia.259 Little would change in the subsequent years, as Huydecoper in numerous reviews of what 
happened stuck to his original exclamation that the Elmina core group (Asafo) is to blame for the direct loss of the 
war.260 Due to Huydecoper’s persistence over time, it seems unlikely, albeit only at first glance, that a closer look is 
required. In limelight of the sequence of events provided in chapter two, a reassessment of Huydecoper’s accusations is 
desperately needed. By pursuing such course of action, we can fully understand if Huydecoper’s assessment was 
correct or incorrect.  
The problem with Huydecoper’s accusation, and the reason why we need to investigate his claim further, lies 
in his methodological approach. Huydecoper quite blatantly resorted to blaming the Elmina troops for the entire war. 
This was due to their overbearing power in the African political landscape that eventually prompted several other troops 
to leave Cape Appolonia as well. The problem with this method is that Huydecoper assigns blame without the proper 
attributable causality. Yes, it is true that eventually the Elmina group turned against Huydecoper, but troops from 
various towns and regions had started to evacuate the battlefield about the same time that the Elminians had started. In 
order to pursue this question in the correct way, we must look not only at the ending of the battle but also at the 
beginning and everything else in between. Doing the research this way, we should avoid having numerous answers, if 
possible. Due to time constraints and word limitation parameters, we will only have time to scrutinize the start of the 
hostilities, each individual battle, and the time in between the last battle and the return to Axim. The information that 
this inquiry will reveal should counterbalance Huydecoper’s accusations, so that we can see if his accusations are 
trustworthy.    
Recall that the origin of this war was a dispute between Mea Tekye of Edwira and Amnichia of Cape 
Appolonia. While in some respect we could blame Mea Teyke for dragging the WIC into the war, it would serve well to 
remember that the WIC and the other African parties only got involved in the war due to Amnichia’s aggression in 
Axim. If the topic is approached with the intent to find the root of the problem, than Amnichia and consequently Mea 
Teyke should receive the full brunt of the blame consignment for their initial roles. The problem with this answer is that 
it yields almost no information about who is responsible for the failure of the battle for Cape Appolonia. Likewise, the 
pursuit of revenge tactics, which promotes the idea that the first few days and weeks are of utmost importance due to 
slowly regressing moral with the passage of time, would provide another skewed answer. This approach yields that the 
troops appropriated to come to Axim’s aid should receive a large part of the blame. This directly means that the slow 
responding troops from the Ahanta region, the Abakan, the Addodasche, the Pippiasche, Boa, as well as the 
shorthanded Manuaals regiment, each share in the blame.261 What is obvious from these two answers above is that 
neither of these preconceived notions, albeit they are informative, would suffice in directly answering the question at 
hand. Further examination is thus forthright required.  
Approaching the subject from the results of each battle reveals yet another opportunity to assign blame. The 
culprits for instance that caused the first battle retreat, aside from the slave who delivered the instigating message, were 
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almost all the African troops. For this battle, specifically we have to highlight the efforts put forth by troops from 
Elmina and blame the troops from Ahanta for instigating the retreat. The latter’s actions subsequently forced the retreat 
of all troops, which eventually lead to the previously discussed delay of almost two months. For the second battle, the 
unnamed fishing soldier from King Entier’s commando should be commended for his swift actions that lead to the 
capture of the Amnichia’s first stronghold. On the other hand, the other troops should be frowned upon for their 
insolence and dogmatic reactions towards the orders of that day. The failure of the last battle can be blamed on the 
supposed laziness of the African troops. Those receiving the brunt of the blame are the youthful troops from Boutry and 
other regions of Ahanta. Equally, the troops from Elmina should receive blame, partially due to their insubordination to 
engage in another fight when so requested by Huydecoper. The problem with the answers above is that the African 
stubbornness and insubordination throughout the battles only reveals which troops were the least willing to fight. These 
results from the battle sequences far from explain who actually forced Huydecoper from the battlefield. Given that 
almost everyone deserves some sort of blame up until this point, it is obvious that the last two weeks were instrumental 
to Huydecoper’s assessment.  
The last fifteen days of the war, were riddled with internal strife, essentially caused by Amnichia’s slew attack 
on the supply lines on March 31st. The atmosphere after Amnichia’s attack changed so drastically, that not only 
bickering between the Africans and European took place, but between the Africans themselves. What is obvious from 
Huydecoper’s logbook is that the African troops largely became concerned for their own well-being. There is no greater 
example than the brutality that the troops from Elmina undertook when in Zuaw’s absence they took over his resting 
place, stripping it bare of its huts and supplies.262 The war that had up until this point largely been focused on 
Amnichia, had in a matter of a day or so turned into a war of self-protection. With the pursuit of self-protection, 
especially in warfare related incident, the act of self-preservation is one of the top priorities. This sequence began to 
transpire on the evenings following Amnichia’s raid on the supply troops. Individuals from several groups including 
those from Elmina, Ahanta, Pomponde, Aprimmedoe, and several others, began fleeing from the encampment. At first 
Huydecoper was able to put a stop to these actions by turning the weapons of the WIC soldiers upon those African 
troops. The best example of this occurred on April 2nd when several troops from Elmina had begun to make their way 
across the river. The Huydecoper loyalists quickly came to Huydecoper’s tent noting the Elminians ulterior motive, 
presumably after seeing them hide their bandoliers in the water vats. 263 Albeit Huydecoper limited the April 2nd fleeing, 
the latter was almost entirely powerless during the last two weeks to prevent the Africans from doing the same as 
support for the war quickly regressed. Valsecchi noted that Huydecoper’s inability to maintain a united front and halt 
the African exodus, were the main reason why he was forced to returned to Axim on April 16th.264 While this 
assessment is true, as certainly one cannot wage war without the support of troops, the causality about why the Africans 
began to return to their homes lies deeper rooted in a previously accorded agreement.  
The reason why support started to ebb has remained a mystery, as neither Baesjou nor Valsecchi attempt to 
explain in detail what actually happened during the last two weeks. As slated above, the disruption of the supply lines 
essentially changed the moods of many of the African troops. This mood change brought about daily meetings by the 
African leaders, who organized themselves in two camps, the pro-abandonment camp and the Huydecoper loyalists.  
The pro-abandonment group, lead essentially by the African leadership (Asafo) from Elmina, began to urge the 
importance of returning home. 265 The troops that generally aligned themselves with this camp, had no personal interest 
in the fight, and must have been disappointed in the battle as it had not delivered the expected booty. On the other hand, 
the Huydecoper loyalist, who consisted of King Entier, Mea Tekye, Boa, Bende, Aveca, Aoumi, and several other 
leaders from Ahanta, were determined to stay and finish the battle that they had started.266 The latter group was so 
passionate in their cause that they declared: ‘that they would walk through fire with me (Huydecoper), without 
abandoning my side at any given point.’ 267 Eventually the loyalists were able to gain the upper hand in the meetings, 
and by April 6th, a renewed vigor took hold of the camp. Despite enduring continuous protest, the loyalist were able to 
pass a favorable resolution on the evening of the 5th going into the 6th, that entailed that another field voyage to 
Amnichia’s second fortress would be forthcoming.268 Sadly enough, this renewed outlook would not last. During an 
emergency meeting called in the evening of the April 6th, the pro-abandonment group was able to restrain the Africans 
from going on the field march that following morning.269 This meeting was the deathblow for Huydecoper’s war, as the 
present African leaders voted against another march and concluded that a return to the Ankobra encampment was 
necessary. What remains suspicious of this emergency meeting was the absence of several of the loyalist. The fate that 
sealed the return voyage ironically was not a single-handed decision by the African leaders from Elmina. Quite contrary 
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to this belief, several defections from the loyalty party and the absence of Entier, Bende, and Aoumi created the right 
conditions that delivered the final blow to Huydecoper’s grip upon the war.270  
Now why the Africans so suddenly turned against Huydecoper probably has its origins in the agreements made 
on March 13th.271 Recall that the troops from Elmina stayed endlessly on the roads in February, much to Huydecoper’s 
frustration, this was probably due to their unwillingness to wage war. If we assume this as true, then when the troops 
from Elmina eventually did return to Axim they must have been quite keen to endure only a short field march before 
venturing home again. Albeit Huydecoper does not reveal who set the limitation for the eight-day excursion limit, it is 
probably fair to assume that this initiative was a construct of the Elmina troop leadership.272 The idea that the Africans 
from Elmina are behind this, is supported by their behavior on March 25th, when the Elmina leadership came to inquire 
if Huydecoper could set a definitive date for the return voyage to Axim.273 Now due to the presumed keenness to return 
home, it is fair to assess that the troops from Elmina had no interest in staying longer than the initially allotted period. 
Thus, if we take the date of departure, which was March 22nd, and add eight full days to this than the deadline for the 
return voyage would be no later than March 31st. In light of the aforementioned explanation, it is quite understandable 
why the troops from Elmina so suddenly became such a headache for Huydecoper from April 2nd onward. Quite simply 
put, Huydecoper had over extended his stay on the battlefield and thusly suffered the consequences of those not willing 
to adjust their rational.   
In light of all that was presented above, the role that the Africans played in the battle for Cape Appolonia 
remains a difficult one to fully comprehend. This is in large part due to the lack African literature about the sequence of 
events, which could have argued against the Eurocentric causality. What is fair to assess is that if the Africans were 
entirely to blame for the war, then certainly it would be impossible to single handedly point out a singular party. The 
argumentation for this claim is based on the idea that several groups from different regions played equal parts in 
procuring the result. While Huydecoper’s assessment is not entirely unfounded, as the troops from Elmina did play a 
major role in the sequence of events, it certainly remains difficult to blame them entirely, especially because they 
fought valiantly during several of the battles. Thus, the only major conclusion readily to be made of the role of the 
Africans is that the group as a whole performed well bellow what Huydecoper and subsequently the Dutch West India 
Company probably had expected. Despite all the above, Baesjou and Valsecchi’s conviction that the withdrawal from 
the battlefield in April was the by-product of the Africans desertion certainly will remain the overbearing image of the 
African role in the defeat.274  
 
  
3.2	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Europeans	  	  	  	  
 
The Africans were far from the only ones who should receive the brunt of the blame, as the Europeans played 
an equally integral part in the procurement of the failure. The roles of the Europeans during the battle for Cape 
Appolonia differs little from the roles of the African factions. Indeed, the division of the African troops that fought for 
honor and those that fought for incentives partially serves to explain the roles of the Europeans. On the one hand, you 
have the Axim representation, essentially Huydecoper and some of the commissionaires sent to aid him during the army 
recruitment process.275 On the other hand, you have the Elmina Council and Director General Erasmi, essentially the 
political body in charge of the financial expenditure on the Gold Coast. This group approached the war from a financial 
point of view and not from the necessity point of view that had preoccupied much of Huydecoper’s early arguments. 
Essentially this group wanted to limit the expenditure of the war much in the same way that the African group focused 
on exponentially bounty. Broadly viewing the war, the one thing that both European factions had in common is that 
they each served as an oversight entity. Both groups were essentially involved in the war to provide the necessary 
strategic oversight and to supply the required war materials. The influence of each of the European roles upon the war 
has been subdivided into two categories: before the war, and during the war. These subdivisions should allow a broad 
overview of the influence of each of the European factions upon the war and subsequently thereafter.     
It was obvious from the start of the troubles in late 1761, that the Elmina council had no particular interest in 
starting a war against Amnichia. Albeit Huydecoper’s attempts to make clear to the council Amnichia’s overbearing 
impact on the regions trade, by as late as February 1762 the council remained uninterested to carry the financial burden 
of a war. Only the direct attack of Amnichia upon fort Saint Anthony in the subsequent month swayed the council from 
their previously pessimistic stance, that the conflict in the region was strictly an internal African conflict. On March 3rd 
two days after the Axim attack, the Elmina council reevaluated their previous notion and concluded that:  
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“They (the council) had decided to support Huydcoper (you) with all its might and prowess, in order to end the 
present danger succumb to Axim and to remove Amnichia entirely from Cape Appolonia if possible.”276  
 
The combined role of the Europeans was essentially to assemble an army and to prepare this unity for a field 
march. Right from the start of the war, even though the Elmina council had previously voted in full confidence to 
support Huydecoper, the aforementioned divisions took shape. One of the earliest disagreements that shaped the role of 
both factions for the duration of 1762 took place six days after the Elmina council had pledged to support Huydecoper 
fully. On March 9th Huydecoper received a return letter from Elmina detailing that his request for more troops from 
Elmina had been denied. The Elmina council was convinced that the troops allocated were plentiful. The real reason 
why Elmina did not want to appropriate more troops from Elmina actually came down to the associated cost that the 
company would have to endure.277 Whilst this letter did give Huydecoper and Walmbeek the subsequent freedom to 
approach Entjakon, it was obvious that forming allegiances would be somewhat of a difficult undertaking due to the 
financial oversight of the Elmina group. As one may recall from chapter two, this overbearing oversight, albeit some 
expenditure did occur to form allegiances, essentially was one of the reasons why almost a year passed before an actual 
invasion occurred.278  
During the actual battle, the roles of the Europeans can be subdivided almost along the same lines. The group 
that supplied the material and those were to use it. For those that supplied the material necessary for the war, in essence 
the Elmina council, a greater overview of their actions will be shown later in section 3.3. The other group that used the 
materials, aside from the Africans that have been covered above, essentially consisted of Huydecoper and the 
subsequent appropriated WIC soldiers.279 Fundamentally these troops attempted to regulate the daily events of the battle 
to the best of their abilities. While the prior group did have some negative impact upon the latter mentioned regulatory 
group, we need not concern ourselves with their influence, as this was of relatively little importance for the actual 
battle. In order to fully understand the structural roles that the Europeans employed during the battles, we will have a 
close look at the chain of command, highlight the actions of several individuals along the way.   
The chain of command of the Europeans essentially started with commander Huydecoper on the top. 
Huydecoper, who had allocated himself as the overseer the building of a coalition army, equally gripped the chance to 
become the controller of the troops when he opted to join them on the battlefield during the March-April excursion. 
Supposedly he had accompanied the troops to ‘raise the spirits and maintain courage’, but the real reason he went along 
was essentially to prevent another disheartening fiasco such as the first battle.280  Once actually on the battlefield, 
Huydecoper’s role was much more than a figurehead. He fulfilled several roles, including the post of commander, 
peacekeeper, judicial officer, regulator, manager of food and material, and at times a transcriber when assistant Paaling 
was ill. Essentially Huydecoper did almost everything humanly possible with the time constraints. The plethora of 
responsibilities that Huydecoper had, should of course not be seen as an excuse or aid in his defense.   
As with most battles the commander position generally tended to be the one of most importance. This role was 
quickly on display when Huydecoper arrived at the western encampment on the Abbo Mossou River. As one of his first 
acts, Huydecoper ordered the African troops to halt their fruitless material squandering gun barrage. Subsequently he 
appropriated one of his European officers, probably known for his marksmanship, to see if the usage of the regular gun 
bore any fruit.281 Similar actions to these are obvious in the previous chapter. While Huydecoper obviously was much 
more than just a simple figurehead, his effectiveness over the command of the African troops remains an arguable fact. 
The constantly changing variable of the African troop’s willingness or unwillingness greatly frustrated Huydecoper, 
who probably would rather have seen either himself or one of his close European confidants in a totalitarian position.  
The role that the European supporting cast played on the battlefield is one that has maintained its mythical 
properties. While we are fully aware of the list of those stationed at Axim in 1763, it remains largely unknown who 
specifically accompanied Huydecoper. Furthermore, a large majority’s actual role on the excursions remains unknown 
because we are not precisely sure of who went and who stayed behind to guard the fort in Axim. Before continuing to 
assess the known roles of the individuals involved in the battle, the above acclaims only apply to the March-April 
excursion, as we have no quantifiable data explain the individual roles for the first excursion in late January. The only 
assessment that we can make at this time of the first battle is that some of the Europeans probably went with the 
Africans to Siama, possibly only in a perfunctory role. The same cannot be said of the second excursion, as we can 
provide detailed information about the accountability of bombardier Leltjes, appointed assistant bombardier 
Heuvelman, sergeants Hasselaar and Lehman, corporal Carbo, and assistant Paaling.  
Bombardier Leltjes and the recently appointed assistant bombardier Heuvelman essentially controlled 
everything related to the canons. Both men are primary factors during the battle for the first fortress, as their strategic 
ability coupled with Huydecoper’s command results in the near destruction of Amnichia’s first palisade and the 
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eventual capture later that evening. The same sequence of events for both men was set in motion during the third battle 
for the second palisade. Before both men were able to position the cannons, a torrential downpour, halted their 
progress. While no records indicate the cannons return voyage to the captured palisade, it is fair to assume that both 
men were in charge of that voyage. For the duration of the war, both had taken up a defensive position on the beach just 
advanced of the captured fortress, until both returned to Axim during the exodus in mid April.   
Sergeants Hasselaar and Lehman were assigned various tasks throughout the war. These differed substantially 
from one another, as one day they might be placed in charge of guarding the supplies or moving the cannons, whilst the 
next they were assigned tasks to go with certain African regiments and explore the region. Both men played a crucial 
role in the successful second battle, as they had advanced further West along the riverbank with Mea Tekye’s troops, in 
order to report on the enemy’s movements. Their reports essentially resulted in several strategic side attacks that 
created a chaotic atmosphere within the enemy’s fortress. Indirectly their actions lead to the capture of the fortress later 
that evening. Corporal Carbo probably played a similar role in the larger picture, even though we can only note of his 
activities that he helped Huydecoper’s party cross the Ankobra river and that he was put in charge of the base camp the 
night that Amnichia’s first palisade was captured.282 The Axim fort assistant Paaling equally had accompanied 
Huydecoper onto the battlefield. His task there was limited to doing the paperwork and keeping oversight of the 
supplies as well. He is with most certainty the individual who wrote Huydecoper’s day journal of the expedition.  
Now as for the roles of the unaccounted European sergeants and soldiers, it is fair to assume that these played 
in a similar perfunctory role as some of the aforementioned. Specifically what their roles were in the actual battle, aside 
from partially accompanying Huydecoper to the frontlines during the battle for the second fortress, will probably 
remain unknown. As for the role that the general soldiers played in the battles, we are only able to convey, that aside 
from the daily task of guarding the stockpiles and Huydecoper, some probably played made their way onto the 
battlefield in a lesser role. The entire group for certain, especially during April, responded several times to the hostile 
inquiries undertaken by the coalition natives, when the latter would come and complain, at times with guns drawn. 
Indeed, if anything the overall role of the European troops, especially the lower rank ones, was simply to guard 
Huydecoper from any potential harm.  
In light of all that was presented above, the role that the Europeans played in the battle for Cape Appolonia 
remains difficult to fully understand. At first glance it is reasonably fair to assess that the commander and overseer of 
the battle would be guilty by default, as many that had predated and post dated Huydecoper suffered a similar fate. In 
light of this general historical pattern, it is obvious why Huydecoper bore the brunt of all accusations made by the other 
Europeans. What the above section accompanied with chapter two actually shows contradicts many of the latter 
accusations, as Huydecoper had applied himself to the fullest of his capabilities to ensure that the war against Amnichia 
would be short lived. While we are able to recover Huydecoper’s individual orders and see them partially mapped out, 
whilst in the hands of several key figures, many lingering questions about the Afro-European power struggle and the 
effect that this had upon the battle sequence remain. Due to the struggle for control, essentially caused by the African 
unwillingness and successive undermining procedures, it seems nearly impossible to consign the full blame upon 
Huydecoper and his European battlefield contingency.  
 
 
3.3	  Material	  &	  Natural	  Issues	  	  
 
One other thing to consider aside from the human elements, are the issues that arise with the materials used 
and the influence of nature upon not only the materials but also the whole sequence of events. Material and natural 
issues are essentially one of the biggest and at times most consistent problems that many historically scrutinized troops 
fighting different battles in different historical stadiums commonly had to have dealt with. Many leaders including 
several Caesar’s, Napoleon, the Soviets, and the Americans, each had their own battles plagued with material and 
natural issues. Given we know that the battle for Cape Appolonia failed and that Huydecoper was arduous in his writing 
about the lack of materials, the question we have to ply ourselves over is if the war actually fail due to material and or 
natural issues. In order to understand if the war did fail due to these issues we will approach the subject with a 
preconceived guilty verdict. This methodological approach will allow us to focus on the bigger picture, instead of 
hampering on the smaller issues such as short delivery delays or the individual effects of each rainstorm.     
The Cape Appolonia war was inertly no different from the wars mentioned above, as material issues plagued 
its success from the onset. The materials issues started well prior to the Europeans actual declaration of war against 
Amnichia, when the latter had purchased all food stock of Axim just prior to advancing upon Mea Tekye. Failure of the 
subsequent farming season is equally to blame on the war, weather, and the increased mouths to feed with the 
settlement of Mea Tekye’s contingency in Axim. The combination of these events created the dire circumstances that 
essentially explain why no large permanent fighting forces were maintained, as Thornton noted that this was a logistic 
nightmare.283 Upon reviewing what happened in the war against Cape Appolonia several years after the facts, 
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Huydecoper revealed that Director General Erasmi had failed to appropriate the company’s vessel, probably the Maria 
Suzanna, for the purposes of delivering the appropriations necessary for the war.284 While this ship was one of the 
larger boats in service of the company on the Gold Coast, capable of caring much greater loads than the longboats and 
canoes that eventually were appropriate to deliver the materials to Axim, in reality its appropriation would have made 
an insignificant amount of change to the events as they played out. This assessment is made on the premises that it took 
a lengthy time before any troops of substantial size actually assembled at Axim. Furthermore, there are the Guinea 
currents to consider, which generally wreaked havoc upon larger ships attempting to travel westward from Elmina to 
Axim. This very fact was responsible for the WIC’s abrupt halt of the first expedition to conquer Axim from the 
Portuguese, as it took the expedition ships well over two weeks before they had reached Takoradi.285 The tides 
(branding), was equally of concern, despite having the Rimadoors available to deliver the materials.286    
Now to simply note that Elmina had entirely failed to deliver upon Huydecoper’s requests is far from the truth. 
Quite contraire to numerous accusations put forth by Huydecoper, many voyages to Axim were undertaken, as is 
evident in the Axim and Elmina correspondence for the years 1761-1763. Ironically, while the period surrounding the 
WIC invasion attempts of Cape Appolonia is littered with distressing reports about the lack of supplies, only a singular 
report with the same undertone and connotation is recoverable for the timeframe that Huydecoper actually spent near 
the Abbo Mossou River. This report was sent on April 3rd and reads as following: ‘Help the Africans for God sake, as 
quickly as it is possible, and beg his Excellency, that he does not turn from us in a time of need, other wise my zeal in 
service of the company will have been of no purpose, as we cannot fight without lead’.287 In light of this passionate 
outreach, it is reasonable to assume that Huydecoper had accrued some sort of stockpile at Axim in the previous year. 
Certainly what this sudden outcry does depict is that there was not enough material, or even a contingency plan, incase 
a catastrophic setback ensued. If anything is to be concluded from the lack of letters during the battle months, it is that 
Huydecoper and probably Clock, who were each latter blamed for not fully keeping Elmina informed, were probably to 
preoccupied dealing with the daily routines than to keep Elmina fully informed of every little detail.  
Dispite not knowing if material was running low during the first few days of the battle, it is difficult to exclude 
material issues as a primary factor of why the war failed. In reflection of the entire battle sequence there are only two 
specific material related instances noteworthy of discussion. The first instance was the lengthy encampment in front of 
the first fortress, and the second was the detrimental advance on the second fortress. Obvious from chapter two, the 
direct blame for the lengthy encampment on the eastern bank of the Abbo Mossou River lies squarely on the shoulders 
of the chain of command. Essentially what should have occurred is that the leaders of the troops that left a day prior 
should have sent a messenger to Huydecoper at the Ankobra camp, detailing a vast structure blocking their 
advancement across the Abbo Mossou River. While this did not occur, it is fair to assess that Huydecoper should have 
known that eventually the cannons would have come in handy. Indeed, if the latter had simply opted to let the cannons 
accompany them to the battlefield than there would have been no material issues that caused the lengthy delay.  
The second instances does not deviate much from the previous assessment, as the lack of usable war supplies 
on March 30th was fundamentally the fault of the chain of command. As one can recall on March 29th Huydecoper and 
his troops advanced to the front of the second fortress where several battles took place, before a torrential rainstorm 
brought a swift halt to the advancement. While arbitrarily the weather was directly responsible for the ruin of the guns, 
gunpowder, and the firing mechanism of the cannons, consignment of the blame might is not clearly transparent. 
Blaming Huydecoper entirely for this monstrosity, would a displaced assessment from the reality. While Huydecoper 
cannot be fully excluded in the blame, bombardier Leltjes group and the African leaders that provided oversight for the 
provisions, are equally if not more responsible for the setback. The actions of the Africans are very auspicious, as not 
long before the rainfall Huydecoper observed how several of the Africans were plundering a small village on one of the 
islands in the river, supposedly taking with them large parts of the enemies huts. 288 Now the Africans probably used 
these partial shelters to shield themselves from the elements, of which the foremost proponent had been the sun 
throughout the day. Now what happened to these makeshift shelters during the torrential rainstorm remains an enduring 
mystery. What must be assumed, due to the total ruin of the war supplies, is that the Africans opted to use the makeshift 
shelters for own purposes instead of providing them to guard the war supplies. We could blame the Africans entirely 
but this would seem inappropriate, as certainly one of the commanding officers, including Huydecoper who had 
observed the phenomenon, should have acted swiftly and demanded that this shelter be used to protect the supplies. 
Despite being unable to fully attribute the blame to a singular party, it was quite obvious that the ruinous power of 
nature had an enduring impact on the war.   
The impact that material and natural issues played on the war’s outcome is questionable at best. Yes, while we 
can select specific instances were material issues and issues caused by a natural phenomenon reign supreme, they were 
in large part to be anticipated. Huydecoper should have known that Amnichia was likely to fortify himself somewhere 
between the Ankobra River and Cape Appolonia. By strategically preparing himself, Huydecoper should have deduced 
that these fortifications could have arisen only at a few locations. One of those points was at the Abbo Mossou River 
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mouth, where indeed Amnichia had built an imposing fortified structure to prevent an easy river crossing. Equally the 
April 29th material setback, as shown above, likewise has a stigmatization of unpreparedness to it. In light of all that 
was presented above, it is safe to assume that the material issues were a result of miscommunication and the erroneous 
role of the involved human beings. The issues caused by nature do not stray far from this assessment.  
 
 
3.4	  Understanding	  Amnichia’s	  Battle	  Victory	  in	  Context	  
 
The previous pages have attempted to explain how the war should be is to be viewed from the perspective of 
the West India Company. In these pages we tried to come to grips with the causality of why the war against Amnichia 
failed. Whilst our research attempted to show the interconnectedness of the numerous reasons why the war did not turn 
out favorably for the WIC, these explanations largely overlook Amnichia’s actual success. If we can grasp ever so 
lightly at the actual story of Amnichia’s success in this battle sequence, certainly than this would shed further light on 
the company’s failure. This following section attempt to provide an  overview of Amnichia’s victory from the context 
of the European sources. It serves purposefully to create a better understanding of the battle sequence.  
Amnichia’s actual success in the war is something worthy for discussion, especially concerning the critical 
analysis of the information provided in the forgone pages. Many questions persisted about Amnichia’s tactical and 
actual success in the Cape Appolonia war. The foremost of these questions must be the very question if Amnichia 
himself or his commanders actually had a direct input on the subsequent victory that had succumb them by mid April 
1763. In order to constitute if Amnichia’s victory came by his own doings, we will quickly reflect back to the major 
battle scenes and try to emulate not only a picture of circumstances from the WIC side, but also a picture from 
Amnichia encampment.  
The first altercation against Edwira, Mea Tekye specifically, in the fall of 1761 was far from a victorious 
undertaking for Amnichia. Quite the opposite is in fact true, as many of those leaders who had previously sided with 
him, or had remained neutral out of fear of possible repercussions turned from his side. Most obvious in the neutrality 
department was Amon Ndofu. He was not inclined to attack Amnichia in prior years due to fears that the Dutch would 
assist Amnichia if he were to attack him.289 Of course, there is a sense of questionability of Amon Ndofu’s true intend 
in the war, given his repeated promises to attack never materialized. Nonetheless, it was obvious since the Dutch had 
condemned Amnichia’s behavior and had partially aligned themselves behind Mea Tekye, that Amnichia suffered a 
major setback in regional politics, as most of the African nations surrounding him left his side entirely or reverted to a 
neutral stance. Amnichia’s invasion of Edwira subsequently turned out to be not only defeat followed by an ensuing 
retreat to the coast, but also into political disaster from which the latter did not soon recover.   
The invasion of Axim initially must have seemed like a victory for Amnichia, but it proved to be a venture of 
mixed results for both sides. For the WIC, especially Huydecoper, it was humiliating that Amnichia could simply 
invade the Axim territory and attack the subjects of the region under his forts control. More so, his nearly unopposed 
march toward Axim clearly revealed how ineffective Huydecoper was throughout the invasion. Contrary of dejection, 
Amnichia’s review of the invasion of Axim shortly after it happened must have been one of positive reflection. Yes, 
although his primary mission to inflict as much damage as possible on the troop from Edwira and subsequently capture 
Mea Tekye was relatively unsuccessful, his subsequent ability to strike fear within the hearts of the Africans, especially 
those from the surrounding areas, gave Amnichia a short-term victory. This short-term victory is most evident in the 
lack of troops that initially responded to Huydecoper’s demands and the subsequent Elmina council order for 
reinforcements. Long-term analysis of the invasion of Axim, however clearly shows that this particular instance was the 
turning point for the Elmina council to come full circle on previous statements and fully support Huydecoper’s prior 
proclamations by declaring war on Amnichia.290 Thusly, albeit that Amnichia at the time must have viewed his 
encroachment upon Axim as at least moderately successful, the subsequent events that followed from this act must 
certainly have made him reassess his supposed victory.  
The battles for Appolonia proved to be a difficult undertaking for both parties, as both had reasons to be 
optimistic and pessimistic. The first invasion, which ultimately ended in a retreat by the WIC coalition troops, was a 
stalemate for both sides. On the one hand the WIC had the right to claim outright victory as they officially defeated 
Amnichia’s troops in battle. Furthermore, they had killed several high-ranking officials and subsequently injured 
several more, which included Amnichia himself. On the other hand, Amnichia’s ability to instill fear after the battle, 
which subsequently leads to a full retreat from Siama, gives him just as much right to claim a victory. Analysis to 
determine who the righteous victor of the first invasion was, essentially finds its causality in the very origins of what 
one determines as victory. With aforementioned in mind, albeit that Huydecoper’s troops had successfully beaten 
Amnichia’s troops, the very fact that they had surrendered the landscape for which they had fought so avidly hours 
prior, certainly gives a more prevalent choice to declare Amnichia as the victor. Nonetheless the very identification of 
victory lies in how someone approaches the subject. From someone approaching it from the WIC point of view, 
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obviously the successful slain of several high ranking officials and severely injuring Amnichia himself, whilst obtaining 
the victory of the battle in the bush and on the beach certainly would outweigh the cowardice retreat. Approaching the 
topic from Amnichia’s point of view, certainly would lay claim to the ousting of the WIC coalition and thus the 
successful defense of the region loyal to his reign. As is obvious from that provided above, the first invasion was a 
stalemate for both sides.   
The second invasion was a successful undertaking for the WIC until Amnichia undercut the supply routes. The 
direct measure of Amnichia’s success, after his troops had cut the supply lines, is difficult to accurately assess or 
measure at face value. What is obvious from the latter paragraphs in chapter two is that Amnichia’s devised plan, which 
should have translated in a full retreat by the WIC forces, failed only due to Huydecoper’s extreme restrain measures. It 
should be noted however, that Huydecoper’s actions had a lasting negative impact on the coalitions cohesion, which 
nonetheless albeit indirectly, caused the disarray Amnichia’s troops had hoped. Indeed, while Huydecoper did not 
envision a retreat yet in early April, it was obvious by April fifth that another invasion was unlikely to happen as the 
troops had divided themselves in several independent camps, unwilling to cooperate with Huydecoper and one 
another.291 Now to fully attribute the retreat to Amnichia’s successful supply line attack would be something that is 
fully unjustifiable. While it is indeed true that the attack caused a degenerative atmosphere to take control over the 
camp, dejections toward Huydecoper had occurred on several previous instances, albeit that these instances were 
limited and easily overcome by simple words. Even though Amnichia’s actions were monumental, the actions of the 
coalition troops themselves and not Amnichia eventually forced Huydecoper to return to Axim.   
 
 
3.5	  The	  Walmbeek	  Presidency	  &	  The	  Consequence	  for	  the	  War	  
 
Most African historians are well aware that political upheaval within own rank, whether it be of African or 
European origin, always had some kind of effect on the African landscape of centuries past. Sometimes the effect was 
so profound that an entire nation or region would suffer under the consequences of political upheaval, as is obvious 
from the historical past of places such as South Africa and it’s Boer wars and apartheid policy, Ugandan and the 
dictator Idi Amin, and the Congo and king Leopold II, just to name a few. The Cape Appolonia war period under 
scrutiny suffered a similar political upheaval that had dire effects on the outcome of the war. The political upheaval 
period at first glance started not soon after Huydecoper’s return from the battlefield. Subsequently at the time of 
Director General Erasmi, an all-absorbing blame game period took hold of nearly everything on the Gold Coast. This 
period indirectly had a profound effect on the local history of Cape Appolonia. The origins of the subsequent events 
following Director General Erasmi’s death that caused this profound change, has its origins well vested in a dispute 
years prior to the Cape Appolonia war.  
The birth of the problem began well prior to Huydecoper’s arrival at Axim, as a series of unfortunate events 
for the latter were set in motion by his own doing in the years 1759 and 1760. The main recipients of Huydecoper’s acts 
of malice were former President Ulsen, Commissioner Walmbeek, and Mr. Clockener. These men played a vital role in 
Huydecoper’s initial demotion from his Presidency stool.292 Understanding his demotion has thus far remained obscure 
and relatively unknown to scholars such as Baesjou, Claridge, Van Dantzig, Valsecchi, and other Gold Coast historians. 
The following information about Huydecoper’s demotion is but a quick sketch of some of the underlying factors. It is 
quite possible that a future inquiry into the matter could reveal that the following outlined details were not as significant 
as made out to be within the context of this research. Nonetheless, until such an inquiry pursues we must persist with 
the idea that the trio of Ulsen, Clockener, and Walmbeek played a vital part in removing Huydecoper from his standing 
position.  
The time-constrained inquiry into Huydecoper’s demotion revealed that his removal from office dealt partially 
with his handling of former Director General de Gietere’s estate and his accusation of former President Ulsen of 
defrauding the company. Interestingly Ulsen who had been no particular friend of Walmbeek or Clockener received aid 
from both men in fending of Huydecoper’s accusations, which eventually lead to his exoneration.293 Why either of 
these men helped Ulsen remains unconformable today, but it is almost certain that a future inquiry will reveal that it has 
a root in Huydecoper’s own bad behavior towards both men. Huydecoper who had turned into a man infamous for his 
lust for drink, subsequently made a few bad judgment calls that weighed particularly heavy against the continuation of 
his reign.294 One of those was bad judgment calls was threatening Mr. Walmbeek with the ‘schiemand gat’ in the 
middle of a meeting, if the latter did not shut his mouth. 295 The ‘schiemand gat’ was essentially a prison cell at Fort 
Coenraadsburg that was ‘frequently used as a disciplinary institution for misbehaving officials of the WIC’. 296 For what 
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reason this outburst occurred, albeit we can probably blame it on Huydecoper’s intoxicated state, remains thus far a 
mystery. What is certain is that this outburst, in which Walmbeek was for the best part innocent, left an enduring 
imprint on Huydecoper’s character and played an important role on his inability to obtain the Director General stool in 
1760.     
The results of the procedures against Huydecoper was that (Fiscaal) Erasmi was promoted to Director General 
and that Huydecoper was given the option to either leave the coast with honor intact or to pick a fortress of his 
choosing. At the time newly promoted Director General Erasmi and commander van Blydenberg, who had but recently 
gained control over Fort Crèvecœur in Accra, secretly made a pact that prompted Huydecoper to choose Axim over 
Accra, even though the latter would have catered to his private trade significantly better.297 Commander Walmbeek, 
with whom Huydecoper had quarreled several times in foregone years, essentially received the short end of the draw. 
He was required to vacate his position as fort commander of fort Saint Anthony in Axim. Deposed of a position, 
because at that time all other fortress positions were taken, council Walmbeek returned to Elmina. Embittered, he 
waited several months before he was finally assigned to Chama after the fort commander there died of illness. While 
this displacement frustrated Walmbeek, especially from a financial point of view, he quickly became one of the more 
affluent voices in Elmina due to his candid position as confidant of the Director General. Walmbeek had in fact become 
so popular and entrusted by Director General Erasmi, that he was sent as council extrodinaire to Axim. His role once 
again at his old fort was to help Huydecoper oversee the war organization. 
Walmbeek and Huydecoper at the time that the prior arrived at Axim were far from friends. This lack of 
friendship is particularly evident from the numerous letters that Walmbeek sent to Elmina and Europe throughout 1761. 
Further inquiry into the records from 1759 through 1767 clearly reveal that there was a continual mutual dislike in the 
form of bickering and questions about competence that reigned between both men. When Walmbeek was displaced, he 
was outright convinced that Huydecoper had picked Axim simply to displace him. He recorded in one of his letters 
addressing the economic injustice done to him that: ‘Huydecoper got pleasure out of the prior’s subsequent economic 
misfortunes’.298 While Walmbeek’s accusations in regard to his financial misfortune must be understood as true, his 
aforementioned comment that Huydecoper got please out of the latter’s misfortune remains incorroborable. What is 
intrinsically obvious from the paragraphs above is that Walmbeek was no friend of Huydecoper, however vice-versa the 
same was probably true as well.  
Huydecoper’s lack of friendship and displeasure with Walmbeek is most obvious during the early years of his 
reign on the coast. The topic was thwarted to the forefront again when Director General Erasmi opts to send Walmbeek 
to Huydecoper in March 1762 to assist him during the coalition formation period.299 Huydecoper responds to this news 
rather cautiously, wearily noting that: ‘he will await Walmbeek arrival with the expectation that said man will be 
reasonable and will cooperate with good intentions, whilst he abides to the commands given to him and makes no 
attempt to take control of fort Axim’.300 The skepticism of Huydecoper towards Walmbeek’s intensions was received in 
Elmina with some contempt, as the fort commander was stifled with a stern letter reiterating the previous statements 
made about Walmbeek’s purpose.301 Walmbeek’s arrival on March 15th ends the questionability factors pursued by 
Huydecoper and meant that the men had to get over their internal strife in order to work for the greater good of the 
company. Now why exactly Director General Erasmi opts to send Walmbeek to Axim, aside from the fact that the latter 
saw him as one of his close confidants, continues to be a mystifying factor. Certainly Director General must not have 
been that oblivious to each mans detest of one another. In some regard the very questionability why Walmbeek was 
sent to Huydecoper’s aid does somewhat confirm Huydecoper’s suspicion that Walmbeek had been sent by the Elmina 
council to keep tabs on Huydecoper’s activities.  
Overall, there are no immediate signs that both men clashed while tenured in Axim for the greater parts of late 
spring and the early summer months of 1762. The records are eerily silent on Walmbeek’s account of that period, but it 
is probably right to assume that he simply did the job he was instructed to do, devoid of any emotional investment in 
the matter. Walmbeek’s request to leave came when the recruitment and coalition building had sustained several 
setbacks during the latter part of that spring. Huydecoper who had reportedly begged Walmbeek to stay could do little 
to change his mind, as Walmbeek wanted out of Axim due to the economic detriment that his absence from his post 
was causing him and his business.302 At first glance, Elmina was not particularly happy with the news and was not 
obliged to give into such persuasion.303 While Walmbeek was at first denied his right to transfer back to his fort, a few 
weeks later the decision was overturned.304 The decision to upend the previously made decision was probably based on 
his last letter dated June 13th in which, he noted that ‘the war could last another 5 to 6 months before all was 
concluded’.305 What exactly happened to change the minds of the Elmina leadership so drastically in a matter of a few 
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weeks will probably remain a mystery as the archives thus far have failed to illuminate any input on the decision. 
Coincidentally Walmbeek’s numerous departure requests and eventual approval to do so, enfolds during the midst of 
the Elmina council taking a renewed look at the necessity of the war.306 While this is a bit of speculation, it is quite 
possible that an anti-Huydecoper block within the Elmina Council had gained some momentum, thusly allowing 
Walmbeek his leave and subsequently questioning the necessity of the war.  
On June 21st Walmbeek learned that he was to be relieved of his duties in Axim by council Clockener in a 
matter of days, subsequently he fades quickly from the overall picture of the war following his return to Chama.307 
While Walmbeek fades from the forefront of the war, his dispatch from Axim does not directly correlate into him being 
no further involved in the war. Quite the opposite is in fact true, as he remained in the thick of things due to his 
relationship as Erasmi’s confidant and his position on the Elmina Council governing board. What Walmbeek’s actual 
influence was on the war will revealed itself in the future, when someone academically delves into the notes of the 
Elmina council’s decisions. Dispite not knowing Walmbeek’s influence for certain, it must be reiterated that 
Walmbeek’s stance toward the war probably was preferable due to his attempt in 1760 to get Amon Ndofu to start a 
war against Amnichia.308 Equally his attempt to continue the war, albeit through an indirect manor, after Huydecoper 
had returned from the battlefield would suggest he was adamant to see Amnichia removed from power in Cape 
Appolonia. With this in mind, if the aforementioned inquiry were to be pursued further it should reveal if the personal 
strife had an impact on Walmbeek’s decision to vote against Huydecoper and the war under his coordination. More so, 
this inquiry could potentially reveal if Walmbeek tried to vilify Huydecoper in order to trounce the latter in the 
governmental order of ascension.   
 
 
3.5.1	  Surpassing	  Huydecoper	  &	  Electing	  Walmbeek	  
 
Director General Erasmi’s sudden death on July 19th 1763 created a peculiarly interesting situation, which had 
an enduring impact on the war. At the center of the following controversy was the Elmina council, which was the 
governing board for the coast and responsible for electing new officials. In late July 1763, this board faced a tough 
decision on who should replace Erasmi. On the one side, there was Huydecoper, who was the obvious and righteous 
heir to the position. The problem that the council had in electing Huydecoper to another term as president, was largely 
based on his previous term as president, as well as his recent unsuccessful return from the battlefield that coinciding 
with a barrage of attacks about the lack of support.309 Understanding the council’s decision to bypass Huydecoper 
requires a closer look at the relationship that each of the board members who presided over the resolution had with 
Huydecoper. 
The Elmina council consisted at the time of election of eight main councilors.310 The most powerful 
councillors at the time of election were Huydecoper, van Leefdaal, Woortman, Klok, Fennekol, Walmbeek, and 
Clockener. Future inquiries into inter-company relations, essentially an inquiry to figure out how each of the council 
members coexisted with one another, almost certainly will reveal that greed and personal benefit at the expense of other 
members of the West India Company occurred regularly. Whilst the scope of this research was not focused on the inter-
company relations, it is almost certain that such relations tainted the election of Walmbeek. Further inquiry into this 
matter will certainly reveal that a bond of deduction, in the sense that ‘your enemies enemy is your friend’ prevailed 
during the election process. The main perpetrators or instigators so to say, which caused Huydecoper to be surpassed 
are council Walmbeek, Woortman, and Clockener. These men were essentially politically joined at the hip due to the 
detriment that Huydecoper had inflicted upon each.   
Council Walmbeek, as is obvious from the foregone section, in the years prior to the election had a relatively 
controversial relationship with Huydecoper. Walmbeek present at the abovementioned meeting, intellectually choose to 
read Huydecoper’s arrogant letter dated July 21st, in which the latter all but officially claims the rightful position of 
president.311 While Huydecoper’s absence from the chambers could be seen as disrespectful, concerning the accusations 
made against him during the council’s session, his absence must have factored little. While we cannot discount 
Walmbeek’s relationship with Huydecoper entirely as examples of latter’s actions towards prior were highlighted 
strenuously in the acclamation document, the council himself had relatively little influence over the procedures of 
electing the following president, as he was kindly requested early on to leave the council’s chamber due to his 
candidacy.312  
The first major opponent against Huydecoper’s ascension that had a significant role in the election chambers 
was council Pieter Woortman. The aforementioned council and commander of Fort Crêvecoeur in Accra had become 
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one of the most revered individuals due to his long tenured service to the West India Company. Pieter Woortman, who 
had come to the coast in 1741, did almost all imaginable jobs possible during his thirtynine year career on the Gold 
Coast. In 1780 his reign as Director General, a position he had been in charge of since 1767, officially ended due to 
advanced age.313 It would seem that any decision made by this man would be made on concrete and socially correct 
assessments. The very reasons predicated by the Elmina council document clearly underwrite such an assessment. The 
document reveals that Huydecoper owed Pieter Woortman thirty gold marks and six goods of trade 
(Coopmanschappen) due to a loan offered to Huydecoper by Woortman in 1759. Pieter Woortman’s son, Jan 
Woortman, had equally borrowed capital to Huydecoper in excess of six marks four ounces, three English gold.314 It is 
obvious from the foregoing why Pieter Woortman would vote against Huydecoper simply out of the financial detriment 
that the latter had inflicted on himself and his family.  
While the root of the problems lies in the financial causality as mentioned above, it is not the only reason why 
Pieter Woortman and his two sons Jan and Hendrik would come to despise Huydecoper. Wordly actions undertaken by 
Huydecoper in 1762 upon his return from Jan Woortman’s post (Cormantyn) severely impeded the Woortman’s to 
continue their friendship with Huydecoper. The cause of this perennial dislike is to be found in Huydecoper’s following 
explanation:  
 
“Pieter Woortman stopped being my friend out of interest of his son. Pieter Woortman was revered and often 
named ‘prime minister’ amongst the whites and ‘little general’ amongst the Africans controlled everything 
under the prior Director General’s government. When I was at Elmina in 1761, Director General Erasmi asked 
me as a friend what the men thought and said about his governing. I praised his Excellencies governance, yet 
out of friendship, I thought it my duty to warn him of the negative banter that had come about due to his 
placement of trust in Jan Woortman. While the latter man was fond of negotiations, he was almost incompetent 
in writing …. The general thanked me for my council, yet he still recalled Pieter Woortman to Elmina to 
overhear him of my accusations word for word. The man himself knew how to influence the Director General 
in the right way and turn my words around so that I supposedly had spoken out jealousy, with the intent only to 
presume rule over the coast. This caused Erasmi to interrogate me about my motives. This very act proves that 
the ‘all knowing’ Woortman knows about everything that is occurring on the Gold Coast.  …The Woortman’s 
had taken an offensive stance towards me, because I had attempted to bring shame to the son (Jan).”315   
   
The above quote clearly illustrates the reasons why Woortman’s had turned against Huydecoper. While the 
explanation given in the Elmina council document clearly illustrates that Pieter Woortman’s dislike for Huydecoper 
was based on the financial detriment that the latter had inflicted, this in reality was only a partial truth constructed to 
convince the WIC council in The Netherlands that the elections were based on facts and not on emotional detachments 
or sour relations. Regardless of the real causality behind Woortman’s determination to see Huydecoper surpassed as 
president, it is obvious that he must have had a severe impact, albeit more so indirectly than directly, on the other 
councilors decisions to appropriate Walmbeek as the next president.      
Equally important in the efforts to surpass Huydecoper is council Daniel Clockener, who had previously 
served as his second in command at Axim from June 1762 until December 1762. Council Clockener during the meeting 
held the master of works (Equipage-meester), albeit only interim. The master of works post meant that the latter had 
one of the minor roles on the council table. Despite his so called ‘lesser’ status, which Huydecoper highlighted 
numerous times in 1763 and 1764, he played an important role in persuading the council to vote against the 
appropriation of Huydecoper. This becomes apparently obvious if one reads between the lines and tries to understand 
the coastal relationship between the members of the council and other company officials at the time Huydecoper was 
surpassed. By partially understanding the official’s relations with one another, due to extensive background research, it 
is obvious that council Clockener had become one of the main anti-Huydecoper block members, which also included 
Pieter Woortman and Hendrik Walmbeek.  
Understanding why the latter became part of this political block has its roots in a dispute of a few years prior 
to the war. During an auction in 1759 Huydecoper verbally abused council Clockener when the latter opted not to pay 
the tendered offer of eight Dutch guilders for the textile from India (salempouris). What specifically occurred was that 
council Clockener went down to the basement of Elmina castle to the warehouse to have a look at what he had 
provisionally bought. Upon visiting the item, he saw that it was rotten and entirely worthless, and subsequently 
retracted his tendered offer.316 Huydecoper who himself had been a character far removed from moral justice, especially 
in his earlier years when he did not pay off his debts, now suddenly wanted to take the high moral road.317 Clockener 
remained steadfast and when eventually the latter did not get the satisfaction of payment, he told council Clockener to 
‘shut his mouth or risk removal from the auction entirely’.318 While some might consider this as an isolated incident, it 
certainly was not the only evidence that could be dug up. Indeed, the very fact that Clockener turned against 
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Huydecoper would equally, if not more so, deal with Huydecoper’s forced economic detriment upon council Clockener. 
From the July 24th document we can infer that Huydecoper at that time still owed a debt in excess of five mark twelve 
English gold and five ounces three English goods of trade (Coopmanschappen) to the councilor.319 Certainly the 
culmination of the above must have factored heavily in his reasoning to vote against Huydecoper’s appropriation as 
president in 1763. 
Now, while the prior two councilors obviously pushed Huydecoper by the wayside due to what must be 
considered as personal dejections, it was not entirely their fault that the latter was surpassed. The very causality upon 
which these men predicated a need for another president actually has its origins in Huydecoper’s own wrongdoings. 
While the personal reason why both of these men could not vote for Huydecoper have been shown above, it must be 
understood that these reasons were only the beginning of the multitude of the arguments why the latter should not be 
elected. One of the more damaging cases presented by the Elmina council was the financial detriment that Huydecoper 
had thwarted upon captain Pieter de Clercq of Zeeland. De Clercq, who had sailed to the Gold Coast and subsequently 
made a contract with Huydecoper in Axim for goods in excess of 20 Ounces of Gold. Huydecoper agreed to fulfill this 
order and promised to send the cargo with the following ship. Nonetheless, nothing of such sorts happened, which 
caused the captain to demand a refund when he had once again returned from Europe. Huydecoper could not comply 
with the captain’s wishes nor provide the captain with his goods, which caused the latter to leave another payment of 
similar value behind in Huydecoper’s care. At the time the council gathered to vote on the next President, Huydecoper 
still had not refunded or delivered the goods to captain de Clercq.320  
Accepting why Huydecoper had such troubles fulfilling the demands and financial obligations of Captain de 
Clercq and a majority of the company officials, should be analysed within the relative context of the time and 
conditions that reigned on the Gold Coast. During the 1760’s trade on the Gold Coast was conditioned by the greater 
African political disputes, especially those of the Asante.321 From numerous sources it was obvious that trade for the 
entire Gold Coast area did not recover until early 1765.322 Axim was hit even harder due to the overbearing impact of 
Amnichia. This lack of trade was as Huydecoper noted largely due to the mismanagement of the region by a few 
incompetent men.323 In order to avoid repeating a large section of chapter 1, it is easiest to conclude that Huydecoper’s 
time at Axim should be reflected as one of personal economic detriment. Within this context, we must understand the 
reasoning why Huydecoper had troubles paying back his creditors. In hindsight, there certainly would be a case for 
Baesjou’s argumentation that Huydecoper started the war simply because: ‘he stood to gain exponentially from the 
wars favorable outcome’.324 Sadly enough proving that point, albeit Huydecoper was in severe debt, is near impossible 
due to the lack of concrete evidence. Due to this limitation we must continue to separate the war from personal expense 
issues, eventhough the temptation to link one another’s causality is great.   
The economic detriment, of which only a small proportion has been covered above, was not the only reason 
that the council did not elect Huydecoper. As aforementioned in the paragraph about David Clockener, Huydecoper had 
a tendicy to lash out at his critics, imparticular those that failed to listen or conform to his standards. Clockener’s 
instance as highlighted by the council was far from the only incident that the council members used to underwrite the 
council’s cause for by passing Huydecoper. The two most explicit examples of Huydecoper’s less than appropriate 
attitude was what he did to Mr. Stephanus Barrevel on the same day as the Clockener incident, and what transpired with 
Mr. Walmbeek.325 Mr. Stephanus Barreveld the boekkeeper (soldy boekhouder), similarly as Clockener during that 
same auction, retracted his bid upon an item. Huydecoper who had previously been irate with Clockener, enacted the 
full verbal brunt of his pentup anger out upon Barreveld, threatening that he would remove him from the room by 
means of ‘throwing him out the window onto the courtyard’ if he did not oblige to shut his mouth.326 While it is 
arguable that Huydecoper’s temper was probably the result of his lust for alcohol, it is obvious that the Elmina 
councilors that highlighted these incidents wanted to show that Huydecoper had not only caused economic detriment, 
but equally disproportionately had abused the power of his office. Thusly, the Clockener, Barreveld and Walmbeek 
incidents as well as numerous other highlighted instances in which Huydecoper had deprived or mistreated the 
company officials were certainly warranted causes for concern of how the man would act in the future if he were to be 
elected president.  
Within the context of the larger picture provided above, the majority of the council members had to make an 
educated decision if they were to supplant Huydecoper’s righteous assension to the presidency. The unanimous ruling, 
in spite of the majority of the Elmina council having no apparent ill feelings towards the latter, almost certainly decrees 
foul play.327 The very fact that council van Bakergem added next to his signature of the document an explanation that 
he did not know of any of Huydecoper’s wrong doings in his previous terms as president, certainly gives the idea that 
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some of the council members were swayed to vote in a certain manner.328 While such accusations cannot be 
corroborated at this time due to a lack of evidence, in all likeliness Huydecoper’s accusation that council Clockener 
mislead if not forced some of the members of the council to change their minds certainly is plausible, if not far from the 
truth at all. This only becomes more apparent when you look at the specific details of the procession document that 
elected Walmbeek, which basically exert that the other councellors had indeed very little reason to vote against 
Huydecoper.  
This picture painted by the Elmina council that a unanimous decision was struck based on the facts provided at 
the meeting, at least if we are to believe Huydecoper, is probably far from the truth. While it is quite easy to understand 
why the directly affected individuals voted against Huydecoper, we are only able to learn from Huydecoper’s rebuttal 
letter of July 27th that several of the other councilors and lesser officials equally had a foregone grudge. Council van 
Bakergem per say, had voted against Huydecoper due to the fears that his trade might suffer under the latter’s 
appointment.329 The reasoning provided by Huydecoper why council Gellis Servaas Galle would attest to the latter’s 
ascension, was in large part based on the prior’s: ‘three years of servitude with the elder Woortman and a subsequent 
marital relation with one of his daughters, which meant that he could in principal not vote against his father in law’.330 
Equally, C.W. Roghe was far from innocent as well, as he probably had based his decision on the premises that 
Huydecoper had previously voted against his appropriation of the accountancy office.331 While in all fairness it 
continues to remain difficult to determine the exact causality behind each councilors vote, largely impart due to the 
limited information, it is obvious that personal interest and some regard to potential benefit equally factored into a large 
majority of the councilors decisions. Nonetheless the possibility of bribery through intimidation, as argued by 
Huydecoper remains possible for the other less politically aligned council members.   
One of the main perpetrators has remained absent from the above section, so that we could analyze him 
separately from the rest of the council due to his direct role in the war. Commies Clock (Klok) who had served along 
side Huydecoper from December 1762 until June 1763, voted against Huydecoper due to unspecified reasons. We base 
the idea that he voted against the latter on the fact that the council had declared that the vote was unanimous. 
Understanding why council Clock voted against Huydecoper remains in large part a mystery, as there is no clear 
explanation or answer for his decision to vote against the latter. We know from latter documentation that Huydecoper 
still considered Clock his friend and ally. More than likely what occurred, baring further inquiry, which could debunk 
this theory, is that council Clock was either blackmailed by the other members or thought fit to vote along with the 
other members on the premise of the information noted about Huydecoper’s actions during his presidency. Regardless 
the theory that the Elmina council might have blackmailed council Clock with the dexterity of his office remains a 
largely unproven theory that should warrant future investigation. Baring the peruse of the possibility of blackmail, we 
have to assume that in all likeliness council Clock as well as councils Simon Bellingen and Claas Rudolphi, simply 
voted along with the aforementioned anti-Huydecoper block in order to prevent any future detrimental actions against 
them.     
The previous paragraphs, which were comprised in this subsection, highlighted the personal reasons why a 
majority of the councilors could not fathom voting Huydecoper to the presidency position. While the culmination of all 
these negative experiences was one of the essential reasons why the council did not elect Huydecoper, the war against 
Cape Appolonia equally played an intriguing role as well. The very nature of the role of the war on Huydecoper’s 
electability can be understood from the council’s following excerpt: ‘…voting for Huydecoper would likely have result 
in a continuation of the war, with him ruling the coast in an autocratic manor, which could spawn new conflicts before 
the old ones were settled.’332 With the idea that the war duration generally had a negative impact upon trade, albeit that 
the council themselves latter said that trade had been better under Erasmi than under Huydecoper, a continuation of the 
war against the Cape Appolonians was thusly on unfavorable terms. If we understand the context behind this 
assessment, than it is obvious that the council blamed Huydecoper directly for the state of the war at that time, and 
indirectly blamed him for the economic detriment that the war had forced upon each character. Given that each man on 
the coast was essentially only motivated by the causes that lead to monetary enrichment, it is quite easy to understand 
why the council wanted to surpass Huydecoper from an economic point of view, as certainly electing the latter would 
have likely resulted in another field march toward Cape Appolonia.   
With careful consideration of all of the abovementioned contexts and under somewhat auspicious conditions, 
the Elmina council voted Walmbeek as their next president on July 24th 1763. Walmbeek’s affirmation of the office of 
president consequently started an argumentative sequence of back and forth arguments about the procedural 
righteousness of the chain of command. Within the context of this sequence, which lasted from July 1763 until 
September 1764, Walmbeek became a key figure in the succession, which eventually led to the total failure of the 
Appolonia war.   
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3.5.2	  President	  Walmbeek	  &	  Consequences	  for	  the	  war	  
 
The surpassing of Huydecoper and the subsequent appropriation of Walmbeek as president had dire 
consequences for the war against Amnichia. This is obvious from the stern start of the Walmbeek presidency, which 
quickly negated any topics of discussion or advancements related to the war. Walmbeek’s short leash approach had dire 
consequence for the war. This is most obvious during late 1763 when the dry season once again commenced. Several 
inquiries were sent by Huydecoper to Elmina reiterating the necessity to continue the war before Amnichia could fully 
recover and rebuild his defenses.333 Huydecoper, who was still keen on the idea of being directly involved in the war, 
deemed that if Amnichia was given ample time to recover that a voyage against the latter would once again be severely 
burdensome for the WIC.334 While Huydecoper’s assessment seems more than justifiable, the profuse arguments feel on 
deaf ears. Numerous times Walmbeek and the Elmina council gracefully thanked Huydecoper for his concerns, and 
instructed the latter to remain idle and pursue no further actions.  
The continual denial of Huydecoper’s advancements about the war would at first glance indicate that 
Walmbeek wanted no part in the war. This idea is of course far from the truth, because Walmbeek had in the year prior 
to Huydecoper’s arrival at Axim approached Amon Ndofu if he was willing to attack Amnichia.335 Walmbeek with the 
approval of the Elmina council had in fact opted to pursue the war as he had originally foreseen it in 1760, by relying 
on Amon Ndofu and other parties that had since aligned themselves against Amnichia. While in some regard this 
methodology could be viewed as little change from the Huydecoper method, Walmbeek and the Elmina Council now 
favored a less financially vested hands off approach. This meant that the West India Company was only to provide the 
necessary materials at considerably reduced price, while leaving the Africans in charge of their own problems and 
coalition building. This change in direction from a hands on to a hands off policy, carried a plethora negative setbacks 
for the West India Company.   
The foremost of these negative reactions was the African inaptitude and the subsequent results of the actual 
war. From numerous letters sent throughout the Walmbeek presidency we can deduce that little progress was actually 
made in ousting Amnichia. This phenomenon can be blamed on the war strategy chosen by Walmbeek. While 
Baesjou’s conviction that Huydecoper wanted to continue the war seems accurate, the change in strategy by entrusting 
the war to Amon Ndofu was largely Walmbeek’s construct and not that ushered by Huydecoper.336 Huydecoper more 
than probably would have wanted to go on another field march once the dry season commenced yet again. This is 
obvious in the following excerpt:     
 
“In regard to the war, I (Huydecoper) can only say that nothing can be as damaging or shameful as the actions 
undertaken by the coastal government, whilst the dry season has almost come and gone again. Without that, men 
pursued something from our side of Cape Appolonia to engage said man in battle or conclude a peace to end the 
war. Men await the field march of Amon Ndofu against Amnichia, which according to native costumes could 
take a longtime before it is actively pursued. Even then the result could be far from what we expect. Amnichia 
has suffered extensively this past year, that he has been unable to undertake any actions against us. Thus we 
should have nothing to fear of Amnichia will to cause us much harm. …Their approach will put the company at a 
disadvantage and will let the opportunity slip to restore her name and glory.” 337    
 
Consequently relying on Amon Ndofu, despite Prehuyzen’s continual promises and a report that upward of 
11000 men were ready for war against Amnichia, caused the war to stagnate entirely.338 Now why Amon Ndofu did not 
attack, was due to a relayed message from the Asante who had sent a messenger to Aowin instructing the latter to 
inform Amon Ndofu not to march on Amnichia.339 This action of course had grave consequences for the war, as the 
coalition troops had sworn an oath to march out again when official word came that Amon Ndofu had made his way 
onto the battlefield. Relying on Amon Ndofu’s word, similarly as it had been throughout 1762-1764, thus bore no fruit. 
If anything, the only result that came of it was that endless frustrations with not only Prehuyzen, but also within the 
council chambers.    
Another consequence of Walmbeek’s war strategy was that the English actually gained a foothold on Cape 
Appolonia by as early as July 1764. 340 At that time it was obvious that the only way the Dutch could save Cape 
Appolonia from falling into British hands, was by negotiating a peace with Amnichia or by defeating him outright in 
battle. The Elmina council opted for the first, but what exactly happened to that end remains unknown, as the archives 
does not reveal if the July 15th expedition was actually ever appropriated for its intended cause, due to recent hostile 
                                                            
333 See: NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 964, Axim Correspondence, dates August-October.  
334 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 929, January 24th 1764, Letter Cmd. Huydecoper to Meeting Lord X, subsection 55, Folio: 194F-195R.  
335 See Chapter 1, section 1.3.  
336 Baesjou, Trade Conflicts in Eighteenth-Century Western Gold Coast, and the Formation of the Nzema State, 36.  
337 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 929, January 24th 1764, Letter Cmd. Huydecoper to Meeting Lord X, subsection 55, Folio: 194F-195R.  
338 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 929, December 10th 1763,  Letter Pres. Walmbeek to Chamber Amsterdan, subsection 46, Folio: 164F-166R.  
339 Baesjou, Trade Conflicts in Eighteenth-Century Western Gold Coast, and the Formation of the Nzema State, 36.  
340 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 115, July 15th 1764, Letter Pres. Walmbeek to Lord X, Folio: 754F. 
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developments.341 From the subsequent sequence of events, it is accurate to say that the Dutch had been unsuccessful at 
their attempts to contact Amnichia. Now what role the British played in this, if any, remains relatively unknown. It is 
fair to assess based on what Baesjou noted of the Dutch attempts to accord peace with Amnichia in 1767, that it was not 
unlike the British to intervene in this and subsequent processes as well.342  
Consequently by the time Huydecoper was restored as head of the coast by the Lord X (European council), 
which was no later than September 10th 1764, it was too little to late to restart a war that had been dormant for sixteen 
months. Eventhough changes were mandated by Lord X, the reshuffle of several men from positions, promoting one 
and stripping another of their title, the events that transpired during the Walmbeek presidency were simply irreversible. 
During these months, several things including the death of Mea Teyke, pending construction at Cape Appolonia by the 
English, and rumors of an Asante war, changed the political landscape of the war drastically.343 The reshuffled WIC 
Gold Coast government was unwilling to look beyond these impending problems. It is quite understandable why this 
occurred as only two characters were removed from the Elmina council. Walmbeek understandably left the company, 
as he was no longer interested due to the recent developments.344 Clockener was stripped of his role in the Elmina 
council, but continued to serve as master of works until his sudden death in November. With several other small 
changes, it would seem that all was in good order to move forward from the previous political debacle. Indeed, 
Huydecoper who had been victimized by the Elmina council and several other men, was willing to renew his 
professional relationship and work towards the common good.345 Their renewed commitment to serve the common 
good of the West India Company uniformly lasted no longer than forty-five days.  
Bickering about the necessity of the war began no latter than early November. The Elmina council so it seems, 
was no longer interested in continuing the war. This idea of course was no new phenomenon as several similar warning 
had in the prior years come and gone. This time however, as is obvious in the councilor’s letters, something needed to 
be done to resolve the issue of the war. Whilst Huydecoper was adamant for another field march, council Pieter 
Woortman specifically noted of the native situation that ‘the only way to get those Africans to undertake another field 
march would be by force of arms’.346 Council Fennekol, quite the skeptic of African loyalty, went well beyond simply 
highlighting the African unwillingness for another field march, as he not only questioned what the acts of alignment 
(jurament) actually meant to the Africans, but equally raised concerns of the practice of hostage giving.347 Several 
meetings would pass before the impasse would be overcome. This happened on December 5th when Huydecoper opted 
to remove himself from the situation, leaving it up to the other councilors to do what they deemed fit.348 On December 
15th 1764 the Elmina council formally ended the war, due to the threat of English invasion of Cape Appolonia and the 
continued unwillingness of the Africans to pursue another fieldmarch. This document specifically noted that ‘the 
Elmina Council had decided to no longer continue the war against Amnichia, opting instead to seek peace with said 
man if he was so inclined.’349  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
341 Valsecchi, Power and State Formation in West Africa, 188.  
342 Baesjou, Trade Conflicts in Eighteenth-Century Western Gold Coast, and the Formation of the Nzema State, 38.   
343 Valsecchi, Power and State Formation in West Africa, 187-188. 
344 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 115, September 24th 1764, Letter Walmbeek to Elmina Council, Folio: 884F-885F. 
345 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 115, September 24th 1764, Letter Elmina Council to Lord X, Folio: 875F-876F. 
346 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 116, November 21st 1764, Letter Cmd. Woortman to Elmina Council, Folio: 19F-20F. 
347 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 116, November 21st 1764, Letter Cmd. Fennekol to Elmina Council, Folio: 27F-30F. 
348 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 929, December 14th 1764,  Elmina Council to Lord X , subsection 120, Folio 352R. 
349 NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 116, December 15th 1764, Letter Elmina Council to Chamber Amsterdam, Folio: 14F-15F. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 “War itself is a type of text – a violent attempt to ‘tell a story’ or to ‘cut in on the conversation’ of others from 
whose company the belligerents feel excluded. Understanding was as text and discourse is not an intellectual 
affectation, but a vital necessity, because only when ‘war talk’ is fully comprehended is it possible for 
conciliators to outline other more pacific options in softer tones.”350   
 
At the beginning of this inquiry we asked ourselves several key questions about the events surrounding the 
WIC-Appolonia war. While we have had the joy of reading the inquiries made by Baesjou and Valsecchi, neither men 
could specifically tell us what happened during this engagement. Valsecchi explicitly said that the war was a ‘complex 
assault with artillery backup’.351 This lack of information, about how and why the Dutch West India Company was 
defeated, has left an open door for further analysis. With this in mind, the inquiry that followed took us from the early 
beginnings of the dispute between Amnichia and Mea Teyke, all the way through to the peace resolution of December 
1764, at times reflecting back several years to provide a deeper understanding for certain issues.  
The findings of this research clearly indicated that the failure of the war was based on numerous factors. These 
factors included: politics, economics, time management, strategy or lack thereof, material issues, the natural elements, 
and last but not least, insubordination. The numerous factors made it especially difficult to consign blame of the failure 
of the war to a particular party or issue, as everything was interconnected. Obviously, if we were to have blamed a 
singular entity without having done the politically contextual background research, than Huydecoper would be the 
target of everyone’s inflictions. Huydecoper, who we are to perceive as a man of excellence and commitment, was far 
removed from being the appropriate individual to lead the battle against Amnichia. Having had no real military training, 
aside from a standard soldier role in the army, Huydecoper had no real prior European or African war experience to 
consult. This fact leads to several key mistakes that caused further delays, which in turn prompted the Africans to start 
haggling Huydecoper for a return voyage to Axim. While usually the commander in charge of a battle received the 
brunt of its success or failure, doing so with Huydecoper is rather problematic. This is in large part due to the fact that 
he never really had any autocratic control over his troops. Authority so it would seem was not centrally located but 
dispersed among several fractions.  
Despite not being able to accurately determine a singular entity to which to attribute the failure, several other 
questions did receive an enduring answer. For instances the war against Amnichia was entirely justifiable, as the latter 
had structurally misbehaved himself by attacking Mea Tekye and subsequently Axim itself. Equally what happened and 
how it happened was clearly covered in chapter two. The causality of why the war failed revealed that there were 
various reasons and a variety of possible answers. The conviction of the other authors quite understandably ventured 
down the path of blaming Huydecoper, as none paid any particular attention to the inter-European tensions or the actual 
power struggle in the Elmina council throughout Huydecoper’s residence on the Gold Coast. Furthermore, Baesjou’s 
and Valsecchi’s consignment that Huydecoper had ‘pinned his hopes for victory over Amnichia on Amon Ndofu’ after 
his return from the battlefield, seems equally misguided.352 This is obvious in the numerous letters sent by Huydecoper 
throughout 1763 and 1764, which clearly indicate that he was for the continuation of the war by entertaining the use of 
another field march.  
Tactically speaking, albeit little attention was given to this in the forgone chapters, Amnichia ability to use his 
landscape not only as a defensive weapon but also as an offensive weapon, much along the lines as those employed 
later by the RUF in Sierra Leone, essentially allowed him to prevail.353 The resemblance of the actions used by 
Amnichia and those by the RUF clearly reveal that the African military practice had changed little over the course of 
three centuries. This similarity could antiquate Thornton’s assessment that ‘African armies no longer fought wars like 
(as) their ancestors did’.354 Certainly a future detailed comparative analysis of the tactics employed during this battle 
and those employed by the RUF in Sierra Leone during the 1990’s and the Mau Mau in Kenya during the 1950’s will 
almost certainly reveal that African warfare is much more an evolution than a revolution. Equally Thornton’s 
preemptive assessment that figures such as Jan Konny were rare in the later periods, would probably have to be 
adjusted somewhat, as certainly Amnichia had become the next Jan Konny that Huydecoper warned everyone about in 
1761.355 Likewise, a future comparative study between the Kommenda war and the Cape Appolonia war could reveal 
the tactical differences of each time frame.   
Notably, as with all research, time and writing space is a researchers worst nightmare. It should be noted that, 
eventhough the WIC had formally brought an end to the war in December 1764, many more problems would arise out 
of this case. For instances, throughout 1765-1766 minor skirmishes between African factions continued to plague 
Axim. The English invasion in 1765 became a substantial problem for the Dutch, who would argue that the English had 
                                                            
350 Richards, Paul, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone, XXIV 
351 Valsecchi, Power and State Formation in West Africa, 187.  
352 Ibid, 187.   Also see: Baesjou, Trade Conflicts in Eighteenth-Century Western Gold Coast, and the Formation of the Nzema State, 36.  
353 Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone, XXVII- XXV 
354 Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa 1500-1800, 16. 
355 Ibid, 67.  
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infringed upon their territory. Out of this infringement, Fort Appolonia at Benyin arose during the late 1760’s as the 
English were trying to claim their right through building a fort in the region. Much to Dutch frustration, the English 
also intervened in the peace consignment plans with Amnichia throughout the 1760’s, which cut off the option to 
undercut the English and potentially endanger the construction of the aforementioned fort.356 All in all, the case grew 
larger and larger, eventually making its way into the treaty of Paris that was signed nearly twenty-three years on from 
the invasion of Edwira. Further analysis of this case is direly needed as we have yet to reveal what role the English 
actually played during the timeframe described here. Certainly if one was to approach the topic exclusively from 
English sources, which may still reveal Amnichia’s take on what occurred, it is quite possible that some more details of 
the war might be divulged. What this inquiry will not do is change the results of the war or influence any of the 
argumentation above, aside from adding that the English were potentially supporting Amnichia against the Dutch. 
Equally omitted from this research, was an in-depth look at Amon Ndofu and Jan Prehuyzen. Certainly future research 
into the role of the caboceer from Assinée and his WIC officer could create a greater understanding of what occurred on 
the Western flank of Cape Appolonia, whilst the Dutch were pursuing war on the Eastern flank.  
The lasting memory of the WIC-Cape Appolonia war of 1761-1764, is the blame game cycle. This essentially 
is a continuously revolving circle that consigns blame to numerous issues and individuals. Blaming Huydecoper for 
instances, about his late dispatch on to the battlefield, we should then equally blame the events that facilitated this to 
have occurred. Thus, the African unwillingness throughout February and March, as well as the soft-handed approach by 
Director General Erasmi during the same time span, essentially should receive the blame for this delay. The blame 
cycle of course would not end there, as the continual blame displacement would eventually trickle back to the very 
methodology by which Elmina pursued the war. The only thing thus that can be permanently deduced from this is that 
the Elmina Council, the Africans of the WIC coalition, Huydecoper, and Amnichia himself, were the four primary 
groups or individuals responsible for the failure of the invasion of Cape Appolonia.     
 
 
                                                            
356 Baesjou, Trade Conflicts in Eighteenth-Century Western Gold Coast, and the Formation of the Nzema State, 38-41.   
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: the alignment of the coalition throughout the early war phases (Yellow=Neutral)  Green=WIC coalition  Red=deserter) 
Invasion of Edwira Invasion of Axim Invasion of Asenda 
(January) 
Invasion of 
Appolonia (March) 
Ano Aka - Edwira Ano Aka - Edwira Ano Aka - Edwira Ano Aka - Edwira 
Mea Tekye - Edwira Mea Tekye - Edwira Mea Tekye - Edwira Mea Tekye - Edwira 
Bekoa Ano (Bekwaw) 
& Mozu 
Bekoa Ano (Bekwaw) 
& Mozu 
Bekoa Ano (Bekwaw) 
& Mozu 
Bekoa Ano (Bekwaw) 
& Mozu 
(Dutch forts Ahanta) 
Akwida (Accoda) 
Axim 
Butri 
Elmina 
Hollandia 
Komenda 
Sekondi 
Takoradi 
Boa Panyin of 
Nvavile 
King Entier 
(Entsir) of Busua  
 
(Dutch forts Ahanta) 
Akwida (Accoda) 
Axim 
Butri 
Elmina 
Hollandia 
Komenda 
Sekondi 
Takoradi 
Boa Panyin of 
Nvavile 
King Entier 
(Entsir) of Busua  
 
(Dutch forts Ahanta) 
Akwida (Accoda) 
Axim 
Butri 
Elmina 
Hollandia 
Komenda 
Sekondi 
Takoradi 
Boa Panyin of 
Nvavile 
King Entier 
(Entsir) of Busua  
 
(Dutch forts Ahanta) 
Akwida (Accoda) 
Axim 
Butri 
Elmina 
Hollandia 
Komenda 
Sekondi 
Takoradi 
Boa Panyin of 
Nvavile 
King Entier 
(Entsir) of Busua  
 
Asare Abrampa - 
Wassa 
Asare Abrampa - 
Wassa 
Asare Abrampa - 
Wassa 
Asare Abrampa - 
Wassa 
Ntiakon (Entjakon)– 
Aowin 
Ntiakon (Entjakon)– 
Aowin 
Ntiakon (Entjakon)– 
Aowin 
Ntiakon (Entjakon)– 
Aowin 
Enimil - Wassa Enimil - Wassa Enimil - Wassa Enimil - Wassa 
Warlord of Sanwi Warlord of Sanwi Warlord of Sanwi Warlord of Sanwi 
Awazi Panin of Enkyi 
- Aowin 
Awazi Panin of Enkyi 
- Aowin 
Awazi Panin of Enkyi 
- Aowin 
Awazi Panin of Enkyi 
- Aowin 
Amon Amon Ndofu – Issinée Amon Ndofu – Issinée Amon Ndofu – 
Issinée 
Amon Ndofu – Issinée 
Sources: NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 962-964, Axim Correspondence, 1761-1763. Also see: Baesjou, Trade Conflicts in Eighteenth-
Century Western Gold Coast, and the Formation of the Nzema State, 33-35.  ,  Valsecchi, Power and State formation in West Africa, 183-186. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Military Personnel employed by the WIC in Africa (322 Total) 
Number of Employed Qualification 
1 Ensign 
1 Gunner 
24 Sergeants 
16 Corporals  
8 Navel Cadets 
11 Cadets 
3 Famboers 
3 Horn Blowers (Pypers) 
211 Soldiers 
Sources: NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 115, December 1st 1763, call roll  
of WIC personnel, Folio: 772F. 
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Table 3: List of people stationed at Axim during 1763 (Probably all employed in the war efforts in some regard) 
Name Rank Place of Origin 
J.P.T. Huydecoper    Commander Ft. Axim & Senior 
Commissioner in Elmina Council  
Hellevoet Sluys 
Harnout Paaling   Assistant Amsterdam 
Hart van der kolff Assistant Woudrichem 
Hans Adam Hasselaar    Sergeant Asleggen 
Hendrik Gryp   Sergeant  Amsterdam 
Jan Heuvelman   Cotton planter & Ass’t Grenadier Bergen op Zoom    
Johan Augar Corporal Stum 
Gerrit Carbo   Corporal  Utrecht 
Jan Hendrik Temper    Constapel Hirschveld 
Martinus Lutherus   Adelborst Amsterdam 
Matthys de Gietere   Cadet Elmina 
Jan Sprogel   Cadet Elmina 
Pieter Janse Oly    Soldier Sardam (Lardam) 
Joseph Rouse Soldier Malbeau 
Louis Courtelle    Soldier Dumas 
Jan Franken   Soldier deventer 
Jean Fares    Soldier Lyon 
Thomas Beuman   Soldier Larbroek  
Philip Hillebrand   Soldier Doornrek 
Joseph Teljee    Bombardier/Grenadier Brussel 
Francois Pallewaar   Soldier Naamen 
Francois Couter   Soldier Doffinee 
Carel Marjon Soldier Cortuur 
Francis Allee Soldier Brussel 
Pieter Paul    Soldier Barcelona 
Pieter Rok   Soldier Brussel 
Pieter Christoffel    Soldier Vryburg (Freiburg) 
Laurens van den Blook   Soldier Euvres 
Francois Bourgon    Soldier Champagne 
Johan Herman Tient     Soldier Hirschveld 
Estienne Rousset      Soldier Derne 
Christiaan Meyer   Soldier Frankendaal 
Jacques David Soldier Rochelle 
Philippe Boudun   Soldier Mentz 
Jean Barbeau   Soldier Neuff Chateau 
Gabriel Faber   Soldier Montegu 
Johan Martin Schik    Soldier de Paltz 
Anthony Hoesen   Soldier Accoda 
Martin Hoesen   Soldier Saccondee 
Abraham Isaac   Soldier Cormantyn 
Andries Nagtegal    Soldier Axim 
Jan Gomes    Soldier Axim 
Matthys From   Soldier Elmina 
Jan Nassauw    Soldier Mouree 
Jan Castares    Soldier Elmina 
Jan Mankholt    Soldier Elmina 
Anthony du Clou    Soldier Taccorary 
Sources: NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 115, December 1st 1763, General Monster Roll of WIC Personnel, Folio: 766F.   
 
 
Table 3: European War related deaths in 1763 (All in Axim) 
Date of Death Name Rank Place of Origin 
January 25th Jean Laurent Soldier Viancourt 
February 23rd Jacob Ratsma Senior Surgeon Harlingen 
April 7th Rene Persau Soldier La Ferte 
May 1st   Charles Carel Soldier Fion Ville 
May 19th Marin du Fresne Soldier Champagne 
May 19th Piere Varon Soldier Certiene 
Sources:  NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 492, April 8th 1763, List of people passing on the Coast of Guinea, Folio: 205F. & Folio: 239F.  
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Table 4: Company Officials by Rank at years end 1763 
Rank Occupancy: Function Name Duty Location 
1 President  Hendrik Walmbeek Elmina 
2 Netherlands reformed Christian minister Dominus Verbeet Elmina 
3  Fiscal Willem Sulyard van Leefdaal Elmina 
4 Senior Commissioner & Counsel Jan Pieter Theodore Huydecoper Axim 
5 Commissioner Counsel & Ad Interim 
Master of Works 
Daniel Clockener Trains Volkeren 
6 Ad Interim Commissioner Counsel Cornelis Clock (Klok) Saccondee 
7 Commissioners for Trade 
 
Pieter Woortman  
Jan Christiaan Fennekol 
Accra 
Elmina 
8 Secretary Commissioner Gilles Servaas Gallé Secretary 
9 Bookkeeper Nicolaas van Bakergem  General Comptoir 
10 Ad Interim Paymaster-general C. Rudolphi Soldy Comptoir 
11 First Secretary Clerk  Adriaan Ras Secretary 
12 Ad Interim First Secretary Clerk  Cornelis Verhaagen Secretary 
13 Sub-commissioners Adriaan Bernard Bols 
Arnoldus Dedens Papo 
Jacobus van der Peuye 
Jan Jacob Montauban 
Gerardus de Korte 
Abraham Nicolaas Testas 
Abraham van Loon 
Jan Woortman 
Jacobus van Gilst  
Johan Michiel Nieser  
Jan Jacob Schadee  
General Comptoir 
Pocquesoe (Hollandia)  
Accoda 
Boutry 
Taccorary 
Commany 
Mouree 
Cormantyn 
Apam 
Bercou 
Accra 
Sources: NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 115, Folio: 762-772. 
 
Table 5: Company Officials by Rank at years end 1764 
Rank Occupancy: Function Name Duty Location 
1 Director General  Jan Pieter Theodore Huydecoper Elmina 
2 Netherlands reformed Christian minister Dominus Verbeet (request dismissal 
23 October not approved) 
Elmina 
3  Fiscal & Counsel Willem Sulyard van Leefdaal Elmina 
4 Senior Commissioners & Counsel Pieter Woortman 
Cornelis Clock (Klok)  
Accra 
Chama 
5 Commissioner for Trade Abraham van Loon Boutry 
6 Commissioner & Counsel Jan Christiaan Fennekol Axim 
7 Commissioners Arnoldus Dedens Papo 
Jacobus van der Peuye 
Gilles Servaas Gallé 
Jacobus van Gilst  
G. D. Kort  
Accoda 
Taccorary 
Sacconde  
Apam 
Bercou 
8 Master of Works 
Paymaster-general 
Daniel Clockener (dies 23 Oct.) 
C.W. Roghé 
Trains Volkeren (Elmina) 
9 Secretary Commissioner Cornelis Verhagen  Secretary 
10 Bookkeeper Nicolaas van Bakergem  General Comptoir 
11 Ad Interim Paymaster-general C. Rudolphi Soldy Comptoir 
12 First Secretary Clerk Arnout Paling Secretary 
13 Sub-commissioners Gerardus de Korte 
Adriaan Bernard Bols 
C.H Aukema 
Jan Woortman 
Jan Jacob Schadee  
Hendrik Berkhuysen 
Abraham Nicolaas Testas 
Taccorary 
Commany 
Mouree 
Cormantyn 
Accra 
Pocquesoe (Hollandia)  
Commany 
Sources: NL-HaNA,WIC, 1.05.01.02, inv.nr. 115, Folio: 866-883. 
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